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"WE ARE THE PEOPLE": ALIEN SUFFRAGE
IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVE
Gerald L. Neuman*
INTRODUCTION
The Gulf War and its aftermath have intermittently focused U.S.
attention on the difficult path of democracy in Kuwait. Demands for
powersharing have strong rhetorical appeal in this era of democratiza-
tion, although in Kuwait they may actually represent the reassertion
of a merchant oligarchy.' Yet even in the unlikely event that the gov-
ernment moves beyond powersharing to universal citizen suffrage irre-
spective of gender, a large proportion of Kuwait's population would
still be left out of the political process. These excluded residents are
aliens, usually "guestworkers" or refugees and their families, including
many who were born in the country. 2 Prior to the war, they formed a
majority of the population; since that time, retaliation against Palestin-
ian residents has reduced their numbers. 3
Western conceptions of democracy are quite equivocal about the
political status of noncitizen residents. The historical, if not logical,
interrelationships among the ideals of democracy, popular sovereignty
and nationhood have made it seem legitimate to withhold voting rights
from alien residents. This restriction of democracy sparks little polit-
ical controversy in the United States at present, although academics
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Harvard College, A.B. (1973);
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Ph.D. (1977); Harvard University, J.D. (1980). I owe
diverse thanks for the help of Alex Aleinikoff, Nadine Baker-Barrett, Barbara Black, Richard
Briffault, Lori Damrosch, Erhard Denninger, Lani Guinier, Louis Henkin, Daniel Kanstroom,
Seth Kreimer, Friedrich Kibler, Howard Lesnick, David Martin, Henry Monaghan, Jamin Ras-
kin, Peter Schuck, and Manfred Weiss, and extra thanks to Ed Baker for patient rereadings. The
errors are fewer, and all the more mine.
1. See, e.g., John Kifner, Power Struggle in Kuwait Blocks New Government, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 31, 1991, at Al.
2. See, e.g., id.; JACQUELINE S. ISMAEL, KUWAIT: SOCIAL CHANGE IN HISTORICAL PER-
SPECTIVE 117-18 (1982); Nasra M. Shah, Foreign Workers in Kuwait: Implications for the
Kuwaiti Labor Force, 20 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 815 (1986). Although percentages differ from
country to country, high proportions of resident aliens are typical of the small oil states of the
Gulf. See, e.g., Georges Sabagh, Immigrants in the Arab Gulf Countries 'Sojourners' or 'Set-
tlers'?, in THE POLITICS OF ARAB INTEGRATION (Giacomo Luciani & Ghassan Salam6 eds.,
1988).
3. See Chris Hedges, A Year Later, Kuwait Sinks into Malaise, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1991, at
Al. The government reportedly plans to limit the use of foreign workers in the future so that
Kuwaitis will no longer be a numerical minority. Id. at A6.
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occasionally question it, and sometimes point out that aliens had full
voting rights in many of the states until the 1920s. 4 In recent years,
the more controversial issues have concerned the extension of this re-
striction to the exclusion of aliens from public employment, which has
been defended on the same basis.5 The status of alien residents is no
doubt mitigated by the easy availability of naturalization in the United
States, and by the conferral of citizenship on children born to alien
parents within its territory - thejus soli principle. Nonetheless, alien
suffrage exists in some U.S. municipalities, and alien suffrage may be
reentering the political agenda in the wake of a well-publicized refer-
endum victory in a Maryland town.6
In Western Europe, in contrast, alien suffrage has been a live polit-
ical issue for decades. Resident aliens form a substantial percentage of
the population of various nations, and proposals to improve their
political rights have been actively considered at the national level, at
the European Community level, and in the Council of Europe. Several
countries have granted alien residents the right to vote in local elec-
tions, sometimes by constitutional amendment.
The question of alien suffrage has proven particularly controversial
in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), which has a large popula-
tion of former guestworkers and their descendants. A constitutional
dispute took shape in terms that may seem counterintuitive to U.S.
readers. Opponents of the proposals charged that legislation granting
resident aliens the right to vote would be unconstitutional because it
would violate the principle of popular sovereignty expressed in a con-
stitutional declaration that "[a]ll state authority emanates from the
people." Far from a fringe position, this claim was vindicated by the
FRG's Federal Constitutional Court in the fall of 1990, when it invali-
dated statutes of two states granting certain resident aliens the right to
vote in local elections.
By coincidence, the West German court's deliberations on this
controversy spanned the tumultuous year in which the residents of
East Germany asserted their own popular sovereignty. What began as
a democratization movement under the slogan "Wir sind das Volk" -
"We are the People" - shifted into a call for national unification
under the slogan "Wir sind ein Volk" - "We are one People." Un-
fortunately, the initial consequence of economic merger with the
wealthy neighbor was mass unemployment in the East; this in turn
4. See infra notes 223-64 and accompanying text.
5. Compare, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) with id. at 447 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
6. See infra notes 265, 267.
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unleashed a violent refusal to share with resident foreigners that con-
veyed a different message: Only we are the people. 7
The vulnerability of resident aliens to xenophobic outbreaks con-
firms their need for protection within the political process. Including
them in the process would not necessarily cure the problem. But is
even that partial solution barred by democratic principles? Or does
the issue of alien suffrage illustrate a divergence between German and
U.S. conceptions of democracy?
This article will explore the constitutional debate over alien suf-
frage in the FRG, both for its own interest and in order to compare it
with understandings of alien suffrage in the United States. As the in-
terdependence of national economies deepens and regional "common
market" arrangements multiply, more nations (including the United
States) may be called upon to rethink the question of alien suffrage.
The thoroughness and the explicitness with which the German legal
community has debated this issue has brought to the surface argu-
ments and assumptions that remain latent in U.S. commentary on the
political status of aliens. Thus, the German dispute and its resolution
not only mark a stage in the evolution of nationalism and unification
in Europe, but illuminate the place of aliens in political theory and
legal thought.
I. THE ALIEN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT IN THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
This Part will give an account of the alien suffrage debate in the
FRG. The first two sections (A and B) provide some historical and
institutional background for understanding the vigorous argumenta-
tion in the German legal community on the constitutionality of alien
suffrage. This argumentation is recounted in section C. I describe the
Federal Constitutional Court's analysis in its twin decisions invalidat-
ing the alien suffrage laws in section D, and comment on the decisions'
significance against the background of the preceding debate and other
contemporary events in section E.
A. Bits of Background
The movement for alien suffrage grew out of two linked phenom-
ena in postwar Germany, the consolidation of the European Commu-
nity and the long-term settlement of foreign guestworkers. Between
1961 and 1973, the FRG engaged in massive recruitment of foreign
7. See, e.g., Schon nahe am Pogrom, DER SPIEGEL, Apr. 2, 1990, at 98; Stephen Kinzer, A
Wave of Attacks on Foreign Migrants Ignites German Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1991, at Al.
Winter 1992]
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workers, principally from Mediterranean countries.8 By 1973, when
recruitment from outside the European Community was halted, nearly
four million aliens resided in the FRG.9 Although many members of
this population have since returned to their home countries, most have
not, and their numbers have increased through births and through the
immigration of absent family members.' 0 Because German law makes
nationality dependent on parentage and not on place of birth, the
FRG's population now includes multiple generations of resident
aliens. I I
Officially, the FRG has viewed itself as "not a country of immigra-
tion." 12 Foreign labor was sought in the form of "guestworkers," who
were expected to reside temporarily in the FRG and not to settle. 13
Unlike the United States, where workers who intend to reside indefi-
nitely must usually seek permission for permanent residence, the FRG
extended residence permits to new foreign workers in limited time in-
crements, subject to discretionary renewal by alien control agencies. 14
This time-limited residence permit was the most common form of offi-
cial permission to reside; under stricter qualifications an alien might
eventually be granted a residence permit without time limit, or a more
protective "residence entitlement."' 5 Also unlike the United States,
where nearly all permanent residents become eligible for naturaliza-
tion as of right after five years, the FRG treated naturalization as an
extraordinary privilege, to be granted or withheld in the discretion of
the alien control agencies. 16 Ordinary guestworker families were dis-
8. See, e.g., Hartmut Esser & Hermann Korte, Federal Republic of Germany, in EUROPEAN
IMMIGRATION POLICIES 165, 170-72 (Tomas Hammar ed., 1985).
9. Id. at 171-73. Of the major sending countries, only Italy was an EEC member in 1973;
Greece, Portugal, and Spain joined later, and Turkey and Yugoslavia are still nonmembers.
10. Id. at 173. The resident alien population was also substantially increased in the period
since 1978 by an influx of asylum seekers. See Marilyn Hoskin & Roy C. Fitzgerald, German
Immigration Policy and Politics, in THE GATEKEEPERS: COMPARATIVE IMMIGRATION POLICY
95, 104-05 (Michael C. LeMay ed., 1989).
11. See, e.g., Kay Hailbronner, Citizenship and Nationhood in Germany, in IMMIGRATION
AND THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 67, 77 (William R.
Brubaker ed., 1989).
12. See, e.g., Esser & Korte, supra note 7, at 189.
13. See, e.g., id. at 172-73, 179.
14. See Hoskin & Fitzgerald, supra note 9, at 100; Gerald L. Neuman, Immigration and
Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of Germany, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 35, 41-42
(1990).
15. See Neuman, supra note 13, at 42-43. European Community nationals have more gener-
ous residence rights as a result of Community law, and are subject to a somewhat different regu-
latory regime. Id. at 45.
16. See Hailbronner, supra note 10, at 67-70; Neuman, supra note 13, at 44. Special rules
govern naturalization of recognized asylees and spouses of German citizens, but these still pre-
serve administrative discretion. See Hailbronner, supra note 10, at 70.
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couraged from seeking naturalization during the 1970s and 1980s.17
The result of this process has been the de facto immigration of a
large permanent population of aliens, whose relative size has been ac-
centuated by the low birth rate among Germans.' 8 Prior to the unifi-
cation of Germany in October 1990,19 resident aliens comprised more
than seven percent of the population of the FRG,20 and two or three
times that percentage in most of the largest cities.2' The living condi-
tions of the alien population and their relations with the German pop-
ulation have long been regarded as serious social problems. 22 Cultural
and religious differences have made the large Turkish population - by
far the largest group, constituting one-third of the 4.5 million foreign
residents 23 - particular targets of rejection and discrimination. 24 In
this environment, alien suffrage has been praised as a means for the
better "integration" of alien residents into German society as well as
for increasing the responsiveness of government to their needs in edu-
cation, housing, and social services. 25
At the same time the FRG was coming to recognize the de facto
17. See, e.g., Hailbronner, supra note 10, at 69-70; Hoskin & Fitzgerald, supra note 9, at 101.
The new Aliens Act passed in 1990 creates certain windows of opportunity in which the former
guestworkers and their children, and more generally aliens who have grown up in the FRG, are
presumptively eligible for naturalization. Bertold Huber, Des neue Ausldnderrecht, 9 NEUE
ZETSCHRIFT FOR VERWALTUNGSRECHT [NVwZ] 1113, 1121 (1990); Neuman, supra note 13,
at 44 n.50.
18. See Esser & Korte, supra note 8, at 176. In using the expression "de facto immigration,"
I do not mean to imply an unlawful status, but rather to reflect the fact that later developments
belied the official expectation that the workers would remain in the FRG so long as they were
needed yet would not settle there.
19. At least prior to unification, the resident alien population in East Germany was much
lower. See Hanns Thomii-venske, Notizen zur Situation der Ausldnder in der DDR, 1990 ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDERRECHT UND AUSL.NDERPOLITIK [ZAR] 125, 126 (citing official esti-
mate of roughly 200,000 resident aliens in East Germany). Alien suffrage in local elections was
introduced in East Germany in March 1989, apparently in response to the enfranchisement of
aliens in Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein, and then was reenacted by the post-Communist gov-
ernment. See Zschalich, Kommunales Wahlrecht fiir Ausldnder - Erfahrungen und Probleme
nach zwei Kommunalwahlen in der DDR, 1990 ZAR 163. The German unification treaty speci-
fied that the continuation of alien suffrage in the new eastern states would depend on the outcome
of the litigation then pending before the Federal Constitutional Court. See Sighart LUrler, Das
dffentliche Recht im Einigungsvertrag, 10 NVwZ 133, 134 (1991).
20. See STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT, STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH 1990 FOR DIE
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 59 (1990) (4.4891 million, or 7.3% of total population as of
Dec. 31, 1988).
21. See DEUTSCHER STADTETAG, STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH DEUTSCHER GEMEINDEN 36
(1988) (Dec. 31, 1987 figures). In order of population: West Berlin, 13.9%; Hamburg, 10.2%;
Munich, 16.6%; Cologne, 15.6%; Essen, 6.4%; Frankfurt, 24.4%; Dortmund, 9.6%; Stuttgart,
18.7%; Diisseldorf, 16.9%; Bremen, 7.8%; Duisburg, 12.6%; Hannover, 10.5%. Id.
22. See, e.g., Esser & Korte, supra note 8, at 183, 190-98.
23. STATISTISCHEs BUNDESAMT, supra note 20, at 59 (1990) (1.5237 million out of 4.4891
million as of December 31, 1988).
24. See, e.g., Esser & Korte, supra note 8, at 196, 200-01.
25. See. e.g., HELMUT RrrrSTIEG, WAHLRECHT FOR AUSLXNDER 20-21 (1981).
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immigration of the guestworkers, suffrage for a more limited category
of aliens was being debated under the aegis of the European Economic
Community ("European Community," or just "Community"). In the
mid-1970s, political rights in municipal and other local elections were
proposed under the rubric of "special rights" that Community mem-
bers should grant to nationals of the other Community members resid-
ing in their territory.26 Extension of the benefits of Community
membership to "special rights" was seen as transcending a narrow
economic view of the Community, and moving toward a political Eu-
ropean Union.27 Correspondingly, many doubted that the governing
treaties gave Community institutions the authority to require such a
grant of political rights, and maintained that an amendment or a sepa-
rate treaty would be required. 28 In any case, the proposal was not
sufficiently acceptable to the governments of the Member States to
gain the approval of the Council. 29 The principal opposition has come
from the countries with the highest proportion of alien residents, to
wit, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and
Germany. 30
Some Member States, however, were willing to enfranchise both
Community and non-Community nationals. Ireland already permit-
ted aliens ordinarily resident for six months to vote and stand for office
in local elections regardless of nationality. 31 In 1981, Denmark ex-
tended similar rights to all aliens resident for three years. 32 The
Netherlands amended its Constitution in order to remove a citizenship
restriction, and then in 1983 extended these rights to aliens after five
years' residence. 33
Meanwhile, the European Parliament and the Commission main-
tained their interest in political rights for all Community nationals in
26. See Towards European Citizenship, BULL. EC, Supp. 7/75, at 25-32 (1975) [hereinafter
1975 Report]; GUIDO VAN DEN BERGHE, POLITICAL RiGHTs FOR EUROPEAN CITIZENS 31-36
(1982).
27. 1975 Report, supra note 26, at 25, 28; VAN DEN BERGHE, supra note 26, at 35.
28. 1975 Report, supra note 26, at 31; Voting Rights in Local Elections for Community Na-
tionals, BULL. EC, Supp. 7/86, at 11 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Report].
29. 1986 Report, supra note 28, at 11-12. The Council, composed of delegates of Member
State governments, is the crucial repository of legislative power in the Community. See P.S.R.F.
MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 34-52 (5th ed. 1990).
30. See 1986 Report, supra note 28, at 15-16, 19.
31. Id. at 29.
32. Id. at 29-30. As a first step, resident nationals of the Nordic Union States - Finland,
Iceland, Norway, and Sweden - had been granted the local franchise in 1977. Id. Sweden had
permitted all foreign nationals to vote and run for office in local elections since 1975. See gener-
ally Ko-Chih R. Tung, Voting Rights for Alien Residents - Who Wants It?, 19 INT'L MIGRA-
TION REV. 451 (1985) (analyzing the Swedish experience).
33. 1986 Report, supra note 28, at 30-31.
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local elections.34 With the initiation of direct election of the European
Parliament, this question became intertwined with the question of
where Community nationals who resided outside their home States
could vote in the election of the European Parliament itself.35 The
Commission invoked not only the goal of a "People's Europe," but
also the need to protect Community nationals from losing their polit-
ical rights when they exercise the rights of free movement and estab-
lishment within the Community, and to remove an "obstacle" to
freedom of movement. 36 From this perspective, the Commission ar-
gued that conferral of voting rights was already within the implied
powers of the Community. 37 This broader view of the Community's
power received at least rhetorical reinforcement by the adoption of the
Single European Act in 1986, whose preamble stated a determination
"to work together to promote democracy. ' 38
In June 1988, the Commission finally submitted a proposed Direc-
tive that would require Member States to permit nationals of other
Member States to vote and to stand for office in local elections.39 The
European Parliament endorsed the Directive, while proposing various
modifications, 4° some of which the Commission accepted.4' The Di-
rective describes itself as "contributing to respect for democratic
rights," which it does within limits: it would apply only to local elec-
tions42 and only to nationals of the Community's Member States.43
34. Despite its name, the European Parliament plays only a secondary role in the enactment
of Community legislation; it is, however, a political body directly elected by the voters of the
Member States. See MATHUSEN, supra note 29, at 16-23. The Commission is the executive
branch of the Community, and also has responsibility to draft legislation for submission to the
Council. Id. at 52-53.
35. 1986 Report, supra note 28, at 42-44; VAN DEN BERGHE, supra note 26, at 187.
36. See 1986 Report, supra note 28, at 8; cf Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (invali-
dating lengthy durational residence qualification for voting in order to protect right of interstate
travel).
37. 1986 Report, supra note 28, at 8, 12.
38. Single European Act, BULL. EC, Supp. 2/86, at 5 (1986); A People's Europe, BULL. EC,
Supp. 2/88, at 29 (1988). On the other hand, a Danish proposal to amend the EEC Treaty to
mandate local voting rights was not incorporated into the Single European Act. See 1986 Report,
supra note 28, at 13-14.
39. Proposal for a Council Directive on voting rights for Community nationals in local elec-
tions in their Member State of residence, 1988 O.J. (C 246) 3.
40. See Texts adopted by the European Parliament, Mar. 1989, at 64-68.
41. See Amended proposal for a Council Directive on voting rights for Community nationals
in local elections in their Member State of residence, 1990 O.J. (C 290) 4 [hereinafter Amended
Proposal].
42. See id. art. 2. The Directive would also authorize Member States to exclude nonnationals
from standing for offices "which involve duties extending beyond the municipality," such as
Mayor, Deputy Mayor, or the equivalent. Id. pmbl. & art. 7.
43. Id. art. 1(I). Moreover, the transition rules include a Luxembourg exception, postponing
political rights in States where nationals of other Member States exceed 20% of total population.
Id. art. 8.
Winter 1992]
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Since that time, the proposed Directive has languished before the
Council." It remains to be seen whether a climate more favorable to
its adoption will develop. The reigning conservative parties in the
FRG have strongly opposed the concept.45
B. Some Quick Definitions
1. "Local." The term "local" will be used in this article to refer
to units of government below the federal and state levels. In German
contexts, "local" is usually a translation of the adjective "kommunal,"
which denotes both the counties (Kreisen) and the cities and towns
(Gemeinden). As will become clear, these units have a special consti-
tutional status in the FRG, unlike such submunicipal units as the bor-
oughs (Bezirke) of Hamburg, which I will nonetheless also call
"local," in keeping with normal English usage. The resulting impreci-
sion is nicely captured in the European Community's definition of "lo-
cal elections" in its voting proposal: "'Local elections' shall mean
elections which are defined as such by the Member States."'46
2. "Basic Law." The 1949 Constitution of the Federal Republic
of Germany, as amended, is known as the Grundgesetz (GG), or Basic
Law.47 It expressly requires the creation of a Federal Constitutional
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), whose duties include judicial re-
view of the constitutionality of legislation and other exercises of public
authority.48 Under current law, the Court consists of two panels, or
"Senates," of eight judges each, with jurisdiction over different classes
of cases. 49 This Court is the only court in the FRG with the authority
44. See Answers to Written Questions, No. 395/90, 1990 O.J. (C 171) 42 ("the Presidency
... cannot, at this juncture, anticipate whether it will prove possible for it to be adopted soon.").
45. See infra note 164 and accompanying text; DAs KOMMUNALWAHLRECHT FOR AUSLAN-
DER 278 (Klaus Sieveking et al. eds., 1989) (reprinting official position of Chancellor Helmut
Kohl's party, the Christian Democratic Union).
46. Amended Proposal, supra note 41, art. 1(2).
47. See generally DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1989). An official translation of the text as it stood prior to
unification appears, for example, in ULRICH KARPEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1988), and the amendments made in implementation of the Unifica-
tion Treaty are translated in Federal Republic of Germany-German Democratic Republic:
Treaty on the Establishment of German Unity, Aug. 31, 1990, F.R.G.-G.D.R., 30 I.L.M. 457,
464-69 (1991). In quoting the Basic Law, this article will generally follow the official translation,
modifying it only on a few occasions where it leaves German words untranslated.
48. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [hereinafter GG] arts. 92, 93 (F.R.G.); KOMMERS, supra
note 47, at 11-17.
49. KOMMERS, supra note 47, at 19-21. The judges are appointed for nonrenewable terms of
12 years. Id. at 24. The judges of each Senate are also divided into three-judge Chambers (Kam-
mern) that dispose summarily of cases not warranting the attention of the full Senate. Id. at 21-
23.
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to find a state or federal statute violative of the Basic Law.50 Under-
standably, it plays a predominant role in the development of German
constitutional law.
3. A "Citizen" and a "German. " Use of the nouns "citizen" and
"German" in relation to the FRG creates surprising difficulties.51
"German" is a defined term in the Basic Law, where it includes not
only persons who are German nationals,5 2 but also a category of
"Germans without German citizenship," also known as "Germans
within the meaning of Art. 116(1) GG," or more concisely as "status-
Germans. '5 3 These are ethnic German refugees and their families, to
whom the Basic Law grants a status intermediate between citizens and
aliens.54 This status was originally created in response to the East Eu-
ropean countries' expulsion of their ethnically German minorities,
such as the Sudeten-Germans, in the wake of the Second World
War.55 The status-Germans enjoy nearly all the constitutional rights
of German citizenship without actually changing their nationality. 56
50. See id. at 3-4. Other courts may reject a constitutional challenge to a statute, but if they
are inclined to hold that a statute violates the Basic Law, they must suspend their proceedings
and refer the case to the Federal Constitutional Court. Id. at 14-15. Other courts may, however,
invalidate administrative regulations, local ordinances, and certain "preconstitutional" statutes
enacted before 1949. Id. at 59.
51. From the perspective of technical accuracy, translation problems abound, although read-
ers who are only superficially acquainted with U.S. nationality law may prefer to ignore this
footnote. An individual's membership in a Nation State, denoted "nationality" in international
law, is called Staatsangehdrigkeit in German; the most precise English term for this is also "na-
tionality," although the term "citizenship" is often used when attention is not being focused on
the fact that the United States has noncitizen nationals. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(22), 1408
(1988). Staatsangehdrigkeit is often translated as "citizenship," and I will not resist this custom,
despite the ambiguity it creates. Often the best translation of "citizen," however, is Staatsb,'rger,
since both connote full membership in the political community. Confusion is enhanced by the
fact that in the United States today, nationality is the broader category, while in the FRG, as
explained in the text immediately following, citizenship is the broader category.
52. Even this category has its subtleties because, with an eye to future unification, the FRG
never recognized East Germany as a foreign state, and West German law always regarded the
East Germans as sharing a common citizenship with its own citizens. See, e.g., Hailbronner,
supra note 11, at 72-73.
53. See KAY HAILBRONNER, AUSLANDERRECHT: EIN HANDBUCH 40 (2d ed. 1989); Hail-
bronner, supra note 11, at 73. This article will use the concise term.
54. GG art. 116(1).
Unless otherwise provided by law, a German within the meaning of this Basic Law is a
person who possesses German citizenship or who has been admitted to the territory of the
German Reich within the frontiers of 31 December 1937 as a refugee or expellee of German
stock (Volkszugehoerigkeit) or as the spouse or descendant of such person.
Id.; see also Hailbronner, supra note 11, at 73.
55. See, e.g., Hailbronner, supra note 11, at 73. The category has since been used to accom-
modate voluntary migration of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Id.
56. The purpose of the definition in the Basic Law was to extend to the status-Germans the
rights that are expressly framed as rights of "Germans" rather than rights of "persons" in the
Basic Law. These include freedom of assembly, freedom of association, the right to resist subver-
sion of the constitutional order, the right to choose a profession, access to public employment,
freedom of internal travel, equal rights in all the states, and freedom from extradition. See GG
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They have a statutory right to naturalization, but for most purposes
are not treated as aliens even if they do not exercise it, and they are
eligible to vote and run for office. Terms like "citizen" are often used
broadly to include status-Germans; context may make clear the in-
tended coverage, but not always.
C. The Juristic Debate on Alien Suffrage
The debate on voting rights for long-term resident aliens in West
Germany has been multifaceted. This brief account will focus primar-
ily on the constitutional status of alien suffrage in local elections and in
elections for the federal legislature (Bundestag).57 Jurists staked out
their positions along a range of options, contending that alien suffrage
in a particular category of elections was constitutionally required,
within legislative discretion, constitutionally impermissible, or so con-
trary to basic constitutional principles that the constitution could not
even be amended to permit it.58 The actual proposals they discussed
also varied in terms of the personal characteristics of the enfranchised
aliens,59 limiting the franchise to nationals of particular foreign coun-
arts. 8, 9, 11, 12, 16, 20 & 33; Neuman, supra note 14, at 78-79. Judicial interpretation treats
aliens as possessing weaker analogues of some of these rights, as part of the right of persons to
free development of the personality under Article 2. Id.
57. It was generally agreed that aliens could vote in elections for purely advisory bodies, and
a number of German cities instituted Alien Advisory Counsels (Auslanderbeirte) elected by
aliens alone. See, e.g., Lutz Hoffmann, Partizipation auf kommunaler Ebene: Auslanderbeirate
aufdem Weg zu Volksgruppenvertretungen?, in DAs KOMMUNALWAHLRECHT FOR AUSLANDER
supra note 45, at 43 (Klaus Sieveking et al. eds., 1989). One could also analyze alien participa-
tion in trade unions, universities, and political parties. See, e.g., CHRISTOPH VON KATTE, DIE
MITGLIEDSCHAFr VON FREMDEN IN POLITISCHEN PARTEIEN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND: ZUGLEICH EINE DARSTELLUNG DER AMERIKANISCHEN RECHTSLAGE
(Schriften zum iffentlichen Recht Band 374, 1980) (arguing that the Basic Law requires exclu-
sion of aliens from membership in political parties).
58. The sentence in the text leaves out a temporal dimension; some authors contended that
the Basic Law could not presently be amended to grant voting rights to European Community
nationals, but that such a grant might later become permissible after further progress toward
European integration. See, e.g., MANFRED BIRKENHEIER, WAHLRECHT FOR AUSLANDER:
ZUGLEICH EIN BEITRAG ZUM VOLKSBEGRIFF DES GRUNDGESETZES 93-96 (Schriften zum
iffentlichen Recht Band 287, 1976); Franz Ruland, Forum: Wahlrecht ftir Auslander?, JURI-
STISCHE SCHULUNG 9, 12 (1975); Gunther Schwerdtfeger, Welche rechtliche Vorkehrungen
empfehlen sich, um die Rechtsstellung Von Ausldndern in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
angemessen zu gestalten? (Teilgutachten Ausldnderintegration), in 1 VERHANDLUNGEN DES
DREIUNDFONFZIGSTEN DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAGE A107 (1980); infra notes 147-49 and ac-
companying text. I will also gloss over the question of which legislature (federal or state) is
granting the voting rights; the additional considerations of federalism and limitations under dif-
ferent state constitutions are of less general interest. But see Helmut Quaritsch, Staatsangeh6rig-
keit und Wahlrecht, DIE 6FFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG [D6V] 1, 4 (1983) (arguing that a state
would violate interstate comity if it granted aliens voting rights, thus putting pressure on other
states to do likewise); Erik Heyen, Verfassungsaspekte einer Beteiligung von Auslandern an der
Hamburger Bezirksversammlungswahl, 41 D6V 185, 193 (1988) (arguing a similar theory).
59. The characteristics typically involved length of residence, immigration status, or ability
to speak German. See, e.g., RIrISTIEG, supra note 25, at 65-68; CHRISTOPHE SASSE & Orro E.
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tries,6° and granting the right to run for office along with the right to
vote,61 but my description will be complicated enough without keeping
track of these refinements.
In broad terms, the controversy centered on the meaning to be at-
tributed to two key principles, democracy and popular sovereignty.
These principles find express statement in Article 20 of the Basic Law,
which contains both a declaration that "[t]he Federal Republic of Ger-
many is a democratic and social federal state, ' 62 and a provision
known as the popular sovereignty clause: "All state authority ema-
nates from the people."'63
Alien suffrage could be consistent with rule by the people to the
extent that rule by the people need not mean rule solely by the people,
or that "the people" could include the enfranchised aliens. The term
translated as "the people," das Volk, has a somewhat different range of
meanings in German than in English. 64 Volk can be rendered either as
KEMPEN, KOMMUNALWAHLRECHT FOR AUSLANDER? 53-55 (1974); J6rg Sennewald,
Kommunalwahlrechtfir Ausldnder?, 1981 VERWALTUNGSRUNDSCHAU 77, 83.
60. Usually either all nations or only nations that belong to the European Community, but
possibly limited in other ways such as nations that give resident Germans similar rights. See,
e.g., DIETMAR BREER, DIE MITWIRKUNG VON AUSLANDERN AN DER POLITISCHEN WIL-
LENSBILDUNG IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND DURCH GEWAHRUNG DES WAHL-
RECHTS, INSBESONDERE DES KOMMUNALWAHLRECHTS 138-39 (Schriften zum offentlichen
Recht Band 422, 1982); SASSE & KEMPEN, supra note 59, at 54-55, 74; T. Oppermann, Sinn und
Grenzen einer EG-Angeh"rigkeit, in STAAT UND VbLKERRECHTSORDNUNG: FESTSCHIFT FOR
KARL DOEHRING 713, '122-23 (Kay Hailbronner et al. eds., 1989); Manfred Zuleeg, Die Ver-
einbarkeit des Kommunalwahlrechts fir Ausldnder mit dem deutschen Verfassungsrecht, in Aus-
LANDERRECHT UND AUSLANDERPOLITIK IN EUROPA 153, 176-78 (Manfred Zuleeg ed., 1987).
In the end, however, the Federal Constitutional Court held that the status-Germans were the
only class of persons lacking German nationality who could be permitted to vote in local govern-
ment elections. See infra notes 168-88 and accompanying text.
61. German terminology treats the right to run for office as a "passive voting right," in con-
trast with the "active" right to cast a vote. Many writers viewed these two rights as going hand
in hand, e.g., BIRKENHEIER, supra note 58, at 86; KARL A. LAMERS, REPRASENTATION UND
INTEGRATION DER AUSLANDER IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND UNTER
BESONDERER BEROCKSICHTIGUNG DES WAHLRECHTS 44 (Schriften zum offentlichen Recht
Band 328, 1977); Ruland, supra note 58, at 9, 13; Sennewald, supra note 59, at 83, but some
regarded alien candidates as even more shocking than alien voters, e.g., Karl Doehring, Die
staatsrechtliche Stellung der Ausldnder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 32 VER6F-
FENTLICHUNGEN DER VEREINIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTSLEHRER [VVDSTRL] 7,
36 (1974). Conversely, some authors argued that aliens could be permitted to run for office in
conteltts where they could not vote, since popular sovereignty entailed the right of the citizens to
choose whomever they pleased. See Klaus-Peter Dolde, Zur Beteiligung von Auslandern am
politischen Willensbildungsprozess, 26 D6V 370, 372 (1973); Hilbert Freiherr von LUhneysen,
Kommunalwahlrecht fir Ausldnder, 34 D6V 330, 331 (1981).
62. GG art. 20(1) (emphasis added).
63. GG art. 20(2)(1) ("Alle Staatsgewalt geht vom Volke aus.") The paragraph continues:
"It shall be exercised by the people by means of elections and voting and by specific legislative,
executive, and judicial organs." GG art. 20(2)(2).
64. The word "Volk" evokes in some American readers a strong negative reaction, for they
associate it with the worst excesses of German nationalism. In some contexts, German speakers
share this reaction, and the derived adjective v"lkisch has negative connotations in political dis-
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"people" or as "nation, ' 65 and is more frequently used in the latter
sense than is the English term "people." Moreover, traditional inter-
pretations of the Basic Law ascribe slightly different referents to sev-
eral of the appearances of the term Volk in its provisions.66 And since
several of the provisions refer specifically to the German people (das
deutsche Volk),67 the question arises whether the noun without the
adjective should be interpreted more broadly. 68
The argument that the Basic Law could not be amended to provide
for alien suffrage may ring strange to American ears. 69 But German
constitutional doctrine highlights the notion of an unconstitutional
constitutional amendment. Article 79 of the Basic Law, which defines
the amendment process, expressly forbids amendments "affecting the
division of the Federation into states, the participation on principle of
the states in legislation, or the basic principles laid down in Articles 1
and 20."70 Whether this prohibition entrenches an exclusion of aliens
course. Other derivatives have positive, even pacific connotations, such as Vdlkerrecht, the jus
gentium, or international law. Readers should not assume the worst whenever the term appears.
65. Klaus Stern in his Staatsrecht notes a range of meaning for Volk in political discourse,
including: the mob, the unpropertied masses, those outside the nobility; the nation in the sense of
a group with common descent and language, possibly living in more than one country; the
"ruled," meaning all the subjects of the State; all the people to be found within the State; the
electorate under current voting laws; the historical continuity of all the past, present, and future
members of the State; and the State itself. 2 KLAUS STERN, STAATSRECHT DER BUNDESREPU-
BLIK DEUTSCHLAND 5-6 (1980) (citing J. HELD, SYSTEM DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER
MONARCHISCHEN STAATEN DEUTSCHLANDS, ERSTER TElL (1856)).
66. See, e.g., 2 STERN, supra note 65, at 24-25; Rolf Grawert, Staatsvolk und Staatsange-
h6rigkeit, in I HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 663,
673-74 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhoff eds., 1987) [hereinafter HANDBUCH DES STAATS-
RECHTS]; Roman Herzog, Art. 20, in MAUNZ-DORIG, GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR 34 n. 1.
67. See, e.g., GG pmbl., arts. 1, 56 & 146.
68. See, e.g., BREER, supra note 60, at 68-69 (discussing but rejecting this interpretation).
69. It should not, however, given that Article V of the U.S. Constitution purports to outlaw
three kinds of amendments. The one prohibition that still has contemporary relevance forbids an
amendment that would involuntarily deprive a state of its equal representation in the Senate.
The U.S. literature also contains occasional arguments for additional, implied limitations on the
amending power. See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL.
L. REV. 703 (1980). Opponents of suffrage for women and for black men have invoked both the
concept of implied limitations and a strained reading of the entrenched right to equal representa-
tion in the Senate as prohibiting amendments that tamper with "the people" by extending the
electorate of a nonconsenting state. See, e.g., Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922); G.S. Brown,
The Nineteenth Amendment, 8 VA. L. REV. 237 (1922); Arthur W. Machen, Is the Fifteenth
Amendment Void?, 23 HARV. L. REV. 169 (1910); William L. Marbury, The Nineteenth Amend-
ment and After, 7 VA. L. REV. 1 (1920); see also CLEMENT E. VOSE, CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE: AMENDMENT POLITICS AND SUPREME COURT LITIGATION SINCE 1900, at 22-62
(1972) (describing activities of Marbury and his circle). In a rather different vein, Akhil Amar
has recently suggested other implied limitations that might be derived from the concept of popu-
lar sovereignty. Akhil Amar, Philadelphia. Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article
V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1045 n.1 (1989).
70. GG art. 79(3). Article I declares human dignity inviolable and acknowledges inalienable
human rights; Article 20 declares basic principles of state organization. By its wording and its
predominant interpretation, Article 79(3) restricts only amendments of the constitution itself, not
the content of a future superseding constitution adopted by the German people in accordance
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from the electorate was also an issue in the alien suffrage debate.
1. Pro-Suffrage Arguments
a. Global Considerations
The strongest proponents of alien suffrage maintained that the
Federal Republic could not live up to its own constitutional principles
without extending rights of political participation to long-term resi-
dent aliens. 71 They argued that the restriction of the franchise to citi-
zens reflected a defective understanding of "democracy." Democracy
rests on the human right of self-determination. 72 Democracy means
rule by the people, in the sense of those subject to the government's
commands.73 That group includes the entire resident population, not
merely those with a particular nationality. 74
The proponents of alien suffrage generally conceded that the au-
thors of the Basic Law expected that the franchise would be limited to
Germans. 75 The original scheme of rights under the Basic Law in-
cludes express guarantees of equal access to public office, freedom of
association, and freedom of assembly, all for Germans only.76 An
amendment in 1968 added an express guarantee of the right to resist
subversion of the constitutional order, again guaranteed only to
Germans. 77 Nonetheless, the provisions of the Basic Law that protect
with Article 146. 1 KLAUS STERN, STAATSRECHT DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 167,
176 (1977).
In fact, the German conception of unconstitutional constitutional provisions goes further
than Article 79(3). In an early decision the Federal Constitutional Court accepted the theoreti-
cal possibility that even an original provision of the Basic Law could transgress principles of
substantive justice to such an unbearable degree that it must be rejected as "unconstitutional."
Judgment of Dec. 18, 1953, Bundesverfassungsgericht [Constitutional Court], 3 Entscheidungen
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 225 (F.R.G.).
71. See, e.g., Brun-Otto Bryde, Auslanderwahlrecht und grundgesetzliche Demokratie, 44
JURISTENZEITUNG 257 (1989); Gotz Frank, Auslanderwahlrecht und Rechtsstellung der
Kommune, 23 KRITISCHE JUSTIz 290, 298 (1990); Zuleeg, supra note 60, at 157-58.
72. See, e.g., Bryde, supra note 71, at 258; Frank, supra note 71, at 298; Zuleeg, supra note
60, at 158.
73. See, e.g., RiTTSTIEG, supra note 25, at 60; Bryde, supra note 71, at 257-58; Frank, supra
note 71, at 298-99; Manfred Zuleeg, Einwanderungsland Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 35 JURI-
STENZEITUNG 425, 430 (1980).
74. RITTSrIEG, supra note 25, at 60; Bryde, supra note 71, at 258; Frank, supra note 71, at
298-99; Manfred Zuleeg, Grundrechte fuir Auslander: Bewahrungsprbe des Verfassungsrechts, 89
DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLAT-r [DVBL] 341, 347-48 (1974).
75. See, e.g., RIrrSTIEG, supra note 25, at 63-64; Zuleeg, supra note 73, at 430; Hans Meyer,
Wahlgrundsdtze und Wahlverfahren, in 2 HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS, supra note 66, at
269, 273.
76. GG arts. 33(2), 9(1) & 8(1) (respectively). Similarly, an interstate guarantee of equal
civic rights applies only to Germans. GG art. 33(1).
77. GG art. 20(4). This right of resistance reflects in part the traditional right of the people
to resist subversion of the constitution by the rulers, but also includes a right to resist subversion
of the constitution "from below," by revolutionary actors. 2 STERN, supra note 65, at § 57.
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the right to vote do not explicitly frame it as a right of Germans, but
rather state that the people must be represented by means of "general,
direct, free, equal and secret elections."78 The Basic Law contains no
unambiguous prohibition on extension of the franchise to non-
Germans.
The proponents of alien suffrage argued that the conditions justify-
ing the assumption that only Germans would vote were transformed
by the conversion of West Germany into a de facto country of immi-
gration. 79 As a result of this immigration, resident aliens comprised
more than seven percent of the population of West Germany, and
more than twenty percent of the population of some cities. Excluding
so large a portion of the population from political participation, it was
argued, undermined Germany's effort to build a democratic society. 80
Under these circumstances, the ambiguity of the reference in Article
20 to the "people" should permit a reinterpretation in favor of alien
suffrage. 81
Some even argued that alien suffrage was constitutionally required
by these changed circumstances.8 2 Resident aliens held a highly vul-
nerable position in German society, being dependent on discretionary
public policies for employment, housing, education, and even the bare
right to remain.8 3 Without voting rights, resident aliens were power-
less to ensure government attention to their needs.84 A broad reading
of the democracy principle was therefore reinforced by the "principle
of social justice," which imposed on the State a constitutional goal of
intervention to redress extreme social inequality. 85
78. GG arts. 28(1) (for state and local elections) & 38(1) (for federal elections).
79. See supra notes 12-25 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Bryde, supra note 71, at 260; Zuleeg, supra note 60, at 185.
81. See, e.g., RrTSTIEG, supra note 25, at 60-61; Frank, supra note 71, at 297-99; Fritz
Franz, Volkssouverd'nitdt contra Demokratie?, in INTEGRATION OHNE PARTICIPATION? 97, 105-
06 (Ulrich 0. Sievering ed., 1981); Meyer, supra note 75, at 273-74; Zuleeg, supra note 73, at 430-
31.
82. See Ekkehart Stein, Demokratie in I KOMMENTAR ZUM GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 1271 (Luchterhand 1984); Manfred Zuleeg, Menschen zweiter
Klasse?, 26 DOV 361, 370 (1973); Wolfgang Roters, Art. 28, in 2 INGO VON MONCH, GRUNDGE-
SETZ-KOMMENTAR 207, 209 (2d ed. 1983) (at local level only). The leading advocate of the
constitutional necessity of alien suffrage was Professor Manfred Zuleeg, now a Justice of the
European Community's Court of Justice. He maintained that the Basic Law required that voting
rights at the federal, state and local levels eventually be afforded to long-term resident aliens, but
he approved experimentation with the local franchise as the first stage in a progressive extension.
See Zuleeg, supra note 74, at 349; Zuleeg, supra note 60, at 172-75.
83. Zuleeg, supra note 74, at 347.
84. Id.
85. Zuleeg, supra note 60, at 160. The "principle of social justice" (Sozialstaatsprinzip) rests
on the declaration in Article 20 that the Federal Republic is a "social federal state." While not
judicially enforceable as such, it places obligations on the legislature, and also affects the interpre-
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Another arguably relevant feature of the Basic Law was its effort
to transcend the traditional conception of the self-enclosed sovereign
State. The Preamble to the Basic Law speaks of a "resolve ... to serve
the peace of the world as an equal partner in a united Europe," and to
that end Article 24 authorizes the Federal Republic to transfer sover-
eign powers to transnational institutions.8 6 The most prominent recip-
ient of an Article 24 transfer is the European Community.8 7
Arguably, then, admission of resident aliens to the electorate would be
consistent with the Basic Law's conception of an "open State."' 88 This
might be especially true if the expansion of the electorate were limited
to European Community nationals.89 Some authors viewed the Basic
Law as facilitating the transition from national citizenship to a true
European citizenship, 9° or more broadly as capable of transcending
outdated notions of nationality. 9'
Moreover, some proponents emphasized that, in one sense, alien
suffrage was already a reality in Germany. The category of status-
Germans under Article 116 included ethnic Germans who lacked Ger-
man nationality and even their alien spouses of whatever origin. These
noncitizens were not treated as aliens for immigration purposes 92 but
their enfranchisement punctured many of the theoretical arguments
against alien suffrage. 93 (Most opponents, however, shrugged off the
tation of other constitutional provisions. See generally KOMMERS, supra note 47, at 41-42;
Kunig, The Principle of Social Justice, in KARPEN, supra note 47, at 187.
86. GG pmbl. & art. 24(1).
87. 1 STERN, supra note 70, at 381-83.
88. Frank, supra note 71, at 295-96; cf Zuleeg, supra note 60, at 164.
89. See, e.g., SASSE & KEMPEN, supra note 59, at 56-57 (especially for European Community
nationals); Oppermann, supra note 60, at 722-23 (European Community nationals only); Zuleeg,
supra note 60, at 176-78 (starting with European Community nationals). A few aspects of the
opposing view are discussed infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text. I will not enter into the
complexities of the German debate over the European Community's jurisdiction to tamper with
voting rules in Member States, the constitutionality from the German perspective of an agree-
ment to confer such authority on the European Community, or the consequences of any possible
unconstitutionality. See, e.g., id. at 182; SABINE NIEDERMEYER-KRAUSS, KOMMUNALWAHL-
RECHT FOR AUSLX.NDER UND ERLEICHTERUNG DER EINB(YRGERUNG 122-94 (1989); Karl
Doehring, Nationales Kommunalwahlrecht ftir europdische Auslander?, in EUROPAISCHE GE-
RICHTSBARKEIT UND NATIONALE VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT 109-11 (Wilhelm G. Grewe
et al. eds., 1981); Ralf Jahn & Norbert K. Riedel, Gemeinschaftsrechtliche Einfuhrung eines kom-
munalen Wahlrechts ftir EG-Ausldnder und innerstaatliches Verfassungsrecht, 8 NVwZ 716
(1989); Ulrich Karpen, Kommunalwahlrecht fur Auslander, 42 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHEN-
SCHRIFT [NJW] 1012, 1016 (1989); Alexander Schink, Kommunalwahlrechtfur Auslander?, 103
DVBL 417, 426 (1988).
90. See, e.g., Oppermann, supra note 60, at 722-24; Zuleeg, supra note 60, at 176-77.
91. Rr-S=IEG,'supra note 25, at 57-58.
92. Section 1(2) of the Aliens Act of 1965 defined "alien" as a person who was not a German
within the meaning of Article 116 of the Basic Law, thus assimilating the status-Germans to
citizens. Auslindergesetz § 1(2) (1965).
93. See, e.g., RITrSTIEG, supra note 25, at 53-54; Meyer, supra note 75, at 272; Zuleeg, supra
note 60, at 155-56.
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status-Germans as a historically contingent, narrow exception.) 94
b. Local Considerations
Some commentators found the arguments for alien suffrage more
persuasive at the local level than at the national level. It was possible
to accept the premise of the fundamentally different relationship that
citizens and resident aliens had to the national government, 95 and yet
to view them as similarly situated in relation to local government. 96
The participation of the state governments in federal lawmaking
through the Federal Council (Bundesrat ),97 however, made reserva-
tions about alien suffrage at the national level equally applicable to the
election of the state legislatures. 98
The argument for alien voting on the local level alone drew further
support from a characterization of local self-government as differing in
kind from the self-government of the federation and of the states in
German federalism. Two variants of this argument were put forward.
Both of them seized on the hybrid character of local government au-
thority, and they emphasized opposing elements. The more popular
variant emphasized the agency relationship between local government
and the state.99 It characterized the authority of the federation and
the states as original State authority, directly resting on the grant of
power from the people, in opposition to the authority of local self-
governing bodies, which was derivative, delegated from the states. Ac-
cording to this theory, local elections do not provide the source of
94. See, e.g., BIRKENHEIER, supra note 58, at 73; Karpen, supra note 89, at 1014; Quaritsch,
supra note 58, at 9; Hans Heinrich Rupp, Wahlrecht fir Auslander?, 22 ZErrsCHRIFr FOR
RECHTSPOLITIK [ZRP] 363, 365 (1989). I cannot resist adding my personal view that even a
historically contingent, narrow exception creates severe difficulties for the claim that a national-
ity qualification is so deeply rooted in the popular sovereignty clause that the Basic Law could
not be amended to permit alien suffrage.
95. See infra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., BREER, supra note 60, at 110, 125; Joachim Henkel, Politische Integration und
Reprasentation ausldndischer Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 5 ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR PARLAMENTSFRAGEN 91, 107, 114 (1974); Schink, supra note 89, at 422-23, 426; Christian
Tomuschat, Die politischen Rechte der Gastarbeiter, in GASTARBEITER IN GESELLSCHAFT UND
RECHT 80, 85-86, 98-99 (Tugrul Ansay & Volkmar Gessner eds., 1974).
97. The Federal Council consists of representatives of the state governments, bound by their
instructions. Among its other powers, its approval is required for a wide variety of laws affecting
the states, and it has advisory and suspensive functions regarding all other legislation. GG arts.
76-77; see DAVID P. CONRADT, THE GERMAN POLITY 152-54, 175 (3d ed. 1986); KOMMERS,
supra note 47, at 106-13. The participation of the state governments in federal lawmaking is
entrenched in the Basic Law by Article 79(3), which forbids, among other things, amendments
"affecting the division of the Federation into states [or] the participation on principle of the states
in legislation."
98. See, e.g., BREER, supra note 60, at 75; SASSE & KEMPEN, supra note 59, at 46.
99. See, e.g., BREER, supra note 60, at 104-05; EDZARD SCHMIDT-JORTZIG, KOM-
MUNALRECHT 22, 39 (1982); Bryde, supra note 71, at 260; von L6hneysen, supra note 61, at 332.
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local government authority, but are rather a supplementary legitimat-
ing element for an authority already delegated to the local government
by the citizenry. Article 28(1) of the Basic Law required electoral rep-
resentation of the people in the counties and communes, '00 but this did
not preclude the representation of others as well.'0 1 Alternatively, the
"people" at the local level might be defined more inclusively than the
people at the national level; obviously, Article 28 did not require that
the entire German people vote in each local election, and thus the
terms could not have identical meanings. 102
The permissibility of aliens' participation in the choice of the
agents exercising delegated power paralleled the permissibility of em-
ploying aliens directly as agents, that is, as appointed public offi-
cials. 03 Although German law gives citizens preferred access to
appointed public office, exceptionally qualified non-Germans may also
be employed. 104 Local government could also be analogized to a vari-
ety of public entities that serve as vehicles for self-determination by
functionally defined segments of the population - for example, uni-
versities, professional self-regulatory bodies, trade unions, and gov-
erning boards which include representatives of beneficiaries in the
social security system. Otherwise-qualified aliens currently enjoy vot-
ing rights in all of these. 10 5
The second variant employed the same analogy with self-regula-
tory bodies to deemphasize the "State-like" aspect of local governmen-
tal authority, reasserting the historical role of local governments as
intermediate between State and civil society.' 0 6 The predecessors of
100. GG art. 28(1).
101. See Franz, supra note 81, at 105-06; von Lbhneysen, supra note 61, at 332; Zuleg, supra
note 60, at 174-75.
102. See BREER, supra note 60, at 119. Further support was drawn from Article 28(2),
which guarantees the right of the communes to regulate "affairs of the local community"
[Angelegenheiten der drtlichen Gemeinschaft]. This arguably broader term might confirm the
propriety of including aliens in the local electorate. See id., at 111; Bryde, supra note 71, at 260-
61; Roters, supra note 82, at 207; Zuleeg, supra note 60, at 175.
103. See Bryde, supra note 71, at 260.
104. See BUNDESBEAMTENGESETZ [Federal Public Officials Act] § 7(2); BEAM-
TENRAHMENREGELUNGSGESETZ [Public Officials Framework Act] § 4(2).
105. See, e.g., BREER, supra note 60, at 114-18; Bryde, supra note 71, at 260; Manfred
Zuleeg, Zur Verfassungsma'fligkeit der Einf,'hrung des Kommunalwahlrecht fir Auslander in
Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1987 KRITISCHE VIERTEJAHRESSCHRIFr FOR GESETZGEBUNG UND
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFr [KRVJSCHR] 322, 328-29.
106. See SASSE & KEMPEN, supra note 59, at 37-44; Schwerdtfeger, supra note 58, at A 110-
AI 11. Most writers, however, regardless of their attitudes toward alien suffrage, rejected this
reprivatization of local government as anachronistic. See, e.g., BREER, supra note 60, at 32-33;
SCHMIDT-JORTZIG, supra note 99, at 22-23 & n.7; Frank, supra note 71, at 299-300; Josef Isen-
see, Kommunalwahlrecht f'ir A usldnder aus der Sicht der Landesverfassung Nordrhein- Westfalens
und der Bundesverfassung, 1987 KRVJScHR 300, 306-07; Zuleeg, supra note 60, at 173-74.
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modern local governments, in Germany as in England, were corporate
bodies with self-governing privileges. 10 7 In nineteenth century Ger-
many, local self-government served to defend the autonomy of bour-
geois society against the administrative apparatus of the monarchy.108
The characterization of local self-government as a "right" survived
into the twentieth century, and even into the Basic Law.I°9 Such exer-
cises of local autonomy need not be equated with the exercise of "state
authority" subject to the popular sovereignty principle. 10
For some commentators, these arguments were merely supplemen-
tary, demonstrating that aliens could still be given the local franchise,
regardless of how the issue was resolved at the state and federal
levels. I 1  Others, however, took highly differentiated positions, in-
cluding the view that alien suffrage in local elections was already
constitutionally permissible, but that alien suffrage in state and na-
tional elections could not be introduced even by constitutional
amendment. 112
2. Anti-Suffrage Arguments
Commentators who denied the constitutionality of alien suffrage
rejected attempts to derive it from an equal right to self-determination.
Many observed that in traditional German political theory, a State
must have a people to act as the "subject" of its power, and that this
people consisted of the citizens of the State. 113 The German concept
of popular sovereignty had been influenced by French Revolutionary
107. See 1 STERN, supra note 70, at 399-403; Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept,
93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1081-95 (1980).
108. See SASSE & KEMPEN, supra note 59, at 39-40.
109. SASSE & KEMPEN, supra note 59, at 37, 40-41. These authors pointed out that the
guarantee of local self-government was included in the bill of rights portion of the Weimar Con-
stitution, and that although this "institutional guarantee" was deleted from the basic rights cata-
log of the 1949 Basic Law, it was still framed as a right in Article 28. See GG art. 28(2);
WEIMAR CONsT. art. 127, translated in THE DEMOCRATIC TRADITION: FOUR GERMAN CON-
STITUTIONS 177 (Elmer E. Hucko ed., 1987).
110. See SASSE & KEMPEN, supra note 59, at 44-46; Schwerdtfeger, supra note 58, at Al 10.
For a similar approval of alien voting in "these minor municipal corporations," see Woodcock v.
Bolster, 35 Vt. 632, 640-41 (1863), discussed infra notes 283-84 and accompanying text.
111. See Bryde, supra note 71, at 260; Zuleeg, supra note 60, at 174-75.
112. See, e.g., SASSE & KEMPEN, supra note 59, at 45-46 (local suffrage already constitu-
tional, but not state or federal suffrage; no position taken on amendability); Schwerdtfeger, supra
note 58, at A107, A 110 (amendment unnecessary for local suffrage, and impermissible for state
or federal suffrage); von L6hneysen, supra note 61, at 331-32 (amendment unnecessary for local
suffrage, permissibility for state or federal suffrage unclear).
113. See, e.g., KARL DOEHRING, DAS STAATSRECHT DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCH-
LAND 87-88 (3d ed. 1984); Ernst-Wolfgang Bckenff6rde, Demokratie als Verfassungsprinzip, in 1
HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS, supra note 66, at 893, 903-04; Josef Isensee, Die staatsrechtliche
Stellung der Auslander in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 32 VVDSTRL 49, 92-93 (1974).
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thought,1 4 which had located sovereignty in the "Nation."11 5 These
opponents of alien suffrage characterized democracy as a form of col-
lective, not individual, self-determination, and maintained that it
would be endangered by giving outsiders a decisive voice in collective
decisions. 116
Much of the literature emphasized two circumstances relating to
citizenship that supported the superior claim of citizens to political
participation: "inescapability" (Unentrinnbarkeit) and "affectedness"
(Betroffenheit). 117 First, aliens were not inescapably tied to the fate of
the community. Aliens within the national borders were subject to its
territorial sovereignty, but nonresident aliens were not subject to the
nation's personal sovereignty independent of location. 1 8 They could
therefore avoid the consequences of ill-conceived policies by returning
to their homelands, which were obliged to receive them. 19 Germans
had no such guaranteed refuge, for no country was obliged to receive
and naturalize them. 120 Aliens, therefore, did not have the same in-
centives as citizens to vote responsibly. Some authors employed the
trope of the nation as a "community of fate" (Schicksalsgemeinschaft),
and resisted efforts to reinterpret this notion as including long-term
resident aliens. 12 1
Second, even while aliens resided within the national territory,
114. Albert Bleckmann, Das Nationalstaasprinzip im Grundgesetz, 41 D6V 437, 438 (1988);
B6ckenrdrde, supra note 113, at 889-90; Peter M. Huber, Das "Volk" des Grundgesetzes, 42 DOV
531, 534 (1989); Quaritsch, supra note 58, at 6.
115. See LA DtCLARATION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME ET DU CITOYEN art. 3 (France 1789)
("Le principe de toute souverainet6 r6side essentiellement dans la nation."); Cranston, The Sover-
eignty of the Nation, in THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE CREATION OF MODERN POLIT-
ICAL CULTURE (C. Lucas ed., 1988). Article 3 of the current French Constitution repeats this
popular sovereignty principle, and limits the franchise to French nationals. See FR. CONST. art.
3; CHARLES DEBBASCH ET AL., DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL ET INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES 532-
35 (3d ed. 1990).
116. E.g., B6ckenf6rde, supra note 113, at 904-05, 911-12; Grawert, supra note 66, at 685-86;
Isensee, supra note 113, at 92-93; Quaritsch, supra note 58, at 9.
117. I will have more to say on the merit of these arguments later, in Part III(B).
118. See, e.g., Isensee, supra note 106, at 303; Schink, supra note 89, at 422. In U.S. law, this
distinction is expressed in terms of exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction on the basis of the princi-
ple of territoriality and on the basis of nationality. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 & cmts. c & e (1987).
119. Eg., BIRKENHEIER, supra note 58, at 62-63; LAMERS, supra note 61, at 37-38; 1 STERN,
supra note 70, at 324; Bleckmann, supra note 114, at 438; Backenf6rde, supra note 113, at 905;
Doehring, supra note 61, at 37; Isensee, supra note 113, at 93. Some, however, viewed this
argument as losing its force at the local level. E.g., BREER, supra note 60, at 112; Henkel, supra
note 96, at 107; Ruland, supra note 58, at 12-13; Sennewald, supra note 59, at 82-83.
120. Eg., BIRKENHEIER, supra note 58, at 63; Ruland, supra note 58, at 11; see also Schink,
supra note 89, at 422. A foreign country that permitted Germans to reside within its boundaries
would enable them to escape the territorial sovereignty of Germany but not its personal sover-
eignty. Naturalization would enable the emigrant to exchange German nationality for another.
121. See, e.g., Bleckmann, supra note 114, at 438; B6ckenf6rde, supra note 113, at 903-05;
Doehring, supra note 89, at 115; Isensee, supra note 113, at 93-94 n. 11; Rupp, supra note 94, at
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they were not affected by government decisions to the same degree as
citizens because aliens did not have equal civic duties; the civic duty
most prominently invoked was military service.' 22 Some further ar-
gued that aliens were so much less affected by government decisions
that giving aliens equal votes would violate principles of equality,
whether a notion of democratic equality inherent in the concept of
democracy itself,'23 or the fundamental constitutional principle of
equality before the law. 124
Others were willing to assume that aliens might be equally affected
by government actions, but argued that being affected by a govern-
ment decision did not entail a right to participate in it. They rejected
365. But see Zuleeg, supra note 74, at 347-48 (membership in the "community of fate" not
limited to citizens).
122. E.g., LAMERS, supra note 61, at 39; Bleckmann, supra note 114, at 438; Doehring, supra
note 89, at 115; Isensee, supra note 113, at 94; Ruland, supra note 58, at 11; see also BREER,
supra note 60, at 52-53 (denying aliens suffrage at the national level only); Schink, supra note 89,
at 422-23, 424 (same).
The chain of inference between military service and voting is more complex and confusing
than superficial attention might suggest. Aliens may be excused from military service as a matter
of legislative expediency, domestic political theory, international courtesy, bilateral or multilat-
eral treaty, customary international law, or constitutional command. The current German draft
statute contemplates conscription of citizens, resident stateless persons, and resident aliens whose
countries of nationality conscript Germans. See Rupert Scholz, Art. 12a, in GRUNDGESETZ
KOMMENTAR, supra note 66, at 18-19. Various categories of citizens are statutorily exempt from
military service. See id. at 19-24. The Basic Law expressly guarantees the right of conscientious
objectors to perform alternative civilian service, provides for conscription of women only for
civilian service during a "state of defense," and forbids women to perform "service involving the
use of arms," even voluntarily. GG art. 12a; Scholz, supra at 14. It authorizes conscription of
"men," with no apparent limitation by nationality. See GG art. 12a(l); Scholz, supra at 18-19.
But see Michael Wollenschliiger & Eckhard Kressel, Wehrpflichtfuir Auslander?, 8 NVwZ 722,
722-28 (1989) (contending that military service is a fundamental duty that can be imposed only
on citizens). It was widely argued in the alien suffrage debate that conscription of resident aliens
would violate international law. See, e.g., LAMERS, supra note 61, at 39; Isensee, supra note 113,
at 94 n.1 13. Conceivably this was one of the "general rules of international law" made binding
by Article 25 of the Basic Law, see BIRKENHEIER, supra note 58, at 64-65. Although the United
States has frequently engaged in conscription of resident aliens, see infra notes 302-07 and ac-
companying text, Professor Karl Doehring has explained this as reflecting a special rule for coun-
tries of immigration, see Giinther Jaenicke & Karl Doehring, Die Wehrpflicht von Ausldndern, 16
ZErrsCHRIFr FOR AUSLANDISCHES 6FFENTLICHES RECHT UND V6LKERRECHT 523, 559 (1955/
56), and of course "The Federal Republic of Germany is not a country of immigration," see
supra note 12 and accompanying text. Thus, not all citizens may constitutionally be drafted, and
not all citizens who may be drafted are actually drafted, and most resident aliens are freed from
conscription by a practice whose ultimate legal basis is uncertain. Nonetheless, "the compensa-
tory relationship between democratic rights and duties, which arises compellingly from the re-
quirement of democratic equality, persists even when it is not actualized in the individual case."
BIRKENHEIER, supra note 58, at 66 (author's translation).
123. See, e.g., BIRKENHEIER, supra note 58, at 62; LAMERS, supra note 61, at 38-40; Isensee,
supra note 113, at 93-95, 105; Ruland, supra note 58, at 11; Hans-Hermann Schild, Kommunal-
wahlrecht fir Auslinder?, 38 D6V 664, 670-71 (1985); Schink, supra note 89, at 423; see also
BREER, supra note 60, at 66 (but not at local level); Sennewald, supra note 59, at 82 (same).
124. The Federal Constitutional Court in its decision expressly declined to reach this issue.
See infra paragraph following note 196 and accompanying text.
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such a "democracy of the affected" as fallacious and unworkable. 25
The proper correlate to subjection to law was protection by law, not
political participation.1 26
As previously mentioned, these arguments were widely accepted as
establishing the unconstitutionality of alien suffrage at the national
level. Extending the argument to local elections, however, required
further elaboration. Part of the analysis rested on the "homogeneity
principle" in Article 28 of the Basic Law, which required the states to
"conform to the principles of republican democratic and social gov-
ernment based on the rule of law, within the meaning of this Basic
Law." 27 Homogeneity was said to require that the "people" at the
local level be the geographically defined subset of the "people" at the
national level.' 28 True local governments were geographical subdivi-
sions of the State, and could not be compared with functionally de-
fined vehicles for occupational self-determination like universities,
trade unions, and professional boards.' 29
Several commentators expressly addressed the claim that the vul-
nerability of resident aliens in Germany justified extending them vot-
ing rights to protect their interests at the local level. Some responded
that an instrumental approach to the distribution of the franchise was
illegitimate; voting rights must be determined as a matter of principle
and not used to further ulterior policy goals.' 30 Aliens' vulnerability
was also turned against them as a reason for denying them the right to
vote. Given the dependence of aliens on the discretion of government
officials, including officials at the local level,' 31 for permission to con-
tinue residing in Germany, alien suffrage would give the executive the
power to manipulate the composition of the electorate for political ad-
vantage. 132 Some also expressed concern that aliens would be vulnera-
125. See Isensee, supra note 106, at 304-05 (rejecting Betroffenendemokratie); see also Bock-
enforde, supra note 113, at 904 (possible only in utopian world without Nation States).
126. See NIEDERMEYER-KRAUSS, supra note 89, at 72-74; Isensee, supra note 106, at 304;
Karpen, supra note 89, at 1014; Hans-Jirgen Papier, Verfassungsfragen des kommunalen Aus-
landerwahlrechts, 1987 KRVJSCHR 309, 312-13.
127. GG art. 28(1).
128. See, e.g., Grawert, supra note 66, at 674; Papier, supra note 126, at 309-10; Quaritsch,
supra note 58, at 2-3; Rupp, supra note 94, at 364.
129. See, e.g., Isensee, supra note 113, at 96-97; Papier, supra note 126, at 313; Rupp, supra
note 94, at 364. One author, however, doubted the propriety of letting aliens vote even in trade
unions. Doehring, supra note 61, at 37.
130. See, e.g., LAMERS, supra note 61, at 37; Isensee, supra note 106, at 304. One author
coupled this assertion with a rejection of interest group pluralism as a normatively proper under-
standing of the political process. Quaritsch, supra note 58, at 11-12.
131. German immigration law is largely enforced at the state and local level. See Neuman,
supra note 14, at 43.
132. Doehring, supra note 89, at 117-18; Isensee, supra note 113, at 95; Karpen, supra note
47, at 1017; Schild, supra note 123, at 670-71 (1985); Schink, supra note 89, at 422; 2 Ingo von
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ble to pressure from their home countries, further disqualifying them
from voting. 33 Experience with municipal voting by aliens elsewhere
in Europe also showed that foreign governments might prohibit their
citizens from participating; 134 it was intolerable for the process of Ger-
man self-determination to be thus rendered subject to the discretion of
foreign governments. 35
More generally, aliens might be disqualified from voting by their
doubtful loyalty. 136 Some commentators placed significant weight on
the notion that citizens were subject to a special duty of loyalty to the
State, a duty which aliens owed to their homelands. 37 In more con-
crete terms, there was a danger that aliens would use their votes to
influence government policy in ways that furthered the interests of
their home countries. 38 Aliens from different countries (e.g., Greece
and Turkey) were also likely to embroil Germany in their rivalries. " 9
These dangers were most salient at the national level, but could arise
even at the local level.'40 Moreover, even if aliens could vote only at
the local level, political parties would have an incentive to favor poli-
cies at the national level that would win them alien votes at the local
level. "4'
The opponents of alien suffrage often maintained that the constitu-
tionally proper route to voting rights for resident aliens was naturali-
Miinch, Art. 38 in 2 VON MONCH, supra note 82, at 461 (at national level). On the other hand,
some proponents of alien suffrage argued that the status of resident aliens must be rendered more
secure in order to shield them from these pressures. See, e.g., Otto Behrend, Kommunalwahl-
rechtftir Auslander in der Bundesrepublik, 26 DOV 376, 378 (1973); Henkel, supra note 96, at
115-16. One proponent argued that only aliens in the most protected immigration status should
be permitted to vote. BREER, supra note 60, at 137-38.
133. VON KATrE, supra note 57, at 99-100; Doehring, supra note 89, at 116-19.
134. See NIEDERMAYER-KRAUSS, supra note 89, at 210-11; 1986 Report, supra note 28, at 9,
31; Ben Koolen, Beteiligung von Ausldndern an den Kommunalwahlen in den Niederlanden, 1990
ZAR 131, 135. The reported incidents involve Moroccan and Indonesian residents in the
Netherlands.
135. See Doehring, supra note 89, at 118-20; Schink, supra note 89, at 422.
136. See, e.g., LAMERS, supra note 61, at 39-40; Bleckmann, supra note 114, at 438-39;
Doehring, supra note 89, at 116-17; Quaritsch, supra note 58, at 12; Ruland, supra note 58, at 11.
137. See VON KATTE, supra note 57, at 85-86; Doehring, supra note 89, at 119; Schink, supra
note 89, at 422-23. Other opponents of alien suffrage, however, rejected reliance on a "general
duty of loyalty" going beyond concrete legal duties. See, e.g., Isensee, supra note 113, at 94
n.113.
138. LAMERS, supra note 61, at 39-40; VON KATTE, supra note 57, at 99-100, 110;
Bleckmann, supra note 114, at 438; Doehring, supra note 89, at 116-17. One author labelled
alien voters as a potential "second front." Ruland, supra note 58, at 11.
139. See Bleckmann, supra note 114, at 438; Karpen, supra note 89, at 1017; Quaritsch, supra
note 58, at 13.
140. See Bleckmann, supra note 114, at 438; Quaritsch, supra note 58, at 12-13.
141. See BIRKENHEIER, supra note 58, at 26; Bleckmann, supra note 114, at 438; cf Henkel,
supra note 96, at 115 (welcoming this linkage); Zuleeg, supra note 73, at 431 (same).
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zation. 142  Some argued with evident sincerity for more generous
naturalization policies.1 43 Not surprisingly, others favored restrictive
naturalization policy in these or other writing,. 44
Some commentators also seized on a weakness of the argument for
alien suffrage: the difficulty of specifying the category of aliens enti-
tled to vote. In German constitutional law as in U.S. constitutional
law, discriminatory denial of the franchise normally triggers a require-
ment of compelling justification. 145 Yet many proponents of alien suf-
frage behaved as if they had discretion to choose which aliens would
vote in which elections, and to employ criteria of linguistic ability or
length of residence that could not be applied to German voters. This
paradox allegedly demonstrated that democratic principles did not
justify alien suffrage, or that politically feasible proposals would them-
selves violate equality before the law.146
The equality argument could also be used against those who
argued that the Basic Law's "openness to Europe" via Article 24 mod-
ified popular sovereignty in favor of European Community nation-
als. 147  More directly, the European option was criticized as a
distortion of Article 24, which permitted the federal legislature to
transfer sovereign authority to supranational institutions in which the
FRG participated as a member but not to dilute the representation of
the German people at home by admitting aliens to the franchise. 14
,There was disagreement as to whether Article 24 could someday be
the vehicle for the submersion of German nationality into a fully uni-
fied European nationality, at which date all Europeans could vote, or
whether the supersession of the Basic Law by a new constitution
would be necessary first. 149
142. See, e.g., Isensee, supra note 113, at 96; Burkhard Kimper, Kommunalwahlrechtfir
Ausldnder in Nordrhein-Westfalen?, 22 ZRP 96, 99 (1989); Ruland, supra note 58, at 11.
143. See, e.g., BIRKENHEIER, supra note 58, at 96-97; Bockenffrde, supra note 113, at 905;
Tomuschat, supra note 96, at 100.
144. Compare, e.g., Bleckmann, supra note 114 and Quaritsch, supra note 58 with
Bleckmann, Anwartschaft aufdie deutsche Staatsangeh"rigkeit?, 43 NJW 1397, 1399 (1990) (de-
riving constitutional limitations on naturalization policy from his "National-State principle")
and Helmut Quaritsch, Einbtirgerungspolitik alsAuslnderpolitik?, 1988 DER STAAT 481 (oppos-
ing naturalization of guestworkers).
145. See, e.g., 1 STERN, supra note 70, at 303-05; Robert Dilworth & Frank Montag, Note,
The Right to Vote of Non-Resident Citizens: A Comparative Study of the Federal Republic of
Germany and the United States of America, 12 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 267, 275 (1982).
146. See, e.g., Heyen, supra note 58, at 193; Isensee, supra note 106, at 305-06; Karpen, supra
note 89, at 1016; Quaritsch, supra note 58, at 9-10; Rupp, supra note 94, at 364.
147. See Isensee, supra note 106, at 305-06.
148. See, e.g., BIRKENHEIER, supra note 58, at 93-94; BREER, supra note 60, at 76-77; Doehr-
ing, supra note 89, at 120.
149. See, e.g., BIRKENHEIER, supra note 58, at 94-96 (Article 24 sufficient); Doehring, supra
note 89, at 120 (new constitution necessary).
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The vigor of the opposition to alien suffrage was strongest among
those who argued that even an explicit amendment to the Basic Law
authorizing alien suffrage would be unconstitutional. Some contended
that any form of alien suffrage was barred, while others distinguished
between local elections and state and federal elections. 1 0 Both groups
argued that the exclusion of aliens from the electorate under the popu-
lar sovereignty clause of Article 20(2) involved a basic principle en-
trenched against amendment by Article 79(3).151 The argument rested
on more than mere literalism; it contended that limiting the franchise
to citizens was so essential to the German conception of democracy
that its entrenchment against amendment was justified. One promi-
nent commentator appears to have gone further, arguing that alien
suffrage, even at the local level, was antithetical to the very concept of
democracy. 152
In contrast, another opponent of alien suffrage disclaimed any in-
consistency between alien suffrage and the idea of democracy in the
abstract, but instead identified the fatal obstacle to alien suffrage as an
implicit constitutional principle requiring the Federal Republic to be a
"National-State" with a distinctively German cultural identity;' 53 He
derived this principle from a structural interpretation of the Basic
Law, reinforced by the Preamble's reference to the desire of the Ger-
man people to "preserve their national and political unity,"' 154 the ex-
tension of political rights to displaced Germans regardless of their
country of nationality, and even the constitutional specification of the
colors of the federal flag.' 55 The National-State principle was also re-
flected in the reservation of political rights to Germans, which contrib-
uted to the loyalty of public officials and representatives to the
interests of the German people. 156 The author deduced from this prin-
150. For those who support the view that the Basic Law cannot be amended to permit fed-
eral, state, or local alien suffrage, see, e.g., Bleckmann, supra note 114, at 442; Doehring, supra
note 89, at 120; Huber, supra note 114, at 536; Kimper, supra note 142, at 89. For those who
support the view that the Basic Law cannot be amended to permit federal or state alien suffrage,
see, e.g., Schink, supra note 89, at 426; Sennewald, supra note 59, at 82; see also BIRKENHEIER,
supra note 58, at 90-92, 131 (unless true European Union occurs); LAMERS, supra note 61, at 46-
47, 54-55, 134-35; NIEDERMEYER-KRAUSS, supra note 89, at 139-40; Ruland, supra note 58, at
11-12; Schwerdtfeger, supra note 58.
151. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
152. See Isensee, supra note 113, at 92-93 ("Democracy loses its legitimation and ethos when
the right to vote is uncoupled from nationality and conceded to nonmembers. The boundary
between democratic autonomy of the political union and antidemocratic heteronomy by outsid-
ers is transgressed.") (author's translation); see also Isensee, supra note 106, at 305.
153. Bleckmann, supra note 114, at 438.
154. GG pmbl. (emphasis added).
155. Bleckmann, supra note 114, at 440-41.
156. Id. at 439, 441.
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ciple constitutional duties to promote national feeling, to preserve the
meaningfulness of German citizenship, 157 and to frame an immigra-
tion policy that would not threaten Germany's cultural identity. 158
The author maintained that both this implicit National-State principle
and the resulting prohibition against alien suffrage were unamendably
anchored in the Basic Law. 159
D. Judicial Rejection
After years of debate, two states took legislative action that made it
possible for the Federal Constitutional Court to resolve the constitu-
tionality of alien suffrage. The state of Schleswig-Holstein amended its
statute governing municipal and county elections to confer the right to
vote and to run for office on nationals of Denmark, Ireland, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland who resided in the
locality. 16° To qualify for these rights, the alien had to be otherwise
qualified as an elector, to have resided in Germany for at least five
years, and either to possess a residence permit or be legally not obliged
to possess one. 161 The second case involved an amendment to the stat-
ute governing the election of borough assemblies within the city-state
of Hamburg. 62 This statute extended voting rights to aliens of all
nationalities, but, as qualifications, required eight years of residence in
the Federal Republic and a residence permit.163
A group of 224 members of the federal Parliament challenged both
statutes in original proceedings before the Federal Constitutional
Court. 164 In October 1989, the Court issued a preliminary order
157. Id. at 443; cf Isensee, supra note 106, at 302 (German citizenship would be discredited
and its democratic substance undermined by alien suffrage).
158. Bleckmann, supra note 114, at 442-43.
159. Id. at 442.
160. Judgment of Oct. 31, 1990, Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2d Sen., reprinted in 17
EUROPA SCHE GRUNDRECHTE-ZEITSCHRIFT [EuGRZ] 438, 439 (1990) [hereinafter Schleswig-
Holstein Case] (citing Act to Amend the Commune and County Election Act, Feb. 21, 1989).
These six nations were said to be the nations extending similar rights to Germans. Id.; cf. Tung,
supra note 32, at 453 (listing countries). Only a few cantons in Switzerland permit aliens to vote.
The statute did not include New Zealand, conceivably because New Zealand permits resident
aliens to vote but not to run for office. See Electoral Act 1956, §§ 25, 39, [1956] 2 Stat. N.Z.
1160, as amended by Electoral Amendments Act 1975, [1975] 1 Stat. N.Z. 205.
161. Schleswig-Holstein Case, supra note 160, at 439.
162. Judgment of Oct. 31, 1990, Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2d Sen., reprinted in 17 EuGRZ
445 (1990) [hereinafter Hamburg Case]. This case was complicated by the fact that Hamburg is
both a state (Land) and a municipality (Gerneinde), and that its seven boroughs (Bezirke) are
submunicipal entities in German local government law. See infra notes 189-95 and accompany-
ing text.
163. Hamburg Case, supra note 162, at 446 (citing Act to Introduce Aliens' Right to Vote in
Borough Assembly Elections, Feb. 20, 1989).
164. These members all belonged to the conservative CDU/CSU caucus. Schleswig-Holstein
Case, supra note 160, at 439; Hamburg Case, supra note 162, at 447. German law authorizes
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prohibiting the participation of aliens in the spring 1990 Schleswig-
Holstein elections. 165 Slightly more than a year later, and four weeks
after the unification of Germany on October 3, 1990, the Court issued
its final decisions, unanimously invalidating both statutes.
In its first decision, the Court held the Schleswig-Holstein statute
inconsistent with the second sentence of Article 28(1) of the Basic,
Law, which provides: "In each of the states, counties and communes,
the people must be represented by a body chosen in general, direct,
free, equal, and secret elections."' 66 The second decision was more-
complicated because the Hamburg boroughs were not themselves
counties or communes, but the Court held that, in light of the popular
sovereignty principle of Article 20(2), the Hamburg statute violated
the first sentence of Article 28(1), which provides: "The constitutional
order in the states must conform to the principles of republican demo-
cratic and social government based on the rule of law, within the
meaning of this Basic Law."' 167 Fundamental to both decisions was
the Court's interpretation of the term "people" (Volk) in the popular
sovereignty clause of Article 20.
1. The Schleswig-Holstein Alien Suffrage Decision
The Court began its analysis of the popular sovereignty clause at
the abstract level of political theory. As a democratic State, the Fed-
eral Republic
cannot be conceived of without a collection of persons that is the carrier
and subject (Trager und Subjekt) of the State authority exercised in it
and through its organs. This collection of persons forms the people of
the State (Staatsvolk), from which all State authority emanates. The
content of Article 20(2)(1) is therefore not that the decisions of State
authority must receive their legitimation from those who are affected by
them; rather State authority must have as its subject the people as a
group of human beings bound into a unity. 168
According to the Court, a systematic reading of the Basic Law
made clear who the members of that collection were: German nation-
als and those assimilated to the status of a German national under
certain governmental actors to seek "abstract" judicial review under circumstances that would be
considered "advisory" under the U.S. Constitution. See KOMMERS, supra note 47, at 15. A
group including one-third of the members of Parliament is so authorized, as is the administration
of a state, id., such as Bavaria, which also challenged the Schleswig-Holstein statute. Schleswig-
Holstein Case, supra note 160, at 442.
165. Judgment of Oct. 11, 1989, Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2d Sen., reprinted in 42 NJW
3147 (1989). The Hamburg statute would have permitted aliens to participate in elections after
January 1, 1991. Hamburg Case, supra note 162, at 446.
166. Schleswig-Holstein Case, supra note 160, at 439.
167. Hamburg Case, supra note 162, at 445.
168. Schleswig-Holstein Case, supra note 160, at 442 (author's translation).
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Article 116(1).169 Membership in the people, said the Court, is medi-
ated by nationality, which forms the legal prerequisite for civic rights
and duties. 70 This was confirmed by the designation of the German
people in the Preamble and Article 146 as possessor of the constitu-
tion-giving power, the guarantee of citizens' rights to Germans in Ar-
ticle 33, and even the wording of the official oath by which executive
officials dedicate themselves to the welfare of the German people.'"
Rather than considering the correspondence between traditional polit-
ical theory and the Basic Law as undermined by inclusion of the sta-
tus-Germans under Article 116, the Court maintained that an explicit
exception to the principle linking popular sovereignty with nationality
had been considered necessary in order to deal with the postwar
situation. 172
The Court denied that subsequent changes in circumstances
through the invited migration of foreign labor had produced a change
in the meaning of the popular sovereignty clause. 73 It agreed that
democratic ideals favored political rights for those subject to State
power in the long term, but concluded that under current constitu-
tional law this could only be accomplished through naturalization. 174
The Court went on to conclude that this interpretation of popular
sovereignty applied not only at the federal level, but also at the state
and local levels. Regarding the states, the Court quickly deduced this
broad application from the "homogeneity principle" articulated in the
first sentence of Article 28(1). 175 The controlling provision on the lo-
cal level, however, was the more specific second sentence of Article
28(1), requiring representation of "the people" in the states, counties,
and communes. 176 The Court explained at length its reasons for inter-
preting this latter provision as excluding aliens from the local
franchise.
The textual juxtaposition of states, counties, and communes sug-
gested, according to the Court, that a unified conception of the "peo-
ple" applied to all three. 177 In implementing the principle of
democracy in a federal system, this conception supplied a unified basis
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 442-43.
172. Id. at 443.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. The sentence is quoted in text accompanying note 167 supra.
176. The sentence is quoted in text accompanying note 166 supra.
177. Id.
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for legitimation of State authority at all territorial levels. 1 78 The Court
rejected as obsolete the vision of city government as a quasiprivate
corporate enterprise. 179 Local government was a portion of the state
structure, carrying out delegated tasks of administration and self-gov-
ernment within its assigned territory.8 0 Article 28 served to legiti-
mate this portion of the State through the participation of the local
segment of the legitimating subject of all State authority.' 8' The
Court rejected the analogy with functionally defined self-governing
bodies like universities and professional boards. 8 2
The historical development leading up to the 1949 Basic Law, the
Court continued, also confirmed the exclusion of aliens from the local
franchise. 83 The primary counterexample was the Prussian municipal
government scheme of 1808, but this scheme antedated the emergence
of a unified concept of Prussian nationality. 184 The Weimar Constitu-
tion of 1919 and the individual state constitutions reinforced the mod-
ern restriction of the local franchise to nationals.8 5 Against this
background, the drafters of the Basic Law would surely have ex-
pressed themselves unambiguously - and would have excited more
controversy - if they had intended to include alien residents among
the "people" of the communes. 8 6
Schleswig-Holstein's grant of the local franchise to certain catego-
ries of aliens was therefore held to violate Article 28(1)(2).187 The
Court emphasized in closing that this did not mean that Article 79(3)
prohibited a constitutional amendment to introduce local alien suf-
frage, as envisioned by current discussion in the European
Community.'
2. The Hamburg Borough Assemblies Case
The companion case was complicated by the submunicipal charac-
ter of the Hamburg boroughs. The Court concluded that the second
sentence of Article 28(1) was inapplicable, but that the grant of the
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 443-44.
182. Id. at 444.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 445. The constitutionality of permitting aliens to run for office was not decided,
since the two statutory grants did not appear severable. Id.
188. Id.
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franchise to alien residents in the boroughs violated the homogeneity
principle of the first sentence, because the borough assemblies did not
"conform to the principles of... democratic ... government ...
within the meaning of this Basic Law" as fashioned in the popular
sovereignty clause of Article 20.189
Relying on the Schleswig-Holstein decision, the Court maintained
that any exercise of State authority must be supported by a "chain of
legitimation" reaching back to the sovereign people, which did not in-
clude aliens.190 Democratic legitimation rested on the interaction of a
combination of factors relating to the institutional source of the au-
thority, external or immanent constraints on its exercise, and the mode
of selection of its personnel. 191 The discretionary authority to make
an official decision constituted a type of State authority requiring such
legitimation, although the need for all the legitimating factors to con-
tribute would vary with the degree of discretionary authority. 192
Applying these principles to the Hamburg borough assemblies, the
Court concluded that the assemblies exercised a broad range of gov-
ernmental powers delegated to them by the city-state, and that their
decisions were binding absent possible revision by the Hamburg execu-
tive council. 193 Hamburg had permissibly relied on direct elections as
the means of providing the necessary legitimation for these govern-
ment bodies. 194 But in that case,
the democratic principle within the meaning of the Basic Law is only
satisfied if the election gives effect solely to the will of the geographically-
limited portion of the people of the state, i.e., is conducted by the
Germans residing in the boroughs. Elections in which aliens are also
entitled to vote cannot convey democratic legitimation. 195
E. First Thoughts
The Federal Constitutional Court has thus held that popular sov-
189. Hamburg Case, supra note 162, at 450 (author's translation).
190. Id. at 448-49.
191. At this point, the Court prominently cited an article by one of its members, in which
these factors are more fully explained. Id. at 448-49 (citing B6ckenfarde, supra note 113, at 896).
The analyses of alien suffrage in this article and the opinions, and even their wording, are similar
in many respects, though there are also significant differences.
192. Id. at 449. The Court expressly distinguished advisory participation through auxiliary
councils and bodies of "experts." Id. Many opponents of the alien franchise had maintained
that these institutions were constitutionally permitted alternatives for the political participation
of aliens.
193. Id. at 451. The Court was uncertain as to the precise contours of the reserved authority
of the executive council (Senat) to revise the borough assemblies' actions, but perceived that the
assemblies had very substantial effective freedom of action. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. (author's translation).
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ereignty means rule by citizens alone, and that even a borough election
in which an alien could vote would not be "democratic" within the
meaning of the current German Constitution. The Court's opinions
were remarkable in several respects, as much for what they did not say
as for what they said.
The first striking feature of the opinions was their highly abstract
quality. Theory required that a State have a "subject" for its author-
ity, and it followed from tradition and textual interpretation that this
"subject" excluded aliens. Once the inquiry had been framed as an
effort to identify "the People," the conclusion of homogeneity seemed
natural. The people who voted in the towns and the people who voted
in the states and the people who voted for the federal Parliament were
the same as the people from whom State authority emanated, namely,
the German people, as defined by the legal institution of nationality
(supplemented by the status-Germans). 196
The opinions seemed little concerned with justifying the exclusion
of aliens from the electorate. The elaborate arguments of ines-
capability and the indissoluble link between citizen and State recurred
in the Court's brief summary of the parties' contentions, but they
played no explicit role in the Court's own reasoning. The Court also
left unaddressed the challengers' claim that alien suffrage would
amount to inappropriately similar treatment of persons who were not
similarly situated, thereby violating the rights of Germans to equality
before the law.
Moreover, the Court's reasoning avoided any endorsement of al-
leged differences disqualifying aliens from voting, including ignorance
of local conditions, vulnerability to pressures from abroad, irresponsi-
bility in adopting policies they could escape, inattention to German
national interests, and outright disloyalty. Such characteristics would
call into doubt any political participation of aliens, including the tradi-
tionally accepted participation of aliens in vehicles of "functional self-
determination" like universities, professional boards, and trade
unions. 197
196. The Court's simple equation even treated as identical two avatars of "the People" that
the scholarly literature had generally considered distinguishable, namely, the sovereign people of
Article 20(2), clause I of the Basic Law, and the active-citizenry people of Article 20(2), clause 2.
Compare, e.g., Schleswig-Holstein Case, supra note 160, at 442 with, e.g., 2 STERN, supra note 65,
at 24-25.
197. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. On the contrary, the Court distinguished
this arena, see Schleswig-Holstein Case, supra note 160, at 444, and a few months later the First
Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court did not even blink at a statutory requirement that
aliens be represented as a relevant social group on the governing boards of public and private
broadcasting entities, for the purpose of ensuring diversity in programming. Judgment of Feb. 5,
1991, Bundesverfassungsgericht, 1st Sen., reprinted in 18 EuGRZ 49, 77-78 (1991).
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As a result, the Court gave a persuasive reconstruction of the text's
intended meaning, but did not make the text as interpreted persuasive.
This silence may have proceeded not so much from formalism as from
the limited purpose of the Court's holdings. The Court found local
suffrage for aliens inconsistent with the principles of democracy as
currently framed in the Basic Law, not with any "essence" of democ-
racy. The Court defended this traditional conception, but not so
strongly as to dismiss as misguided the enfranchisement of long-term
resident aliens. The Court pointed out in the Schleswig-Holstein deci-
sion that it was not implying that Article 79(3) stood in the way of a
constitutional amendment to permit local alien suffrage. 198 The Court
mentioned only the European Community's proposal to enfranchise
Community nationals, but probably was not intimating that a broader
amendment - one including all resident aliens - would be
inadmissible. 199
The Court did not specifically address, even in passing, the admis-
sibility of an amendment allowing aliens to vote at the state or federal
levels, a purely academic question at present. One could read the
Court's nod to the European Community narrowly, as implying only
that an amendment could sacrifice homogeneity and remove local gov-
ernments from the sphere of direct popular sovereignty by widening
the local electorate. On the other hand, the Court's emphasis on the
"State" character of local government authority would argue against
this narrow interpretation. Moreover, the Court expressly recognized
the status-Germans as a positive exception to the citizens' monopoly
on the franchise, undermining the claim that the exclusion of all other
resident aliens from "the people" is a fundamental principle en-
trenched against constitutional amendment by Article 79(3).
The opinions also made no allusion to the extraordinary constitu-
tional event occurring between argument and decision - the accom-
plishment of unification. This may seem unremarkable, given the
likelihood that the opinions were largely complete before October 3,
but the text of some of the very provisions invoked by the Court was
amended as part of the unification process, 2°° and rather than quote
them the Court paraphrased them in terms general enough to be accu-
rate at either date.201
198. Schleswig-Holstein Case, supra note 160, at 445.
199. Nowhere in the opinions did the Court mention Article 24 of the Basic Law and the
"openness" of the legal order to Europe. Cf supra note 86-91, 147-49, and accompanying text.
200. See Treaty on the Establishment of German Unity, Aug. 31, 1990, F.R.G.-G.D.R., art.
4, 1990 Bundesgesetzblatt II 889, 30 I.L.M. 457, 465-66. The amended provisions invoked in the
decisions were the Preamble and Article 146.
201. See Schleswig-Holstein Case, supra note 160, at 442-43.
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Nonetheless, unification was relevant to the alien suffrage contro-
versy in two respects. One is the relationship between nationality and
the constitutional mandate for unification.202 An important theme in
the law of nationality under the Basic Law had been the care to pre-
serve the claim that a common German nationality shared by West
and East still existed despite the "temporary" division of Germany. 20 3
With the unexpectedly sudden achievement of unification and the de-
finitive abandonment of claims to the lands beyond the Oder-Neisse
line, 204 the legal fiction of a West Germany "partly identical" with the
former German Empire205 had served its purpose. Unification also
neutralized one of the odder claims in the debates on immigrant policy
(though not one that the Court might have been expected to affirm):
that West Germany needed to be protected from the influence of non-
German immigrants who would be indifferent to unification. 20 6 Yet it
was probably too soon to expect the Court to accept the claim that
nationality had lost its function in contemporary Europe, 20 7 especially
while national identification was being called upon to serve an integra-
tive function between "Ossis" and "Wessis. ' '208
The second link between unification and the alien suffrage deci-
sions concerned the European audience for the controversy. During
the period of the Court's deliberations, the high priority given to unifi-
202. For discussion in English of the unification mandate, see generally Alona E. Evans,
Federal Republic of Germany Case Note, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 147 (1976) (summarizing Judgment
of July 31, 1973, Bundesverfassungsgericht, 36 BVerftGE 1); Gregory v. S. McCurdy, Note, Ger-
man Reunification: Historical and Legal Roots of Germany's Rapid Progress Towards Unity, 22
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 253, 258-71 (1990).
203. See, e.g., Hailbronner, supra note 11, at 72-73; Evans, supra note 202, at 153; cf Bryde,
supra note 71, at 258 ("A thoroughgoing reform of nationality law is, however, politically dead-
locked for a variety of reasons. The most important has nothing to do with the aliens at all, but
rather with the explosiveness of the topic of nationality in relation to the German question.")
(author's translation).
204. Karl Kaiser, Germany's Unification, 70 FOREIGN AFF. 179, 200-02 (1991); Peter E.
Quint, The Constitutional Law of German Unification, 50 MD. L. REV. 475, 538-39, 599-605
(1991).
205. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 202, at 150; McCurdy, supra note 202, at 264-66; Quint,
supra note 204, at 481-82.
206. See, e.g., Hailbronner, supra note 11, at 75 ("Nor would the massive naturalization, say,
of one million Turks, contribute to the reunification of Germany, which - whether we like it or
not - is a fundamental constitutional principle legally binding for every German government.");
Quaritsch, supra note 144, at 496-97; Otto Uhlitz, Deutsches Volk oder "Multikulturelle Gesell-
schaft"?: Von den verfassungsrechtlichen Grenzen der Ausldnder- und Einbirgerungspolitik, 1986
RECHT UND POLITIK 143, 146. To the contrary, the Court noted the breadth of the legislature's
discretion in framing the law of naturalization, and emphasized it as a means for restoring the
congruence between the rulers and the ruled in light of the changed composition of the FRG's
population. Schleswig-Holstein Case, supra note 160, at 443.
207. See supra; RrrrsTIEG, supra note 25, at 55-59 (discussing the decreasing importance of
nationality in modem Europe).
208. See generally Mare Fisher, Germans Divided by 'Wall in the Head, WASH. POST, May
11, 1991, at Al.
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cation and the increased strength expected to result from it had cre-
ated insecurities in Germany's European neighbors. 2° 9 The Court's
analysis would inevitably form a -part of Germany's self-presentation
to Europe. It would have been an inopportune moment for the Court
to endorse the claim that the citizenship qualification for voting was
unamendable, thereby revealing that the FRG had joined the Euro-
pean Community with an implied reservation that other European cit-
izens could never be permitted to exercise political rights. As we have
seen, the Court went out of its way to disavow this claim (at least as
regards local elections), although neither a constitutional amendment
nor a statute directed to European Community voters was at issue.
Similarly, the abstractness of the opinions, avoiding references to dis-
loyalty, solidarity and "communities of fate," may have been as well-
chosen for the European as for the domestic audience.
Thus, the alien suffrage debate illuminates the German legal cul-
ture's dominant understandings of German identity and of the current
locally operative version of democracy. The "demos" includes only
German citizens and the status-Germans. This conclusion derives in
part from a political theory of the State as a collective actor. But it
also reflects the particular historical development of nationhood in
Germany, where the rise of a linguistic and cultural nationalism at the
beginning of the nineteenth century led to an emphasis on nationality
rather than residence as a crucial factor in defining a polity.210 In the
modem political culture of the FRG, Nationalismus is a pejorative
term, and the Federal Constitutional Court's endorsement of measures
to facilitate naturalization of resident aliens represents a distancing
from the nationalist past. Nonetheless, relics of nineteenth century
nationalism do persist in German law, such as the privileged position
of ethnic German immigrants. 21 1 These relics also inform the inter-
pretation of popular sovereignty that forbids the German people to
share political power with their fellow residents.
II. THE PRACTICE OF ALIEN SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES
The U.S. Constitution is, notoriously, even more oblique about
voting rights than the FRG's Basic Law.21 2 Article I provides, how-
ever, that the members of the House of Representatives shall be "cho-
209. E.g., Kaiser, supra note 204, at 192-94; McCurdy, supra note 202, at 298-300, 304-07.
210. See, e.g., PETER ALTER, NATIONALISM 58-61 (Stuart McKinnon-Evans trans., 1989);
Grawert, supra note 66, at 665-67; Hailbronner, supra note 11, at 73-74; Quaritsch, supra note
58, at 7-8.
211. See Hailbronner, supra note 11, at 73-74.
212. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1 (1982).
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sen every second Year by the People of the several States. '213 This
reference to "the People" could have been read as prohibiting alien
suffrage, as could the indirect statements of the popular sovereignty
principle in the Preamble and the Tenth Amendment. Nonetheless, it
appears to be settled doctrine that, so far as the federal Constitution is
concerned, alien suffrage is entirely discretionary - neither constitu-
tionally compelled nor constitutionally forbidden.
How did it come to be this way? Partly by long-settled practice.
But though the story involves pragmatism, it has not been uncompli-
cated by arguments of principle. The transformation from an early
system with a marginal role for alien suffrage to a system with very
substantial electoral participation of "declarant aliens" reflected con-
tention over the proper approach to suffrage in a country that deliber-
ately invited immigration.
A. The Progress of Alien Suffrage214
In order to appreciate the complex history of alien suffrage in the
United States, it is first necessary to confront the difficult history of the
law of citizenship. In the colonial period, the practices of British na-
tionality law had coexisted with a practice of local naturalization valid
only within a particular colony. 215 Citizenship in the individual states
was the dominant concept in the immediate post-revolutionary period,
though given extraterritorial consequences by the privileges and im-
munities clause of the Articles of Confederation. 216 The 1787 Consti-
tution added a concept of national citizenship, reinforced by a
congressional power over naturalization, 21 7 but did not specify the in-
tended relationship between citizenship in a state and in the nation. It
took three decades to settle the exclusivity of the federal power to nat-
uralize to national citizenship,218 and even thereafter the possibility of
213. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
214. In a well-known article in 1977, Gerald Rosberg called for a return to the tradition of
alien suffrage in the United States. Gerald A. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not
the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092 (1977). In sketching some of the precedents for alien
suffrage, Rosberg lamented the absence of an adequate history of the subject. Id. at 1093-94.
This article cannot hope to fill that gap, though it adds some further elements to the story. I
would be delighted to be superseded by a comprehensive treatment of this important subject.
215. See, e.g., JAMES H. KETINER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-
1870, at 74-77, 93-97, 103-05 (1978); JOHN P. ROCHE, THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED
STATES CITIZENSHIP 2 (1949).
216. KETTNER, supra note 215, at 219-24; see ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV.
217. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, ci. 2 (Representatives must have been citizens of the United
States for 7 years); id. § 3, cl. 3 (Senators must have been citizens of the United States for 9
years); id. § 8, cl. 4 (power to adopt uniform rule of naturalization); id. art. II, § 5 (President
must be a natural born citizen of the United States).
218. Compare Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259 (1817) (Marshall, C.J.) (power to
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state conferral of state citizenship seemingly remained. 219 The rela-
tionship of national citizenship to state citizenship was only partially
clarified by the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, which limited
the power of the states to withhold state citizenship from national citi-
zens.220 The Fourteenth Amendment also continued the tradition of
denying national citizenship to many Native Americans, who were
clearly U.S. nationals in the international sense.221 The divergence be-
tween "citizenship" and "nationality" only increased with the acquisi-
tion of overseas territories. 222
Some early examples of alien suffrage were linked with the confu-
sion over the relationship between state and federal citizenship. The
would-be state of Vermont had included in its Constitution of 1777 a
provision admitting foreigners to the rights of natural born subjects
after one year's residence and an oath of allegiance. 223 Vermont re-
naturalize exclusive) with Collet v. Collet, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 294 (C.C.D. Pa. 1792) (Wilson, Blair
and Peters, JJ.) (power to naturalize concurrent).
219. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405 (1857).
220. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). It does not
clarify the status of persons who are not "born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof," Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971), nor does it necessarily forbid the
conferral of a local, state citizenship. The Dred Scott decision had emphasized the proposition
that a state could legally recognize as its "citizens" persons who were not "citizens of the state"
within the meaning of the federal Constitution because they were not citizens of the United
States. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 405. The Fourteenth Amendment could
have been read as overturning this proposition, but the Court seems to have assumed its continu-
ing validity in Boyd v. Neb. ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 175 (1892), and it has occasionally been
reasserted in modern times. See, e.g., Crosse v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 221 A.2d 431
(Md. 1966); Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV.
487, 525-27 n. 162 (1981). Distinguishing between local state citizenship and constitutional state
citizenship may seem obscurantist because the distinction may have no practical significance at
present, particularly since aliens no longer vote in state elections and the federal government no
longer withholds citizenship from Native Americans.
221. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884); EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTEC-
TION OF CmZENS ABROAD OR THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS §§ 12, 216 (1915); FE-
LIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 520-523 (1st ed. 1942). Congress finally
extended citizenship to all Native Americans in 1924. See Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat.
253.
222. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(3), (21), (22), 1401, 1408 (1988); ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ, DE-
FINING STATUS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES TERRITORIAL RELATIONS
28 (1989).
223. See VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § 38. This provision, like much of the Vermont Consti-
tution, was copied from the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776. See PA. CONST. of 1776 § 42
("Every foreigner of good character, who comes to settle in this State, having first taken an oath
or affirmation of allegiance to the same, may purchase, or by other just means acquire, hold, and
transfer, land or other real estate; and after one year's residence, shall be deemed a free denizen
thereof, and entitled to all the rights of a natural born subject of this State, except that he shall
not be capable of being elected a representative until after two years residence."); see also
KETrNER, supra note 215, at 214 (noting the dependence of Vermont's Constitution on Penn-
sylvania's); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at
339 (1972) (same). Pennsylvania omitted that provision, however, from its superseding Constitu-
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tained the provision with only slight modification in its statehood Con-
stitution of 1793.224 Aliens appear to have voted freely in some parts
of Vermont, raising the concern that local practice conflicted with the
federal naturalization power. 225  The Constitution was amended in
1828 to redress this perceived conflict, although aliens who were al-
ready freemen were not deprived of their status.226 (Such transition
rules grandfathering in existing alien voters proved to be a frequent
feature of later suffrage "reforms.") The state of Virginia naturalized
and enfranchised aliens into the 1840s, 227 a practice that was briefly
debated by Congress in a contested election case. 228
Voter qualifications for both state and federal elections were in the
hands of the states. The federal constitutional convention had decided
against imposing uniform federal voting qualifications, 229 and had in-
stead specified that in the people's choice of Representatives "the Elec-
tors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of
the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature. ' 230 The Senators
tion of 1790, on the assumption that naturalization conflicted with the conferral of the naturali-
zation power on Congress in the federal Constitution of 1787. See United States v. Villato, 28 F.
Cas. 377 (C.C.D. Pa. 1797) (No. 16,622); cf PA. CONST. of 1790, art. III, § 1 ("In elections by
the citizens, every freeman .... ")
224. VT. CONST. of 1793, ch. II, § 39; see also VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. 2, § 36. Vermont
finally became a state in 1791, after New York, from which it had effectively seceded, ceased to
oppose admission. See Gary A. Aichele, Making the Vermont Constitution: 1777-1824, 56 VT.
HIsT. 166, 181-85 (1988).
225. See Journal of the Council of Censors, at their Sessions at Montpelier and Burlington in
June, October, and November 1827, at 5-6, 21-22, 31-32, 45-46 (1828) (explaining need for
amendment). The Council of Censors was a body elected every seven years to recommend revi-
sions in the state constitution. See VT. CONST. of 1793, ch. II, § 43; id. amend. 25 (1870) (abol-
ishing Council of Censors); WOOD, supra note 223, at 339; cf THE FEDERALIST No. 50 (James
Madison) (criticizing the Pennsylvania Council of Censors, from which it was copied). The Ver-
mont Council of Censors had also recommended denying aliens the right to vote for state officials
in 1814. See Journal of the Council of Censors, at their Sessions in June and October 1813 and
January 1814, at 28, 48-49 (1814).
226. See VT. CONST. of 1793 amend. 1 (1828) ("No person, who is not already a freeman of
this State, shall be entitled to exercise the privilege of a freeman, unless he be a natural-born
citizen of this or some one of the United States, or until he shall have been naturalized agreeably
to the acts of Congress.") The 1828 amendment appears not, however, to have precluded aliens
who were not freemen from voting in town and school district elections. See Woodcock v. Bol-
ster, 35 Vt. 632, 637-41 (1863).
227. See Va. Act of Dec. 23, 1792, ch. 110, § 2; cf Va. Code of 1849, tit. 2, ch. 3, § I
(recognizing as citizens of the state "all persons who have obtained a right to citizenship under
former laws," but omitting provision for further naturalizations).
228. See H.R. REP. No. 520, 28th Cong., 1st Sess. (1844); 1 HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES 1049-50 (1907).
229. See THE FEDERALIST No. 52 (James Madison). Similarly, in the drafting of the Fif-
teenth Amendment, proposals for comprehensive regulation of voter qualifications were rejected
in favor of a ban on discrimination "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV; see WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND
THE PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 59, 71, 77 (1969).
230. U.S. CONT. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
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were originally selected by the state legislatures, and therefore indi-
rectly by the state electors, and Article II left it to the states to decide
how Presidential electors would be chosen. 231 Because Congress was
empowered to propose constitutional amendments to be ratified by the
state legislatures, state electoral laws also conferred an indirect voice
in the amending process. 23 2
Alien suffrage was not, however, solely a policy of individual
states. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 expressed an initial federal
hospitality toward alien suffrage in the territorial governments.
Although the Ordinance was originally enacted by the Congress of the
Confederation, it was immediately reaffirmed by the first Congress
under the Constitution, without relevant change, 23 3 and its suffrage
provisions were incorporated into the organic acts of several later ter-
ritories.234 The Ordinance provided for elected representatives in the
territory once there were five thousand "free male inhabitants," and it
contemplated voting by both former citizens of the states and other
such "inhabitants. ' 235 Given the constitutional structure, this alien
suffrage was localized; territorial residents might elect officials with
territorial jurisdiction and nonvoting delegates to Congress, but the
territories did not participate in electing the federal legislature or exec-
utive. The tradition of alien suffrage in the territories gained wider
effect when two of the first states admitted from the Northwest Terri-
tory, Ohio and Illinois, conferred the franchise on "white male in-
habitants" rather than "citizens. '236
231. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, ci. 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. The Seventeenth Amendment, substi-
tuting direct popular election of Senators, made the qualifications for House and Senate electors
identical. Id. amend. XVII.
232. U.S. CONST. art. V. Article V also envisions other means, such as proposal by "a Con-
vention," and ratification "by Conventions." It does not say who is eligible to elect delegates to
the conventions; no proposing convention has yet been held, and the only historical instance of
ratification by conventions involves the Twenty-First Amendment, which was proposed after the
last state had abandoned alien suffrage. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 64 n.9 (2d ed. 1988).
233. See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50.
234. See Orleans Territorial Government Act, ch. 23, 2 Stat. 322 (1805); Michigan Territo-
rial Government Act, ch. 5, 2 Stat. 309 (1805); Mississippi Territorial Government Act (1798).
But see, e.g., Missouri Territorial Government Act, ch. 95, § 9, 2 Stat. 743, 745 (1812) (en-
franchising white male citizens of United States and other white male persons already resident at
the time of the Louisiana Purchase).
235. The Northwest Ordinance, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50 (1789) ("provided also, that a freehold in
fifty acres of land in the district, having been a citizen of one of the States, and being resident in
the district, or the like freehold and two years residence in the district shall be necessary to
qualify a man as an elector of a representative."). It should be recognized that "inhabitant," like
"resident," can have a technical legal meaning.
236. See ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. II, § 27; OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. IV, § 1; Spragins v.
Houghton, 3 Il. (2 Scam.) 377 (1840). It appears that Ohio later reinterpreted the term to
exclude alien residents. See id. at 410-13; Rosberg, supra note 214, at 1096-98 & n.32.
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With increasing levels of immigration from a variety of source
countries, the political rights of "foreigners" became more controver-
sial. Nativist movements, culminating in the Know Nothing Party of
the 1850s, favored restrictive immigration and naturalization policies,
and sometimes even the denial of political rights to naturalized citi-
zens. 237 During the first wave of nativist agitation in the 1830s, objec-
tions were raised in Congress to the admission of Michigan as a state
under a Constitution that enfranchised alien inhabitants. 238 Actually,
the enfranchisement of aliens by the original Michigan constitution
was rather modest, including only white male inhabitants who were
resident in the state at its effective date.239 Although Michigan did
gain admission, during the succeeding decade the organic act of every
new territory, and the constitution of every new state formed from the
territories, limited the franchise to citizens of the United States. 24°
237. See DAVID H. BENNETT, THE PARTY OF FEAR: FROM NATIVIST MOVEMENTS TO THE
NEW RIGHT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 39-155 (1988); FRANK G. FRANKLIN, THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF NATURALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 184-300 (1906); MALDWYN A. JONES,
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 147-61 (1960); cf R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. II, §§ 1, 2 (setting sepa-
rate property qualifications for native and normative citizens); MASS. CONST. of 1780, amend.
XX (1857) (adopting English literacy test).
238. See, e.g., 12 CONG. DEB. 1007 (1836) (remarks of Sen. Clayton); id. at 4251 (remarks of
Rep. Russell); see also 13 THE PAPERS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 126-36 (C. Wilson ed., 1980)
(version, of uncertain provenance, of Calhoun's speech on the issue). Alien suffrage was not the
only objection to Michigan statehood; the territory was engaged in a border dispute with Ohio
and Indiana, and had sought statehood without the prior blessing of Congress. See 12 CONG.
DEB. 1008-10 (remarks of Sen. Tipton); id. at 1015 (remarks of Sen. Ewing). In the absence of a
congressional enabling act, the territory had made its own definition of the voter qualifications
for the constitutional convention, and had included alien residents, thus further irritating the
nativists. See id. at 4252-53 (remarks of Rep. Russell). To avoid misunderstanding, perhaps I
should emphasize that I am not equating opposition to alien suffrage with nativism; Russell's
polemics against the Irish and call for a change in the naturalization law go beyond mere opposi-
tion to aliens' voting. See id. at 4253-59. A lengthy discussion of alien suffrage in Michigan as a
partisan dispute between Whigs and Democrats may be found in RONALD P. FORMISANO, THE
BIRTH OF MASS POLITICAL PARTIES: MICHIGAN, 1827-1861, at 81-101 (1971).
239. See MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. II, § 1; 12 CONG. DEB. 1008, 1014 (1836) (remarks of
Sen. Buchanan). These inhabitants would arguably be naturalized by the admission of Michigan
to statehood. See Boyd v. Neb. ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 167-68 (1892); 12 CONG. DEB.
4214, 4227-30 (remarks of Rep. Everett); see also infra notes 295-97 and accompanying text. Not
everyone in Congress viewed the issue in this light. See 12 CONG. DEn. 1032, 1043-45 (remarks
of Sen. Buchanan); id. at 4246-47 (remarks of Rep. Hamer); id. at 4253-57 (remarks of Rep.
Russell). A later, superseding constitution of 1850 expanded the electorate to include persons
who were unquestionably aliens, but had declared their intention to become citizens. See MICH.
CONST. of 1850, art. VII, § I.
240. Iowa Territorial Government Act, ch. 96, 5 Stat. 235 (1838); Wisconsin Territorial
Government Act, ch. 54, 5 Stat. 10 (1836); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 1; FLA CONST. of
1838, art. VI, § I (admitted 1845); ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. IV, § 2. Texas may present a
special case. Annexed from foreign territory, its statehood constitution enfranchised persons
who had been resident long enough for naturalization but had not taken the required oath of
allegiance to the Republic at the time of annexation. Compare TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. III,
§§ 1, 2 (qualifications of electors) with TEX. CONST. of 1836, § 6 (naturalization). It is unclear
whether annexation made these persons citizens of the United States. See 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 397
(1871).
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An innovation in Wisconsin opened up new ground for compro-
mise between the proponents and opponents of alien suffrage. In the
Wisconsin Territory of the 1840s, the Democratic Party sought the
support of the large immigrant population by emphasizing the links
between the Whigs and the nativist movement.241 This polarization
strategy resulted in an effort to revive alien suffrage. The statehood
Constitution ultimately adopted the compromise formula of permit-
ting white male aliens to vote if they had made a declaration of intent
to be naturalized under the federal naturalization laws.242 Since 1795,
federal naturalization procedure had provided that aliens must first
declare under oath to a competent court their intention to apply subse-
quently for citizenship (known colloquially as "taking out first pa-
pers"), and had postponed eligibility for actual naturalization
("second" or "final papers") until three years after the declaration. 243
The declaration could be made at any time after arrival, did not divest
aliens of their prior nationality, and did not legally oblige them to
complete the naturalization process.244 In fact, the declaration did not
even include an oath of present allegiance to the United States.245
Nonetheless, the declaration could be portrayed as some evidence of
attachment to the country, in order to broaden the base of support for
enfranchising noncitizens. 246
The declarant alien qualification for suffrage became increasingly
241. Louise P. Kellogg, The Alien Suffrage Provision in the Constitution of Wisconsin, 1 Wis.
MAG. HIST. 422 (1918). The politics of the issue were further complicated by the concentration
of immigrants in the eastern part of the future state. Id. at 425.
242. See WIs. CONST. of 1848, art. III, § 1; Kellogg, supra note 241, at 425.
243. See Act of January 29, 1795, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 414; FREDERICK VAN DYNE, CITIZEN-
SHIP OF ThE UNITED STATES 62 (1904). The delay between declaration and naturalization was
lengthened to five years by the Naturalization Act of 1798, part of the infamous Alien and Sedi-
tion Acts package, but cut back to three years in 1802. Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, § 1, 1 Stat.
566; Act of April 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 1, 2 Stat. 153. The 1906 Naturalization Act modified the
procedure so that an alien who did not petition for naturalization within seven years after filing
the declaration would have to start the process all over again. Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3592,
§ 4, 34 Stat. 596. Prior to that time, the declarant could wait indefinitely. Some states dealt with
the problem by limiting the declarants' suffrage rights to a period of years sufficient for naturali-
zation. See Mo. CONST. of 1865, art. II, § 18 (five years); N.D. CONST. of 1889, art. 5, § 121 (six
years).
244. VAN DYNE, supra note 243, at 62, 66; Rosberg, supra note 214, at 1098. This fact was
emphasized by opponents of alien suffrage. See, e.g., THE ATTAINMENT OF STATEHOOD 359,
365 (Wisconsin Historical Publications Vol. XXIX, Milo M. Quaife ed., 1928) (reprinting de-
bates of second constitutional convention).
245. An additional oath from aliens to support the state and federal constitutions had been
included in the first proposed Wisconsin constitution, but was regarded by many aliens as insult-
ing. This proposed constitution was rejected by the voters, apparently on other grounds. See
Kellogg, supra note 241, at 424; Frederic L. Paxson, Wisconsin - A Constitution of Democracy,
in THE MOVEMENT FOR STATEHOOD 1845-46, at 30, 42-43, 48 (Wisconsin Historical Publica-
tions Vol. XXVI, Milo M. Quaife ed., 1918).
246. See, e.g., "Letters of 'Jefferson' - No. 3," reprinted in THE MOVEMENT FOR STATE-
HOOD, supra note 245, at 194-95.
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common in the nineteenth century. Shortly after the admission of
Wisconsin, Congress adopted it in the organic act for the Oregon Ter-
ritory, and the next year for the Minnesota Territory. 247 Alien suf-
frage was not initially afforded, however, in the new lands acquired in
the Mexican War.248 Thereafter, Congress enfranchised declarant
aliens in the Washington, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, Dakota, Wyo-
ming, and Oklahoma Territories. 249  In all nine of these territories,
Congress imposed the additional requirement of an oath to support
the U.S. Constitution. 250
During the mid-1850s, the brief springtime of Know-Nothingism,
the Senate debated declarant alien suffrage in terms of both principle
and policy, and found itself closely divided. The Senate initially
adopted the Clayton amendment to the Kansas-Nebraska bill, exclud-
ing aliens from the electorate for the crucial first territorial legisla-
tures. 251 The sectional voting alignment, however, indicates that
support for the Clayton amendment actually turned on the expected
antipathy of immigrant electors to slavery, and when the Northern-
dominated House of Representatives rejected the amendment, all but
seven of its supporters in the Senate settled for the bill's other advan-
tages. 252 The debate was repeated in somewhat purer form in 1857,
247. Act of May 29, 1848, ch. 50, 9 Stat. 233 (admitting Wisconsin); Oregon Territorial
Government Act, ch. 177, § 5, 9 Stat. 323, 325 (1848); Minnesota Territorial Government Act,
ch. 121, § 5, 9 Stat. 403, 405 (1849).
248. See Utah Territorial Government Act, ch. 51, § 5, 9 Stat. 453, 454 (1850); New Mexico
Territorial Government Act, ch. 49, § 6, 9 Stat. 446, 449 (1850); see also CAL. CONST. of 1849,
art. II, § 1. I am not sure whether these restrictions have something to do with the fact that
Article VIII of the Treaty of Guadelupe Hidalgo gave Mexican citizens in these territories one
year to declare their election to retain Mexican citizenship, failing which they became United
States citizens.
249. See Oklahoma Territorial Government Act, ch. 182, § 5, 26 Stat. 84 (1890); Wyoming
Territorial Government Act, ch. 235, § 5, 15 Stat. 178, 180 (1868); Dakota Territorial Govern-
ment Act, ch. 86, § 5, 12 Stat. 239, 241 (1861); Nevada Territorial Government Act, ch. 83, § 5,
12 Stat. 209, 211 (1861); Kansas-Nebraska Act, ch. 59, §§ 5, 23 (1854); Washington Territorial
Government Act, ch. 90, § 5, 10 Stat. 172, 174 (1853). Congress initially enfranchised the free
white male inhabitants of the Idaho Territory, see Idaho Territorial Government Act, ch. 117,
§ 5, 12 Stat. 808 (1863), but the Revised Statutes restricted the franchise in all territories to
citizens and declarant aliens. Rev. Stat. § 1860 (1874).
250. See sources cited supra notes 247 and 249.
251. See CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 1st Sess. 520 (1854).
252. See id. at 1321; Robert R. Russell, The Issues in the Congressional Struggle Over the
Kansas-Nebraska Bill, 1854, 29 J. So. HIST. 187, 208 (1963); cf CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 1st
Sess. App. 301-02 (1854) (remarks of Sen. Atchison of Missouri) (explicit denial of this motive,
followed by offer to permit alien voting if postponed).
For some further realism on the subject of declarant alien suffrage, see id. at 780 (remarks of
Sen. Jones of Iowa) (emphasis deleted) ("I have had much experience in territorial elections ....
I can assure gentlemen that whether the Clayton alias Pearce amendment be adopted or not,
every white male inhabitant of Nebraska and Kansas, above the age of twenty-one years, will not
only be permitted to vote at their first elections, but will be expected, as good citizens, to exercise
the privileges always awarded to the sovereign squatter.").
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when alien suffrage provisions of the Minnesota statehood enabling act
were first struck, and then reinstated amid charges of foreign
influence. 253
Some, though not all, of the territories that permitted alien suffrage
retained it when they achieved statehood. 254 Older states also joined
the trend. 25 5 When Indiana and Michigan adopted new Constitutions
in the early 1850s, they enfranchised declarant aliens. 256 Reportedly,
this change reflected competition for immigrants among the midwest-
ern states.257 Numerous former Confederate states adopted the same
tactic, at least temporarily, after the Civil War.258
As the desire for new immigrants faded, so did the acceptance of
alien suffrage. In the 1890s, the closing of the frontier and increases in
immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe gave rise to a move-
ment for restriction of European immigration. The reaction against
these "new immigrants" ultimately led to the enactment of a literacy
requirement for immigrants in 1917, and the imposition of immigra-
tion quotas based on national origin in the 1920s. 259 Meanwhile, the
changing attitude toward immigration also led to the repeal of alien
suffrage provisions. 26° The First World War unleashed pervasive hos-
tility against Germans and German culture in the United States.
261
253. See CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3rd Sess. 808-14, 849-65, 872-77 (1857). But cf ERIC
FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 256 (1970) ("The vote indicated that most northern anti-Democratic
Congressmen were willing to forego nativism to secure the admission of another free state .... ).
254. See KAN. CONST. of 1859, art. V, § 1; MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. VII, § 1; NEB.
CONST. of 1867, art. II, § 2; N.D. CONST. of 1889, art. 5, § 121; OR. CONST. of 1857, art. II, § 2;
S.D. CONST. of 1889, art. VII, § 1; cf OKLA. CONST. of 1907, art. III, § 1 ("male citizens of the
United States, male citizens of the State, and male persons of Indian descent native of the United
States"). Montana and Washington limited their prospective enfranchisement to citizens while
grandfathering in declarant aliens. MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 2 (with five-year transi-
tion); WASH. CONST. of 1889, art. VI, § 1. But see NEV. CONST. of 1864, art. II, § 1 (citizens
only); WYO. CONST. of 1889, art. VI, § 5 (same).
255. Illinois, in contrast, imposed a citizenship requirement in 1848, while grandfathering in
present voters. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. VI, § 1.
256. IND. CONST. of 1851, art. II, § 2; MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. VII, § 1.
257. See, e.g., Rosberg, supra note 214, at 1098.
258. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1867, art. VII, § 2; ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 2; FLA.
CONST. of 1868, art. XIV, § 1; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 2; LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 185;
S.C. CONST. of 1865, art. IV ("an emigrant from Europe, who has declared his intention .... );
TEX. CONST. of 1876, art. VI, § 2; cf ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFIN-
ISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 213-14, 419-20 (1989) (discussing Southern efforts to en-
courage immigration). Missouri, also a former slave state, did likewise. Mo. CONST. of 1865,
art. II, § 18.
259. See, e.g., JONES, supra note 237, at 256-60, 269-270, 276-77.
260. See, e.g., 2 Official Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Ala-
bama, May 21st 1901, to September 3rd, 1901, at 2721-23 (1940); 3 id. at 3217, 3221-23; Ros-
berg, supra note 214, at 1099-1100.
261. See, e.g., JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NA-
TIVISM 1860-1925, at 207-12 (2d ed. 1988); JONES, supra note 237, at 271.
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This hostility, along with shock at the idea of voting by enemy aliens,
prompted several more states to abolish alien suffrage at that time.262
By 1928, no state afforded alien suffrage in statewide or federal elec-
tions.263 This situation persists in the United States today.264
It is more difficult to assess the current status of alien suffrage at
the local level. Alien residents are reportedly eligible to vote in munic-
ipal elections in several Maryland towns.265 Aliens also qualify as
electors and candidates in the decentralized school board of elections
of New York City and Chicago. 266 A referendum this past November
in Takoma Park, Maryland attracted media attention when voters nar-
rowly approved enfranchising alien residents.2 67 The victory has in-
spired discussion of undertaking similar efforts elsewhere, and we may
be beginning a new cycle of controversy over alien suffrage in the
United States. 268
B. The Ideology of Alien Suffrage
It would be pleasant to be able to say that the inclusion of aliens in
the electorate reflected U.S. ideals of universal democracy. To some
extent, this was true. The early nineteenth century saw a strong move-
ment toward abolition of property qualifications for the franchise in
the name of "universal manhood suffrage, ' 269 and the supporters of
alien suffrage invoked this ideal. 270 The Illinois Supreme Court con-
262. See HIGHAM, supra note 261, at 214, 376 n.50; KIRK H. PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUF-
FRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 252 (reprint 1969) (1918).
263. See Leon E. Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 AM. PoL. SCi. REV. 114
(1931).
264. Rosberg, supra note 214, at 1100.
265. See, e.g., SOMERSET, MD., CHARTER § 83-21 (1990); Beth Kaiman, Deciding Ballot
Rights; Takoma Park to Rule on Non-Citizen Vote, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1991, at M1 (listing
Somerset, Barnesville, Chevy Chase Sections 3 and 5, and Martin's Additions). I am indebted to
Jamin Raskin and Howard Lesnick for enlightenment on this subject.
266. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, paras. 34-1-1, 34-2-1 (1989) (parents and community resi-
dents, without citizenship qualification, eligible to vote and to run for local school councils);
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 81 n.15 (1979) (alien parents eligible as voters and candidates
in New York City community school board elections); N.Y.C. BOARD OF EDUCATION, COMMU-
NITY SCHOOL BOARD ELECTIONS 1989: AN ELECTION WHERE YOU CAN FEEL THE IMPACT
OF YOUR VOTEI 8 (n.d.) (on file with author).
267. See Beth Kaiman & Lynne K. Varner, Takoma Park Residents Favor Vote For Non-
Citizens in City Elections, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1991, at A30.
268. See Stephanie Griffith, Hispanics Seek Wider Clout in D. C and Va.; Takoma Park Ref-
erendum on Voting Eligibility Spurs Immigrants' Interest, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1991, at D6;
Melanie Howard, Vote to extend voting rights seen as likely to start a trend, WASH. TIMES, Nov.
7, 1991, at B3 (noting both expressions of interest from Texas and California, and opposition of
Federation for American Immigration Reform).
269. See generally CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTY TO
DEMOCRACY 1760-1860 (1960).
270. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess., App. 769 (1854) (remarks of Sen.
Seward) ("ITlhe right of suffrage is not a mere conventional right, but an inherent natural right,
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cluded that its constitution extended
the right of suffrage to those who, having by habitation and residence
identified their interests and feelings with the citizen, are upon the just
principles of reciprocity between the governed and governing, entitled to
a voice in the choice of the officers of the government, although they may
be neither native nor adopted citizens. 27 1
Some members of the Democratic Party, which traditionally relied on
the immigrant vote, emphasized their party's name and ideals, seeking
to strengthen the immigrants' partisan identification in the face of the
threatening countertrend of nativism. 272 The fact that the Democratic
Party particularly opposed voting rights for black citizens, and that
women's suffrage enjoyed little support in any party, may indicate the
limits of this "universality. '27 3
Alien suffrage was also urged for instrumental reasons, as an en-
couragement to immigration.2 74 The argument was sometimes made
in competitive terms - that immigrants' choices of destination could
be influenced by the early grant of political rights, and that states
which insisted on naturalization as a prerequisite for voting were sad-
dling themselves with a competitive disadvantage. 275
To others, alien suffrage ruptured the fundamental connection be-
tween citizenship and voting, and threatened the ideal of popular sov-
ereignty.2 76  A striking parallel to the German decisions on alien
suffrage may be seen in an 1811 opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, analyzing the principles of apportionment for the
state house of representatives. 277 The court began with the "unques-
of which no Government can rightly deprive any adult man who is subject to its authority, and
obligated to its support.")
271. Spragins v. Houghton, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 377, 408 (1840).
272. See, e.g., Henry A. Chaney, Alien Suffrage, 2 PUBLICATIONS MICH. POL. Sci. ASS'N
130, 132-33 (1894) (quoting from debate at 1850 Michigan constitutional convention); To Persons
of Foreign Birth, in THE MOVEMENT FOR STATEHOOD, supra note 245, at 439-41.
273. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, supra note 269, at 278; ELLEN CAROL DuBois, FEMINISM AND
SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 1848-
1869, at 40-47 (1978).
274. See, e.g., Spragins, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) at 398; PORTER, supra note 262, at 130-31 (citing
Minnesota constitutional convention); The Constitution - No. 8, in THE STRUGGLE OVER RAT-
IFICATION 1846-1847, at 488-489 (Wisconsin Historical Publications Vol. XXVII, Milo. M.
Quaife ed., 1920).
275. See CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess. App. 297 (1854) (remarks of Sen. Pettit) (dis-
cussing 1851 Indiana constitution); Chaney, supra note 272, at 134 (discussing 1850 Michigan
constitutional convention).
276. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 371, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. (recommending bill to bar aliens
from voting in the territories); CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 864-65 (1857) (remarks of
Sen. Crittenden); id. at 874-76 (remarks of Sen. Bell); CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess. App.
775-79 (remarks of Sen. Bayard).
277. Opinion of the Justices, 7 Mass. 523 (1811). The occasion for the analysis was a request
from the House of Representatives for an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of a proposed
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tioned principle" that
as the supreme power rests wholly in the citizens, so the exercise of it, or
any branch of it, ought not to be delegated by any but citizens, and only
to citizens.... And if the people intended to impart a portion of their
political rights to aliens, this intention ought not to be collected from
general words, which do not necessarily imply it, but from clear and
manifest expressions, which are not to be misunderstood. 278
The court therefore concluded that the provisions authorizing "in-
habitants" or "residents" to vote must be construed as referring solely
to citizens. But so long as aliens gained no political rights thereby,
poll taxes paid by aliens could be taken into account in apportioning
representatives to the towns.279
Many Southern politicians, however, coupled opposition to alien
suffrage with a states' rights insistence that sovereignty entailed the
state's power to enfranchise whomever it pleased. 280 They asserted in-
stead, as a matter of policy, that a newly arrived immigrant had no
attachment to U.S. political institutions.281 As their principal concern
was presumably the institution of slavery, the overwhelming prefer-
ence of immigrants to live in the free states suggests that, in a sense,
they were correct.282
States that excluded aliens from the electorate did not necessarily
pursue citizen sovereignty to the logical extreme of denying aliens all
opportunity for political participation. Sometimes aliens were eligible
voters in municipal elections, though not in statewide elections. 283 A
Vermont court deemed it "a wise policy in the Legislature to allow
[aliens] to participate in the affairs of these minor municipal corpora-
tions, as in some degree a preparatory fitting and training for the exer-
cise of the more important and extensive rights and duties of
citizens. '284 Aliens also performed a unique role in self-government
method of apportionment; the Supreme Judicial Court has jurisdiction to render advisory opin-
ions at the request of the legislature. See MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. III, art. II.
278. 7 Mass. at 525; see also id. at 529 ("that we might not unnecessarily fix on the people an
intention of imparting any of their sovereignty to aliens").
279. Id. at 529; see MASS. CoNST. of 1780, pt. 2, ch. I, § III, art. II (allocating representa-
tives according to number of "rateable polls" in the town).
280. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 809 (1857) (remarks of Sen. Brown); id. at
811-12 (remarks of Sen. Mason); id. at 813 (remarks of Sen. Butler).
281. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 811-12 (1857) (remarks of Sen. Mason);
CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1307 (1854) (remarks of Sen. Butler); id. at 765 (remarks of
Sen. Brown).
282. See, e.g., FONER, supra note 253, at 236. At the same time, many immigrants to free
states were indifferent or hostile to abolitionism. Id. at 230-31; JONES, supra note 237, at 159-69.
283. See Stewart v. Foster, 2 Binn. 110 (Pa. 1809) (borough elections); Woodcock v. Bolster,
35 Vt. 632 (1863) (school district). On local alien suffrage today, see supra notes 265-68 and
accompanying text.
284. Woodcock v. Bolster, 35 Vt. at 640-41. The court also noted that alien parents would
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through jury service285 in those states that preserved the English prac-
tice of permitting an alien defendant to be tried by a jury de medietate
linguae, or mixed jury, composed half of citizens and half of aliens.286
The states that gave aliens full voting rights were not necessarily
indifferent to the concept of popular sovereignty. Most of their consti-
tutions included express popular sovereignty clauses, typically stating
that all (political) power was "inherent in the people. ' 287 Some states
merely accepted the fact that aliens as well as citizens could vote. But
others sought to reconcile popular sovereignty with alien suffrage by
concluding that alien voters were citizens of the state, though not of
the United States. The Wisconsin Supreme Court confronted this
problem in a series of cases in the 1860s. 288 The court explained at
length in In re Wehlitz that, as far as state law was concerned, declar-
ant aliens were citizens of Wisconsin:
[A]lthough it may be possible for the state to confer the right of voting
on certain persons without making them citizens, yet I should think it
would require very strong evidence of a contrary intention to overcome
the inference of an intention to create a citizenship when the right of
suffrage is conferred .... the rights of voting and holding office are al-
be more likely to be supportive of the public education of their children if they were permitted to
participate in the management of the schools. Id. at 641.
285. For a recent reiteration of the character of jury service as a political right, see Akhil
Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1187-99 (1991).
286. See, e.g., United States v. Cartacho, 25 F. Cas. 312 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (No. 14,738);
People v. M'Lean, 2 Johns. 381 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1807); Richards v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. (11
Leigh) 690 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1841); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *346. The institu-
tion of the mixed jury, with its deliberate focus on the juror's alienage, must be distinguished
from the practice of simply including aliens among those eligible as jurors. See, e.g., People v.
Scott, 56 Mich. 154 (1885) (declarant aliens, being electors, are eligible as jurors).
Interestingly, the majority in Richards criticized the mixed jury practice and construed it as
discretionary in the trial court, but not on the grounds that alienage was incompatible with the
powers of a juror. Rather, the majority contended that the mixed jury was less appropriate to
U.S. circumstances because aliens were welcomed and did not face prejudice, and because a
mandatory rule would supersede property qualifications and might place "fugitives and
vagabonds" on the jury. 38 Va. (II Leigh) at 695-97.
287. Eg., ALA. CONST. of 1867, art. I, § 3; ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST. of
1868, Declaration of Rights, § 2; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 2; IND. CONST. of 1851, art. I,
§ 1; KAN. CONST. of 1859, Bill of Rights, § 2; MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 1; N.D. CONST. of
1889, art. I, § 2; OR. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 1; S.D. CONST. of 1889, art. VI, § 26; TEX. CONST.
of 1876, art. I, § 2. Other states declared that all power was "vested in and derived from the
people," e.g., COLO. CONST. of 1876, art. II, § 1; Mo. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 4, or tracked the
Declaration of Independence by characterizing governments as "deriving their just powers from
the consent of the governed," e.g., NEB. CONST. of 1867, art. I, § 1; WIS. CONST. of 1848, art. I,
§ 1.
288. In re Conway, 17 Wis. 543 (1863); In re Wehlitz, 16 Wis. 468 (1863); State ex rel. Off v.
Smith, 14 Wis. 539 (1861). In the latter case, the court agreed with the Massachusetts court's
analysis of popular sovereignty, and concluded that the state Constitution impliedly barred
nondeclarant aliens from holding elective office, while conferring "the right of suffrage and privi-
leges of citizenship" on declarant aliens. 14 Wis. at 542-43 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 7
Mass. 523 (1811)).
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ways given as the most complete and perfect attributes of citizenship. 289
The court described the independence of state citizenship from U.S.
citizenship as an acceptable consequence of the dual-sovereign system
of federalism. 29° A few other state courts similarly construed declar-
ant alien voters as citizens of the state,291 and Alabama expressly de-
clared their citizenship in its reconstructed Constitution. 292
Whatever Alabama may have thought, the Supreme Court was
certain that aliens were not citizens of the state within the meaning
of the federal Constitution. While rejecting the claims of women's suf-
frage in Minor v. Happersett, the Court denied any necessary connec-
tion between citizenship of the state and the right to vote, and
observed that
citizenship has not in all cases been made a condition precedent to the
enjoyment of the right of suffrage. Thus, in Missouri, persons of foreign
birth, who have declared their intention to become citizens of the United
States, may under certain circumstances vote. The same provision is to
be found in the constitutions of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, and Texas. 293
The federal courts were equally sure that unnaturalized alien voters
were not "citizens of a State" for diversity purposes. 294
Even the federal courts, however, relied on the intuition that vot-
ers, being members of the political community, must surely be citi-
zens, in developing a doctrine of collective naturalization upon the
admission of a territory to statehood. The issue appears to have arisen
first in Louisiana, where both the state and federal courts held that the
congressional enabling act, by authorizing the noncitizen inhabitants
to participate in the formation of a state constitution, had recognized
289. 16 Wis. at 473.
290. 16 Wis. at 470-71 (citing Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)).
291. See State ex rel .Uche v. Fowler, 6 So. 602 (La. 1889) ("It is, however, difficult to
conceive how a person can be an elector and not a citizen of the community in which he exercises
the right to vote."); Abrigo v. State, 29 Tex. Crim. 143 (1890). There are also ambiguous deci-
sions from Indiana. See McCarthy v. Froelke, 63 Ind. 507, 511 (1878); Thomasson v. State, 15
Ind. 449 (1860).
292. See ALA. CONST. of 1867, art. III, § 2 ("That all persons resident in this State, born in
the United States, or naturalized, or who shall have legally declared their intention to become
citizens of the United States, are hereby declared citizens of the State of Alabama, possessing
equal civil and political rights and public privileges."); see also ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. I, § 2
(similar). Alabama phased out declarant alien suffrage in 1901. See ALA. CONST. of 1901, art.
VIII, § 177.
293. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 177 (1874). The case arose in Missouri. Id. at 163. The Court's
list was, of course, incomplete.
294. See, e.g., City of Minneapolis v. Reum, 56 F. 576 (8th Cir. 1893); Lanz v. Randall, 14 F.
Cas. 1131, 1133 (C.C.D. Minn. 1876) (No. 8,080) (Miller, Cir. J.) ("The error has arisen from the
same confusion of ideas which induced the advocates of female suffrage to assert, in the supreme
court, the right of women to vote.").
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them as citizens of the future state.295 The Supreme Court eventually
confirmed a version of this doctrine in Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel
Thayer, maintaining that the admission of a state naturalizes "those
whom Congress makes members of the political community, and who
are recognized as such in the formation of the new State with the con-
sent of Congress. ' 296 Since only citizens and declarant aliens had been
permitted to vote on the Nebraska Constitution, however, the Court
concluded that only declarant aliens and their families were natural-
ized by the admission of Nebraska. 297
Where voting was restricted to declarant aliens, it could be argued
that the modification of citizen sovereignty was modest. As early as
1803, St. George Tucker had maintained in his edition of Blackstone
that declarant aliens stood in an intermediate status between aliens
and citizens, having "disclaimed" their former allegiance, and that the
United States had a duty to complete their naturalization. 298
Although the federal government did not adopt Tucker's view of the
limitations on its power to deny naturalization, it did treat declarant
aliens in some respects as inchoate citizens, 299 and responded to their
anomalous situation. At various periods, the federal government is-
295. Desbois's Case, 2 Mart. 185, 192-93 (La. Super. Ct. 1812); see also United States v.
Laverty, 26 F. Cas. 875 (D. La. 1812) (No. 15,569a) (British and Irish immigrants to the terri-
tory cannot be arrested as alien enemies in War of 1812, following Desbois). The Alabama
Supreme Court held otherwise in State v. Primrose, 3 Ala. 546 (1842), but the theory of that
opinion is not inconsistent with the Louisiana cases (which the Alabama court had heard of but
had not read). Rather, the Alabama court incorrectly believed that only United States citizens
had been permitted to vote on the statehood constitution.
296. Boyd v. Neb. ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 170 (1892). The doctrine of collective natu-
ralization also entails that grandfather clauses for alien inhabitants of new states may sometimes
have been redundant.
297. Id. at 175-77. James Boyd did not fit precisely into this category, but the Court held
that he was a constructive declarant by virtue of a declaration made by his father in Ohio when
James was a minor. Id. at 178-79.
298. BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES Appendix, Note L at 100 (St. George Tucker ed.,
1803) (emphasis deleted).
[W]hen he has, in compliance with the laws, made the requisite declarations of his intention
to become a citizen, and to renounce for ever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
or state, and particularly that prince or state whereof he was last a citizen or subject, he
seems to have acquired a right, of which no subsequent event can divest him, without violat-
ing the principles of political justice, as well as of moral obligation. For the government, in
requiring this declaration of renunciation on the part of the alien, previous to his admission
to the rights of citizenship, and that at a very considerable period before his right can, by the
rule prescribed, be consummated, tacitly engages not to withdraw its protection from him;
and much more, not to betray him, by sending him back to that sovereign, whose allegiance
he had, in the most solemn manner, disclaimed, and whose subject and adherent he could no
longer be considered to be ....
Id. Tucker seems to have overstated the effect of declaring a present intent to renounce one's
allegiance at a future date, but he proved to be right that declarants were risking a loss of the
former sovereign's protection. See BORCHARD, supra note 221, at 567-68.
299. See, e.g., Boyd, 143 U.S. at 178-79; Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 47, § 2, 2 Stat. 292 (when
declarant dies before naturalization, widow and children immediately eligible for naturalization).
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sued passports to declarant aliens, and it intermittently asserted the
authority to protect domiciled declarant aliens when they traveled
outside the United States. 300 One famous instance involved the forci-
ble rescue of the Hungarian emigr6 Martin Koszta from Austrian
agents in Turkey.301
The federal government has also viewed declarant aliens as partic-
ularly fair game for military conscription. The history and theory of
drafting aliens in the United States has been quite complex.302 The
inclusion of declarant aliens in the first federal draft, during the Civil
War, appears to have reflected both the large pool of immigrant man-
power and an insistence that prospective citizens who were already
voting should share the burden of military service.30 3 This conscrip-
tion provoked a flurry of diplomatic correspondence, 3°4 which was re-
solved by permitting a declarant alien to avoid the draft if he
abandoned his intention to naturalize and left the country, but only if
he had not yet voted.30 5 It deserves to be emphasized that alien
soldiers fought for the North in the Civil War, and that alien voters
were among the People who adopted - by hook or by crook3°6 - the
Civil War Amendments. Declarant aliens were also designated for
conscription in the Spanish-American War and the First World
War.
30 7
300. See Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 1, 34 Stat. 1228; Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 79, § 23,
12 Stat. 754; BORCHARD, supra note 221, at 500-02, 567-70; VAN DYNE, supra note 243, at 68-
76.
301. See BORCHARD, supra note 221, at 570-74; cf In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890)
(describing Koszta affair as instance of inherent executive power). For a popularized account,
see ANDOR KLAY, DARING DIPLOMACY: THE CASE OF THE FIRST AMERICAN ULTIMATUM
(1957).
302. See, e.g., William W. Fitzhugh, Jr. & Charles C. Hyde, The Drafting of Neutral Aliens
by the United States, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 369 (1942); Charles E. Roh, Jr. & Frank K. Upham, The
Status of Aliens Under United States Draft Laws, 13 HARV. INT'L L.J. 501 (1972).
303. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 1, 12 Stat. 731. The drafting of declarant aliens was
added as a floor amendment in the Senate. It was originally proposed by Sen. Doolittle of Wis-
consin (a state where declarants could vote), in a form that limited conscription to declarants
who had actually voted. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 991-92 (1863) (remarks of Sen.
Doolittle). The amendment was voted down, id. at 993, but the proposal was successfully rein-
troduced by Sen. McDougal of California (a state where only citizens could vote) in a form that
conscripted all declarants, regardless of whether they had ever voted, id. at 1001 (remarks of Sen.
McDougal).
304. See Compulsory Service, 4 MOORE DIGEST § 548, at 53-56; Passports, 3 MOORE Di-
GEST § 495 AT 871-72; Fitzhugh & Hyde, supra note 302, at 372-73. The problem had already
arisen in 1862 with regard to the state militias. See id. at 372.
305. See Presidential Proclamation of May 8, 1863, 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESI-
DENT 168 (James D. Richardson ed., 1899); Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, § 18, 13 Stat. 9 ("no
person of foreign birth... who has at any time assumed the rights of a citizen by voting...
Fitzhugh & Hyde, supra note 302, at 373.
306. See Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.
1013, 1065-69 (1984).
307. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 2, 40 Stat. 77; Act of Apr. 22, 1898, ch. 187, § 1, 30 Stat.
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Thus, the ideology of declarant alien suffrage in particular may
have reflected a broad concept of democracy, but it also rested on an
empirical view of European immigrants as future U.S. citizens. The
latter aspect becomes especially salient when one recalls the racial im-
plications of declarant alien suffrage. Prior to 1870, only "free white
persons" could be naturalized under the general naturalization laws,
and so only whites could participate in the declaration of intent pro-
cess. 3 8 In 1870, "aliens of African nativity and persons of African
descent" were made eligible for naturalization, but the ineligibility of
other immigrants, most prominently the Chinese, was deliberately
maintained. 30 9 The Fifteenth Amendment addresses the question of
racial discrimination in voting, and prohibits disenfranchisement only
of citizens of the United States.310 Far from implying the impropriety
of alien suffrage, this limitation resulted from a clear recognition that
aliens did vote, and a fear that a broadly written amendment would
force Pacific coast states to permit Chinese immigrants to vote.3 11 The
practical operation of declarant alien suffrage after the Civil War in-
cluded exclusion of Chinese and other Asian immigrants from the
franchise. Chinese immigrants finally became eligible for naturaliza-
tion in 1943,312 but by then the period of declarant alien suffrage was
over.
361; Fitzhugh & Hyde, supra note 302, at 372-75; see also Selective Training and Service Act of
1940, ch. 720, § 3(a), 54 Stat. 885 (making citizens and declarant aliens liable for service). But
see Act of December 20, 1941, ch. 602, § 2, 55 Stat. 845 (extending liability for service to
nondeclarant resident aliens); Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, ch. 144,
§ l(d), 65 Stat. 75 (making aliens admitted to permanent residence and other aliens remaining in
the U.S. more than a year liable for service). I omit here the later history of provisions by which
aliens who were willing to renounce the possibility of American citizenship could seek exemption
from service.
The declaration of intent was dropped from the naturalization procedure in 1952, see 8
U.S.C. § 1445(f) (1988), and is no longer relevant to selective service law, see 50 U.S.C. App.
§§ 453(a), 454(a), 456(a)(1) (1988).
308. See Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103.
309. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 256; see CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess.
5121-25, 5148-77 (1870).
310. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
311. GILLETrE, supra note 229, at 56, 90. Senators William Stewart of Nevada (the propo-
nent of the Fifteenth Amendment in the Senate, see id. at 54-61, 70-75), John Conness of Califor-
nia, and Henry Corbett and George Williams of Oregon successfully opposed Charles Sumner's
attempt to have the limitation to citizens struck from the amendment. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th
Cong., 3d Sess. 1030-35 (1869). The Oregon state constitution both permitted declarant aliens to
vote and expressly prohibited voting by any "negro, Chinaman, or mulatto." OR. CONST. of
1857, art. II, §§ 2, 6. Opposition to ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in Oregon was
based on the view that it might still lead to suffrage for the Chinese, and Oregon gratuitously
voted to reject the amendment after it had already been adopted. GILLErrE, supra note 229, at
153-57. Of course, the Fifteenth Amendment did lead to such suffrage in one respect, once it was
confirmed that children born to Chinese immigrants in the United States were American citizens.
See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
312. See Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, § 3, 57 Stat. 601.
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It might not be too much of an exaggeration to regard declarant
alien suffrage in the latter half of the nineteenth century as a compro-
mise with locally undesired effects of the "uniform rule of naturaliza-
tion" clause. The Constitution had assigned an exclusive power of
naturalization to Congress, and those states that wished to assimilate
immigrants more quickly than the national majority could only confer
nonconstitutional state citizenship or grant particular rights of citizen-
ship notwithstanding alienage. 313 Congress, in turn, was hampered by
the uniformity requirement in differentiating among the territories.
Declarant alien suffrage served as a de facto acceleration of the pro-
cess, targeted at those whose naturalization was welcome.
C. Second Thoughts
The foregoing narrative account of alien suffrage in the United
States provides only a limited basis for contrast with the German ap-
proach. At this stage of the analysis, the principal contribution of the
American experience is the fact of alien voting. Unquestionably a
commitment to popular sovereignty coexisted with widespread en-
franchisement of persons who were not yet nationals of the United
States. In some instances, a democratic ideal of resident suffrage justi-
fied this policy. In other instances, the instrumental goals of an inten-
tional "country of immigration" with a federal division of powers
determined the outcome. Few in the United States saw an inherent
contradiction in the popular sovereign's sharing political power with
aliens, but history does not indicate a uniform theoretical basis for the
practice. Later, in Part III, an attempt to determine the place of alien
voters within the framework of current constitutional conceptions of
voting rights in the United States will provide a more informative basis
for comparison.
Turning from a comparison of theories to a comparison of effects,
it must be admitted that the predominant form of alien suffrage in the
states, enfranchisement of declarant aliens, deserves mixed reviews as
a response to the American "immigrant problem." In the face of the
antebellum nativist movement, swift enfranchisement of immigrants
may have afforded some local protection and decreased the incentives
of the major national parties to adopt antiforeign policies. On the
other hand, European immigrants were entitled to naturalization after
five years anyway. Asian immigrants - not only "Chinese laborers,"
313. It may be worth mentioning that before 1900, federal immigration law had not yet
developed to the point where the risk of being deported gave European immigrants an incentive
to naturalize.
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whose further immigration was barred after 1882, 3 14 but also those not
yet barred - could neither naturalize nor vote. The denial of voting
rights to persons racially ineligible for citizenship, circumscribed by
the wording of the Fifteenth Amendment, leaves the United States lit-
tle standing to criticize the FRG's failure to enfranchise immigrants
from Turkey.
We may congratulate ourselves, however, on bringing the disen-
franchisement to an end after one generation, by means of the jus soli
principle of citizenship. As regards whites, this principle was origi-
nally taken for granted as part of the common law inheritance, and it
comported well with the United States's original Enlightenment self-
image as an ideological republic open to like-minded immigrants. 315
A primary purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to extend this
principle to African-Americans. 31 6 In the 1890s, amid the heyday of
an American nationalism identified with racial Anglo-Saxonism, 317 the
Supreme Court affirmed that the Fourteenth Amendment also guaran-
teed the citizenship of children born to Chinese parents in the United
States, notwithstanding Congress's anti-Chinese immigration and nat-
uralization policies. 31 8
More recently, the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of citizen-
ship to children born in the United States, regardless of ancestry, has
evolved into a disavowal of an ethnically restrictive national iden-
tity.3 19 The United States has largely repudiated the tradition of ro-
mantic nationalism that influenced the German constitutional
conception of a Nation State. 320 As a consequence, discrimination by
race or nationality in naturalization has been repealed.3 21 In the
314. See Act of May 6, 1882, 22 Stat. 58.
315. See HANS KOHN, AMERICAN NATIONALISM: AN INTERPRETIVE ESSAY 135-41 (1957).
But see PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL
ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 52-53, 90-91 (1985) (findingjus soli principle expressive of
liberal society's openness to immigration, but in tension with liberal theory's emphasis on
consent).
316. See, e.g., SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 315, at 74-75.
317. See, e.g., KOHN, supra note 315, at 157-60; RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWIN-
ISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 170-84 (1955 ed.); Rogers M. Smith, The "American Creed" and
American Identity: The Limits of Liberal Citizenship in the United States, 41 W. POL. Q. 225,
233-36 (1988).
318. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
319. See, e.g., KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND
THE CONSTITUTION 196-97 (1989); Smith, supra note 317, at 245-46.
320. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
321. See 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (1988). Ironically, racial neutrality was not achieved until the
much-criticized McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 311, 66 Stat. 239. The English lan-
guage requirement, however, first adopted in 1906, still persists. See 8 U.S.C. § 1423 (1988);
Ricardo Gonzalez Cedillo, A Constitutional Analysis of the English Literacy Requirement of the
Naturalization Act, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 899 (1983) (finding invidious effect on Hispanic citizens).
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United States, unlike the FRG, naturalization is available as of
right,3 22 and naturalization rates for resident aliens are generally high,
with significant exceptions among immigrants from Latin American
countries.323 These factors, rather than theoretical objections, proba-
bly explain why so little effort has been made in recent years to revive
alien suffrage in the United States.
III. PERSONS AND PEOPLES
In this Part, I will employ insights gained from the discussion of
the German alien suffrage debate to serve two discrete goals. The first
and lengthier effort (subpart A) will be to determine how a revival of
alien suffrage would fare under the currently operative constitutional
understanding of democracy in the United States. Does the American
conception of government by the people determine a single definition
of the electorate that necessarily excludes alien residents? Because
alien suffrage has rarely been debated here in the modern period, it
will be necessary to approach this question indirectly, by considering
other constraints on the construction of the political community. Ulti-
mately, this examination will suggest that, in the United States, a lib-
eral interpretation of democracy as facilitating individual self-
determination supports the conclusion that enfranchisement of alien
residents is a permissible option.324
The second, briefer inquiry (subpart B) will focus on alienage as a
legal status category that submerges individuals in a fictive shared
identity. The German discussion vividly illustrates how this status
discourse can be used to promote negative generalizations about
noncitizens, a phenomenon that has also occurred in U.S. debates.
322. The principal qualifications for naturalization are five years' residence, good moral char-
acter, the ability to write and speak simple English, a basic knowledge of United States history
and government, and being attached to constitutional principles and well disposed to the good
order and happiness of the United States. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1423, 1427 (1988). At the time of natural-
ization, the applicant must renounce prior allegiances and take an oath of allegiance to the
United States. Id. at § 1448.
323. See, e.g., Louis DeSipio, Social Science Literature and the Naturalization Process, 21
INT'L MIGRATION REV. 390 (1987); Harry P. Pachon, An Overview of Citizenship in the Hispanic
Community, 21 Ir, r'L MIGRATION REV. 299, 299-301 (1987) (1980 census figures indicate that
66% of all eligible residents had naturalized, but only 35% from Mexico, and an average of 43%
for South America). After ten years in the United States, 44% of all Latino residents were
naturalized, id. at 301; by comparison, a German author reports that as of 1985, only 0.5% of
aliens with 10 or more years' residence in the FRG were naturalized. Hailbronner, supra note
11, at 70. The lower rate of Hispanic naturalization could lead to greater interest in alien suf-
frage among Hispanic rights organizations. See Griffith, note supra note 268.
324. I will not revisit here the argument that the United States Constitution itself requires
alien suffrage, for which see Rosberg, supra note 214. I believe that the constitutional text, cus-
tom, political theory, and the inclusiveness of the naturalization laws, taken together, preclude
the conclusion that limiting the franchise to citizens denies resident aliens the equal protection of
the laws.
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A. "Defining the Political Community"
The conditions that made declarant alien suffrage politically at-
tractive in the United States have receded into history, and the very
existence of the practice is widely forgotten. It is therefore reasonable
to ask whether contemporary constitutional understandings in the
United States differ from those expressed by the Federal Constitu-
tional Court. That Court rejected an interpretation of "das Volk" as
referring unspecifically to the mass of the governed. In light of tradi-
tional German political theory, the Court found it normatively attrac-
tive to say that the "subject" of popular sovereignty has a determinate
referent, defined by citizenship. The peculiar constitutional history of
the United States has rendered the identity of "the People" far more
contestable, 325 but the Supreme Court has spelled out the rudiments of
political theory in language that suggests substantial agreement with
the German conception of democracy:
The exclusion of aliens from basic governmental processes is not a
deficiency in the democratic system but a necessary consequence of the
community's process of political self-definition. Self-government,
whether direct or through representatives, begins by defining the scope
of the community of the governed and thus of the governors as well:
Aliens are by definition those outside of this community. Judicial incur-
sions in this area may interfere with those aspects of democratic self-
government that are most essential to it.326
This passage appears to be intended not as a mere description of a
particular state's law, but rather as a statement of correct democratic
principle. It bears some resemblance to a judicial incursion, dictating
that the states should exclude aliens from the political community.
The Supreme Court has employed similar locutions in other mod-
em cases addressing the "political" rights of aliens. 327 In justifying
deferential review of a state's exclusion of its alien residents from vari-
ous forms of government employment, Justices have oscillated be-
325. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987);
Simeon E. Baldwin, The People of the United States, 8 YALE L.J. 159 (1899); Gerald L. Neuman,
Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 917, 949-51, 972-74 (1991).
326. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439.40 (1982) (White, J.). Justice Marshall
quoted from this passage without reservation in Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 221 (1984).
327. The modern Supreme Court has never had occasion to reconsider the constitutional
permissibility of alien suffrage; rather, it has faced a series of cases alleging unconstitutional dis-
crimination against aliens in the reservation of certain jobs, benefits, and activities to citizens. A
much-discussed series of cases between 1973 and 1984 evolved an equal protection approach
under which the states, though usually forbidden to discriminate against their alien residents, are
free to exclude them from a fairly broad category of public employment viewed as closely related
to the process of self-government. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a Human Face:
Justice Blackmun and the Equal Protection ofAliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51 (1985). The Court
summarily rejected a claim that denial of the franchise to aliens violates equal protection in
Skafte v. Rorex, 430 U.S. 961 (1977), dismissing appeal from 553 P.2d 830 (Colo. 1976).
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tween a description of the exclusion as reflecting the state's "broad
power to define its political community" 328 and an invocation of the
state's "obligation 'to preserve the basic conception of a political com-
munity.' ",329 One does not need to be a Hohfeldian to recognize that
there is a critical difference between a power and an obligation, and
the hint that even "the basic conception" is at risk only heightens the
contrast.330 Not surprisingly, in 1979 a German comparativist who
opposed political rights for aliens in the FRG seized on this "obliga-
tion" argument as evidence that granting aliens political rights would
also be unconstitutional in the United States. 331
In doctrinal terms, it is easy to dismiss these intimations as dicta,
since the cases themselves clearly hold only that the various disqualifi-
cations of aliens are permissible, and most of their language stresses
the state's discretion. One of the cases upheld a statute excluding
voluntarily nondeclarant aliens from employment as public school
teachers, while admitting declarant aliens and even "excusable"
nondeclarants. 332 Indeed, in that case the Court noted without objec-
tion that in New York City alien parents are permitted both to vote
for and to be elected to local school boards. 333 It is hard to believe, in
view of the long history of alien suffrage in the United States, that the
Supreme Court would interfere with a state's attempt to restore it.
Nonetheless, one may wonder whether the Court's acceptance would
reflect a triumph of history over principle. Or does principle support a
power of community self-definition broad enough to include a state's
discretion to enfranchise alien residents?
It is first necessary to clarify what "defining the political commu-
nity" should mean. Unless the Court was referring solely to events in
the distant past, it cannot mean constituting a new political commu-
nity from a state of nature. Rather, the Court was invoking the ongo-
ing process of community self-definition through the maintenance or
328. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. at 440; Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 643
(1973) (Blackmun, J.); see also Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) (Blackmun, J.)
329. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978) (Burger, C.J.); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. at 647; see also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 74 (1979) (Powell, J., quoting Sugarman).
James O'Fallon has trenchantly criticized this "obligation" rationale for deference, although he
too seemed to arrive at a right answer thesis. See James M. O'Fallon, "To Preserve the Concep-
tion of a Political Community," 57 U. DET. J. URn. L. 777 (1980).
330. See also Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 299 (1978) (Burger, C.J.) (it would be "anoma-
lous to conclude that citizens may be subjected to the broad discretionary powers of noncitizen
police officers"). Query: should the exclusionary rule apply?
331. VON KATrE, supra note 57, at 151.
332. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. at 68.
333. Id. at 81 n.15; see also id. at 86-87 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); supra note 266 and ac-
companying text.
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restructuring of an already organized community or a portion thereof.
The rules for distribution of the electoral franchise represent one
method for marking off the boundaries of the political community,
though not the only one. The rules determining qualification for office
often differ from the rules for voting, and persons who are not entitled
to vote still have other opportunities to make persuasive contributions
to the political process. There are "passive" members of the commu-
nity whose interests are entitled to the special consideration owed to
members, but who receive only "virtual representation." For exam-
ple, the children of "active" members, or formerly "active" members
who have lost the competence to act for themselves,334 are surely
within "the community of the governed," unless that term is twisted
into a synonym for the electorate. The disenfranchisement of felons
could be viewed as reducing them to passive status, or alternatively as
a thinly veiled equivalent of banishment from the community.335
The ideal type of the republic may be a small unitary State with no
crime, no physical or mental illness, and no children. The United
States and Germany, however, are both large federal States, with
crime, illness, children - and resident aliens. The political communi-
ties actually engaged in "basic governmental processes" in such States
are narrower than the entirety of the community. I will focus here on
the rules of electoral qualification, though without forgetting that they
define a community within a community.
1. On the Correctness of a Polity
The move toward universal citizen suffrage, in the sense of over-
turning restrictions of class, property, race, religion, and gender, has
been a great achievement. But it could mislead us into concluding
that questions of electoral qualification always have unique right an-
swers. Modern legal doctrine on voting rights could have a similar
tendency. In the United States, restrictive voting qualifications, with a
few traditional exceptions, are now subject to "strict scrutiny" under
the Equal Protection Clause. When the permissible qualifications are
cumulated they define a constitutionally privileged category of citizens
(nonfelonious residents over the age of eighteen, etc.), which I will call
the "core electorate." The breadth of this core electorate in the
334. The Supreme Court has not recently reexamined the traditional exclusion from the elec-
torate of "insane persons," see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 214 (1971) (Harlan, J.), and it is
often omitted from summaries of voting rights law. But see Manhattan State Citizens' Group v.
Bass, 524 F.Supp. 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (disenfranchisement of all involuntarily committed per-
sons overbroad; adjudication of incompetence required).
335. The alternative is argued in Note, The Disenfranchisement of Felons: Citizenship, Crimi-
nality, and "The Purity of the Ballot Box," 102 HARV. L. REv. 1300 (1989).
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United States is a measure of the success of egalitarian reforms. Mem-
bers of the core electorate have not infrequently succumbed to the
temptation to identify the core electorate with the political commu-
nity, and to regard any enfranchisement of others as a dilution of their
votes and a violation of their rights.
For example, 'in Katzenbach v. Morgan,336 New York City voters
sought an injunction against enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, to the extent that it exempted persons who had been educated in
Spanish in Puerto Rico from New York State's English literacy quali-
fication. The Supreme Court had upheld literacy requirements only
seven years earlier, 337 and it avoided overruling that decision. 338 In-
stead, it responded that the extension of voting rights could be upheld
as within Congress's power on either of two grounds: because Con-
gress had concluded that the English literacy test itself operated as an
invidious discrimination against Puerto Rican residents, 339 or "as a
measure to secure for the Puerto Rican community residing in New
York nondiscriminatory treatment by government ... [in] the provi-
sion or administration of governmental services, such as public
schools, public housing and law enforcement. ' 340 In other words,
even if persons literate only in Spanish were not within the core electo-
rate, Congress could extend the franchise to them as a means of pro-
tecting their rights.
Expansion of a political community beyond its core electorate also
occurs in connection with residence requirements. The contours of
the law are less settled here, but the issues deserve close attention,
since this is the context where the Supreme Court first employed the
rhetoric of "preserv[ing] the basic conception of a political commu-
nity." In Dunn v. Blumstein, the Court set narrow limits on states'
durational residency requirements, but indicated in dictum that a "re-
quirement of bona fide residence may be necessary to preserve the ba-
sic conception of a political community, and therefore could withstand
close constitutional scrutiny."' 34'
How necessary? From the positivist perspective, it should be rec-
ognized that the text of the federal Constitution repeatedly expresses
an assumption that residence or inhabitancy indicates political mem-
336. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
337. Lassister v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
338. 384 U.S. at 649; see also Cardona v. Power, 384 U.S. 672, 674 (1966) (remanding case to
determine whether ruling on constitutionality of literacy requirement as applied to persons not
covered by Voting Rights Act can be avoided).
339. 384 U.S. at 656.
340. Id. at 652.
341. 405 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1972).
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bership in a state, though without specifying it as a sine qua non.34 2
The constitutional text is silent on the subject of membership in a
political subdivision, as it is on all other matters of local government.
Residence is clearly one reasonable basis for inclusion in a political
community. 343 Empirically, residence provides a useful predictor of
the frequency with which an individual will be affected by the actions
of a territorially restricted governmental unit. (Residence also serves
legally as a basis of government jurisdiction, but this is as much a
consequence as a justification of the ascription of residents to the polit-
ical community.) Within limits, residence is voluntary and each per-
son has only one place of residence at a given time,344 so that residing
may be viewed as a consensual undertaking of political allegiance.
Common residence supplies some of the preconditions for ideal poli-
tics, by intertwining the interests of the residents in a multiplicity of
issues that affect them jointly, and by creating opportunities for con-
tinuing face-to-face interaction within which dialogic politics can oc-
cur. On the other hand, the importance of residence may be
exaggerated by reliance on the mental image of the small unitary re-
public in which people live, work, and carry on all their other impor-
tant activities. 345
Despite these advantages of residence as a qualification for mem-
bership, Congress has twice overridden requirements of residence
within a state for federal election purposes. Less than two years before
Dunn v. Blumstein, the Supreme Court validated a provision of the
1970 Voting Rights Act Amendments that gave former residents of a
state the right to cast their votes in the state in presidential elections, if
they made an interstate move too close to the date of the election to
vote in their state of actual residence.3 46 Six Justices upheld this grant
as part of an amelioration of the conflict between durational residence
342. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (Representatives must be inhabitants of states from
which they are elected); id. § 3, cl. 3 (same for Senators); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (members of
electoral college must cast one of their two votes for an inhabitant of a state other than their
own); id. amend. XII (same); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (persons born or naturalized in United States
are citizens of state wherein they reside); id. § 2 (decreasing representation in House for states
disenfranchising inhabitants on certain grounds).
343. See C. Edwin Baker, Republican Liberalism: Liberal Rights and Republican Politics, 41
FLA. L, REV. 491, 498-501 (1989).
344. Efforts to specify residence uniquely are important to districting schemes within a polit-
ical community, where double-counting must be avoided.
345. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II - Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 346, 413-14 (1990).
346. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). It is fair to say that the Justices' opinions
conferred very little of their attention on this aspect of the statute. The government's brief pro-
vided a more explicit defense. See Brief for the United States, at 53, 57.
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requirements and the right to interstate travel;347 they thus permitted
facilitation of other constitutional rights to prevail over a residential
definition of the constituencies for the electoral college.348 Building on
this decision, Congress has granted U.S. citizens who reside abroad,
and who have no intention of returning, the right to vote in their states
of most recent former domicile in both presidential and congressional
elections. 349 The legislative history includes findings that this grant
was necessary to protect the interests of citizens who had exercised the
right of international travel. 350  The constitutionality of this statute
has not been resolved, but it seems only incrementally more dubious
than the provision the Court upheld.351 The statute clearly rejects the
view that current residence is an indispensible element for membership
in a political community. 352
347. See 400 U.S. at 236-39 (Brennan, White and Marshall, JJ.); id. at 292 (Stewart and
Blackmun, JJ. and Burger, C.J.). Justices Black and Douglas had idiosyncratic reasons for up-
holding the statute, and Justice Harlan considered it unconstitutional as an interference with
state prerogatives. Id. at 134 (Black, J.); id. at 147-50 (Douglas, J.); id. at 213-16 (Harlan, J.).
348. It may be customary to speak of the President as responding to a single national constit-
uency, but the national political community is not so easily defined. A constitutional amendment
was considered necessary to include the citizens of the District of Columbia in the presidential
electorate, see U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, and the citizens of the other territories are still ex-
cluded. The problem of citizens residing in other countries is addressed in text immediately
following this note.
349. See Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-203, 89 Stat. 1142
(current version codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff-1973ff-6 (1988)); Dilworth & Montag, supra note
145, at 271. Citizens who have never resided in the United States, however, are not enfranchised
by the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-6(5) (1988).
350. H.R. REP. 649, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7 (1975) ("American citizens outside the United
States do have their own Federal stake - their own U.S. legislative and administrative interests
- which may be protected only through representation in Congress and in the executive
branch."). Citizens residing abroad may more plausibly be said to constitute a discrete group
with interests in need of protection than may citizens who moved interstate thirty days before an
election. It should be observed, however, that Congress has not extended similar rights to citi-
zens of the states who relocate to the territories. Cf Attorney Gen. of Guam v. United States,
738 F.2d 1017, 1018 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting claim that enfranchising overseas voters but not
citizens of the territories violates equal protection, and noting that rights of former state citizens
residing in Guam had not been specifically raised).
351. See Dilworth & Montag, supra note 145, at 32; cf H.R. REP. No. 649, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 13-19 (1975) (minority views doubting constitutionality). The fact that Congress has not
required the states to enfranchise these extra federal voters in state elections might have caused
trouble, in view of the clauses in Article I and the Seventeenth Amendment linking the qualifica-
tions for congressional elections with those for the most numerous branch of the state legislature,
but this seems unlikely after the Supreme Court's loose interpretation of those clauses in Tashjian
v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 225-29 (1986) (qualifications for congressional elec-
tions may be no stricter than qualifications for state legislature elections, but may be less strict).
Overseas voters are not double-counted in United States elections, although they may also enjoy
voting rights in the countries where they reside, either as enfranchised aliens or as dual nationals.
352. In this connection, it is interesting to observe that German constitutional law has af-
forded the legislature considerable discretion with respect to the voting rights of overseas citi-
zens. Residence in the federal territory is one of the traditional qualifications that the Federal
Constitutional Court has regarded as consistent with the requirement that elections be "general."
See, e.g., Judgment of Oct. 7, 1981, Bundesverfassungsgericht, 58 BVerfGE 202. This rule was
obviously necessary in the period before unification; given the common nationality of East and
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The requirement of residence for inclusion in the political commu-
nity has also been relaxed in the context of local government. The
courts have usually been quite accepting of enfranchisement of nonres-
idents who have identifiable interests to defend. In 1962, at the outset
of the Warren Court's engagement with voting rights issues, the Court
summarily upheld a voting scheme for a seaside resort town that ex-
tended the franchise to residents of the surrounding county who
owned property in the town.3 53 As the district court had noted, this
voting scheme represented a compromise solution to the conflict be-
tween summer residents and year-round residents for control of a mu-
nicipality in which the nondomiciled minority owned a majority of the
taxable property.354 This dispute might be viewed as a struggle over
the definition of a community that included permanent part-time
members whose primary identification was with another community,
although it should be observed that county residents who owned prop-
erty solely for investment purposes were also enfranchised. 355 In other
respects, the hybrid qualification of residence or property ownership
reflects a melding of an earlier republican system in which traditional
property qualifications defined the core electorate with the class-egali-
tarian conception of democracy that the Court would soon be cham-
pioning.3 56 It thus raises the question whether criteria that cannot be
West Germans, the entire citizenry of East Germany would otherwise have been entitled to vote
in West German elections. The Court has repeatedly upheld the limitation of extraterritorial
voting rights in federal elections to soldiers and government employees stationed abroad and
their households, although in 1981 it suggested that the legislature would eventually have to
extend this right to German citizens residing abroad as officials of the European Community.
Id.; see Dilworth & Montag, supra note 145, at 32. The current statute extends voting rights to
all Germans who had maintained residence in the federal territory within the ten years preceding
the election, and to all Germans who formerly resided in the FRG but now reside in the territory
of a member state of the Council of Europe. See Bundeswahlgesetz (Federal Election Act)
§ 12(2)(1)(2,3); Judgment of Nov. 2, 1990, Bundesverfassungsgericht (Kammer), 41 NJW 689
(1991) (rejecting discrimination complaint of German who had never resided in FRG).
353. Spahos v. Mayor of Savannah Beach, 371 U.S. 206 (1962), aff'g mem., 207 F.Supp. 688
(S.D. Ga. 1962); Glisson v. Mayor of Savannah Beach, 346 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1965) (following
Spahos). The lower courts have not regarded these holdings as outdated. See, e.g., Collins v.
Town of Goshen, 635 F.2d 954, 958 (2d Cir. 1980) (Friendly, J.); Brown v. Board of Comm'rs,
722 F.Supp. 380, 398 (E.D. Tenn. 1989); Ortiz v. Hernandez Colon, 385 F.Supp. 111, 115
(D.P.R. 1974), vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness, 429 U.S. 1031 (1977).
354. Spahos v. Mayor of Savannah Beach, 207 F.Supp. at 690.
355. Only a "substantial majority" of the nonresident property owners were summer resi-
dents. Id. Moreover, non-county-residents and non-property-owning summer residents were not
enfranchised; the district court observed that the discrimination against property owners residing
outside the county was not before it. Id. at 692; see also Oliver v. Mayor of Savannah Beach, 346
F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1965) (procedurally defective effort to challenge this discrimination).
356. Since the mid-1960s, the Supreme Court has displayed great hostility to property quali-
fications that exclude local residents from voting, and has denied the superiority of propertied
voters. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Quinn v.
Millsap, 109 S. Ct. 2324 (1989) (rejecting as irrational a requirement of freehold as qualification
for election to local government reorganization board).
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used to disenfranchise members of the core electorate on the basis of
insufficient interest in the political process can be used to identify in-
terested persons outside the core electorate for inclusion in the polit-
ical community. 357
Economic discrimination among nonresident members of the polit-
ical community of a summer resort provided the focus for a more re-
cent circuit decision involving qualifications for candidacy.3 58 There
the court struck down the requirement that nonresident freeholders
running for city commission not be delinquent in their local taxes.3 59
One judge concluded that "[t]he City's commendable effort to en-
franchise nonresidents and to insure nonresidents' participation in the
leadership of the City does not ipso facto permit conditioning nonresi-
dent candidacy on tax non-delinquency. ' '360 She added:
I believe that a community that opens participation in its political pro-
cess to nonresidents can limit that participation to persons with some
attachment to the community. This may present one of those rare
"other circumstances" referred to in Turner v. Fouche "in which a prop-
erty qualification for office-holding could survive constitutional scru-
tiny," . . . as long as the City provided a comparable opportunity to
nonresident candidates without the economic means to be freeholders,
such as one based on a record of consistent seasonal renting or
employment. 36'
Other courts, however, have afforded the states considerable discretion
for enfranchisement of nonresidents of a city who own property within
its limits and are therefore subject to its taxing authority.3 62
357. See Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners'Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1519,
1542 (1982) (doubting whether current doctrine would permit this).
358. See Deibler v. City of Rehoboth Beach, 790 F.2d 328 (3d Cir. 1986). The qualifications
for candidacy define a slightly different segment of the political community than the qualifica-
tions for voting, but they are closely related, and it may be recalled that the Supreme Court's
recent dicta concerning exclusion of aliens from the political community occurred in cases in-
volving public employment.
359. 790 F.2d at 337. The constitutionality of the freeholder qualification itself was not
before the court. Id. at 330.
360. Id. at 339 (Sloviter, J., concurring). A dissenting judge argued that because nonresi-
dents had no constitutional entitlement to run, the city should be freer to define their qualifica-
tions for candidacy. Id. at 340-41 (Weis, J., dissenting). The third judge rejected the non-
delinquency qualification, but noted in passing his doubt that enfranchising nonresidents was
permissible at all. Id. at 331, 336 (Ziegler, J.).
361. Id. at 340 (citing Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 364 (1970) (invalidating freehold
qualification for candidacy to school board)).
362. See Snead v. City of Albuquerque, 663 F.Supp. 1084 (D.N.M. 1987), aff'd mem., 841
F.2d 1131, cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988) (upholding extension of right to vote on city indebt-
edness referendum to county residents only if they own property in city and paid property tax in
preceding year); Brown v. Board of Comm'rs, 722 F.Supp. 380, 397-400 (E.D. Tenn. 1989)
(extension of municipal franchise to nonresident freeholders not unconstitutional on its face, but
irrational and thus unconstitutional if multiple owners of parcel of trivial value all can vote).
Different considerations control the Supreme Court's approval of property-based voting in
the "special-purpose district" elections that it has considered immune from the usual franchise
[Vol. 13:259
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The interests of "nonresident" taxpayers have been accommodated
without economic discrimination in a series of lower court cases typi-
fied by the efforts of county residents to exclude from county school
board elections the residents of a city within the county that has a
separate school system. 363 The challenged voters were, cartographi-
cally speaking, residents of the county, but they could be regarded as
nonresidents of the county's district in a substantive sense; this charac-
terization is reinforced by the fact that several decisions have found
unconstitutional vote dilution. 364 With one early exception,3 65 the de-
cisions look only for a "substantial interest" of the city residents in the
county board's operations to justify their votes. The courts have
found a "substantial interest" in either a significant financial contribu-
tion to the county budget or the use of county services by a significant
number of city residents; 366 the threshold of substantiality may depend
on the degree of "dilution" produced by including the city voters. 367
rules. See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981). On the other hand, if these districts were not
"political communities" in any sense, denying voting rights to citizens of other states might be
constitutionally questionable. Cf Millis v. Board of County Comm'rs, 439 U.S. 802 (1978), aff'g
mem., Millis v. High Drive Water District, No. 75-M-1021 (D. Colo. Jan. 18, 1978) (limiting
water district elections to state residents consistent with federal Constitution); Porterfield v.
Boening, 744 P.2d 468 (Ariz. 1987) (voters in irrigation districts need not be residents of state).
363. See, e.g., Sutton v. Escambia County Bd. of Educ., 809 F.2d 770 (1 th Cir. 1987); Creel
v. Freeman, 531 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1976); see also Collins v.
Town of Goshen, 635 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1980) (water service district); Cantwell v. Hudnut, 566
F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1978) (police and fire service districts). For
simplicity, I refer to a city within a county and school systems; the types of units involved in
these cases vary, although the relation of geographic inclusion is always present.
These cases all involve ongoing relationships; there is a separate body of cases dealing with
annexation and secession referenda. See, e.g., Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community
Action, 430 U.S. 259 (1977); Fullerton Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 654
P.2d 168 (Cal. 1982).
364. See Hogencamp v. Lee County Bd. of Educ., 722 F.2d 720 (11th Cir. 1984); Phillips v.
Andress, 634 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1981) (school board); Locklear v. North Carolina Bd. of Elec-
tions, 514 F.2d 1152 (4th Cir. 1975); cf Cantwell v. Hudnut, 566 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1977) (revers-
ing district court's finding of unconstitutionality).
365. Locklear v. North Carolina Bd. of Elections, 514 F.2d at 1154-56 (applying strict scru-
tiny, and finding city residents' interests in county's transportation, special education and re-
source center services fail to create compelling interest justifying "dilution" of county residents'
votes).
366. See Sutton, 809 F.2d at 774 (attendance in county schools and interaction in provision
of services); Hogencamp, 722 F.2d at 722 (insufficient contribution of students and dollars to
amount to substantial interest); Collins v. Town of Goshen, 635 F.2d at 959 (taxes); Phillips, 634
F.2d at 950-51 (insufficient contribution of students and dollars to amount to substantial inter-
est); Cantwell, 566 F.2d at 35 (taxes and provision of police and fire services at work places of
many nonresidents); Creel, 531 F.2d at 289 (attendance in county schools and tax revenues);
Clark v. Town of Greenburgh, 436 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1971) (taxes and a few municipal services).
367. See, e.g., Phillips, 634 F.2d at 951 ("We conclude that this measure of support is insuffi-
cient to justify the inclusion of so many otherwise disinterested electors as to reduce by over one-
half the weight of the votes cast by those who actually reside in the county system's jurisdic-
tion"); Creel, 531 F.2d at 289 ("particularly when there is no evidence of invidious discrimina-
tion which might arise from domination of elections by Jasper and Carbon Hill voters.").
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These cases do not discuss the possibility of enfranchising only the city
residents who use the services or pay the taxes. The latter alternative,
of course, would bring back into prominence the issue of economic
discrimination that the overinclusive residence qualification avoids.
The Supreme Court has not yet spoken to this type of city-county
district dispute. It might pursue the same analysis as the lower courts.
Alternatively, it might avoid more than cursory inquiry into the non-
residents' interests, by giving the state's formal definition of the bor-
ders of a political subdivision the same deference in considering claims
of overinclusiveness that it gave in considering claims of underinclu-
siveness in Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa.368 That decision up-
held the denial of voting rights in city elections to county residents
who were subject to the city's "police jurisdiction" but not to the full
measure of governing powers the city enjoyed within its borders. Jus-
tice Rehnquist conceded that their claim had some appeal in light of
"this country's tradition of popular sovereignty," but responded that if
they were constitutionally entitled to vote in the city, then so was eve-
ryone else who was affected by the city's actions; 369 the constitutional
entitlement had to stop somewhere, and the city's geographical bound-
ary was the line suggested by prior cases. 370 The majority opinion ex-
pressed no hostility to enfranchisement of interested nonresidents, but
denied their right to the franchise. 37'
These examples suggest that the Constitution does not provide a
single "conception of a political community" that uniquely determines
the electorate of each governmental unit, resulting in a neatly nested
hierarchy of political communities, towns within counties within states
within a nation. Rather, it affords government some discretion to sup-
plement the core electorate with a variety of noninvidiously defined
optional electorates, consisting of categories of persons who have in-
terests implicated in the community's political process. Some of these
examples involve extensions of the franchise expressly justified by the
368. 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
369. Id. at 69-70. This is the same caricaturing argument against a "democracy of the af-
fected" that we have seen employed by German opponents of alien suffrage. See supra note 125
and accompanying text.
Interestingly, Justice Rehnquist had symmetrically employed this argument against residents
and in favor of landowners in an earlier case involving a special-purpose district. See Salyer
Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 730-31 (1973). The special-
purpose district cases form a different line. See sources cited supra note 362.
370. 439 U.S. at 69-70.
371. I do not consider it likely that the present Court would be so squeamish about selective
enfranchisement of nonresidents that it would go even further and hold that only an extension of
the region within which voters must reside is permissible. If this were to happen, much of my
discussion of optional electorates in American constitutional law would be wrong.
[Vol. 13:259
Alien Suffrage in Germany and the U.S.
optional voters' need to protect their interests; in other instances, the
courts have more ambiguously asserted that the interests provide a
sufficient justification for enfranchising the optional voters.
The resulting variation in electorates necessitates a fragmented and
fluid account of the People as a political agent. This should not be
surprising, given the complex federal and territorial structure of the
United States. The presidential electorate is not the same as the con-
gressional electorate; the congressional electorate is not the sum of the
state electorates; and a state's electorate need not be the sum of the
electorates of its political subdivisions. The definitions of the individ-
ual electorates will also vary over time, in response to perceptions of a
particular extension's necessity and drawbacks. In some instances,
such as a state's amendment of its own electoral laws, supplementation
takes the form of a self-extension by the prior electorate, and the ad-
ded members would be entitled to a vote (direct or indirect) on a fu-
ture proposal for its repeal; in other instances, such as a state's
adoption of local government laws, the extension may be imposed on
the community from above, and the added members may have no elec-
toral influence on its continuation.
Although the political activity of the core may be seen as the self-
determination of a previously identified collectivity, the participation
of optional electors appears to have a more individualist basis. This
latter characterization contrasts with the conclusions reached by
Frank Michelman in a recent study of Supreme Court opinions involv-
ing claims of unconstitutional exclusion from the core electorate;
Michelman found in these cases evidence that U.S. constitutional law
conceives of politics as a dialogic process having constitutive signifi-
cance for the identity of its participants, rather than being instrumen-
tally valued as a means for protecting prepolitical interests.37 2 My
purpose here is not to criticize his analyses,3 73 but to emphasize the
contrary impression created by cases involving claims of dilution of
the core electorate by enfranchisement of optional voters. A system
that treats a particular individual's inclusion in the electorate as op-
tional, subject to the largely unfettered discretion of a majority to
withdraw the franchise later,3 74 would seem not to be basing that indi-
vidual's enfranchisement on a view of her right to vote in that commu-
372. Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument.
Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443 (1989).
373. But see Baker, supra note 343, for alternative analyses.
374. This discretion is still subject to the constitutional rules that govern distribution of
nonfundamental goods. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.) (con-
victed felon disqualification scheme invidiously motivated by desire to disenfranchise black vot-
ers violates equal protection).
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nity as constitutive of personal identity. Similarly, permitting
peripheral groups to be provisionally enfranchised in order to protect
identifiable interests suggests an instrumental valuation of their mem-
bers' political participation.
2. Aliens as Optional Electors
We are now ready to inquire into the consistency of alien suffrage,
apart from its historical pedigree, with generally operative principles
of U.S. constitutional law. The preceding discussion shows that the
fact that resident aliens375 are not constitutionally guaranteed the right
to vote does not in itself mean that enfranchising them would be con-
stitutionally impermissible. Resident aliens certainly have the types of
interests that have justified inclusion of other groups in optional elec-
torates. An individual has a strong interest in having a say in the
adoption of rules that will govern her conduct, regardless of whether
she is a member in the fullest sense of the political community. When
the rules of community governance are being worked out in the con-
text of an adjudicatory proceeding directed at an individual, including
a nonresident or an alien, the individual even has a constitutional right
to participate under the Due Process Clause, which serves dignitary
interests in self-determination as well as instrumental interests in as-
suring accuracy.376 If a property owner who resides in another state
has an interest sufficient to support optional enfranchisement, then the
same must be true of an alien who resides in the jurisdiction. More
compellingly, the enfranchisement may be intended to protect alien
residents against hostile government action;377 U.S. history offers am-
ple reason for concern that their interests may be systematically disfa-
vored in a political process that excludes them. The question, then, is
whether something peculiar about their status disqualifies resident
aliens from becoming an optional electorate.
Three interrelated concerns need to be addressed. First, the U.S.
375. I will limit the discussion to aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, whose
lawful domicile in the United States corresponds nicely to the tradition that citizens must reside
in a community to be in its core electorate. The U.S. system of admission for permanent resi-
dence, with some exceptions, largely avoids the embarrassment that the German system of re-
quiring repeated renewal of a residence permit causes for proponents of alien suffrage trying to
identify the class of aliens to be enfranchised.
376. See, e.g., TRINE, supra note 232, at 666; Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due
Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search
of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 49-52 (1976). Resident aliens have also routinely
been afforded the opportunity to participate in administrative rulemaking procedures, both at the
agency and the judicial review levels.
377. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (identifying protection against discrimi-
nation as one rationale for upholding congressional enfranchisement of citizens not literate in
English).
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conception of popular sovereignty may make citizenship in the nation
an essential precondition to voting at all levels. Second, state en-
franchisement of aliens may represent a trespass against federal pow-
ers. Third, some feature of alienage may unavoidably disqualify a
person from participation in the political community. I will argue
here that the U.S. constitutional tradition has drawn on more than one
vision of democracy, and is not committed to a version that would
forbid alien suffrage.
As far as the U.S. conception of popular sovereignty is concerned,
the preceding discussion of the ideology of alien suffrage indicates a
broad spectrum of opinions. The German debate should alert us to
the distinction between a liberal interpretation of popular sovereignty
as a vehicle for personal self-determination founded on the individual
and communitarian interpretations of popular sovereignty as a vehicle
for collective self-determination, which may be founded in nationalism
or in some other theory of the right collectivity. Although popular
sovereignty is largely a theory of the ultimate source of political
power, rather than a recipe for the structuring of individual govern-
ment institutions, a nationalist interpretation of popular sovereignty
could justify the conclusion that the people should never share their
political power with nonnationals. 378 Both the nationalist-communi-
tarian and liberal-individualist perspectives have been represented in
the United States, outside the alien suffrage debate as well as inside
it.379 Downes v. Bidwell 380 could be cited as an apotheosis of an An-
glo-American nationalist popular sovereignty. Scott v. Sandford did
much the same for a white nationalist popular sovereignty, although
its dicta simultaneously accept alien suffrage.38' The optional en-
franchisement of citizens with interests to protect, however, in accord-
378. A nonnationalist communitarian interpretation should also be possible, and'appears to
inform Prof. Zuleeg's argument that resident aliens are part of the same Lebens- und Schick-
salsgemeinschaft (that is, community living together and sharing a common fate) as citizens, and
therefore are included in the Volk. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. I imagine differ-
ent formulations of such an interpretation would imply different criteria for becoming a member
of the community. I will concentrate here, however, on the implications of the individualist
interpretation, which has played a significant role in the enfranchisement of optional electorates.
379. For examples inside the alien suffrage debate, see supra notes 269-72, 276-79, and ac-
companying text.
380. 182 U.S. 244 (1901). Downes was the most important of the so-called Insular Cases,
which held that constitutional limitations on federal power do not always apply to territories
acquired by the United States. One major purpose of the doctrine was to enable the nation to
acquire an overseas empire without admitting its new subjects to citizenship; this was explicitly
justified on racial grounds. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 325, at 957-64. A similar example,
decided several years earlier by a similarly divided Court, is Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698 (1893), upholding a sweeping federal power to deport resident aliens. See also Smith,
supra note 312, at 242-44 & n.13.
381. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). Chief Justice Taney contrasted white women and chil-
dren, who were members of the sovereign political community without being entitled to vote,
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ance with the characterization of the right to vote as "a fundamental
political right, because preservative of all rights, 38 2 illustrates the
influence of the individualist interpretation of popular sovereignty. So
does the historic rallying cry against "taxation without
representation."
The history of federalism supports the view that the Constitution
does not make national citizenship a prerequisite for voting in the
states. The Constitution directly addresses suffrage in the states only
by means of the antidiscrimination amendments and the republican
form of government clause. The doctrine that states may have "citi-
zens" defined as such solely for internal purposes, employed in Scott v.
Sandford to explain away voting by free blacks, has survived despite
its association with that tainted decision. The citizenship clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not even exhaustively specify the per-
sons who may be considered citizens of the nation, let alone of a state.
Though I am trying not to rely on the historical fact of alien voting, I
think it is fair to point out the parallel fact that different states adopted
different policies on the enfranchisement of Native Americans who
lacked national citizenship.383 In short, popular sovereignty in the
United States has been a flexible notion, which has not restricted polit-
ical power by a rigid definition of the "People," and certainly not by
the legal category of national citizenship.
With this in mind, it also cannot be said that enfranchisement of
lawful resident aliens infringes the express federal power over naturali-
zation or the implied federal power over immigration. National citi-
zenship involves more than the right to vote in a state, and a state that
enfranchises one of its alien residents has not purported to naturalize
that resident. It is probably true, however, that modem constitutional
law would uphold an explicit congressional prohibition on alien vot-
ing. Although the infringement of state sovereignty would have trou-
bled earlier generations, the states have shrunk sufficiently to enable
the Supreme Court to view the prohibition as within the "plenary"
federal power to set the conditions on which aliens will be admitted to
U.S. territory. The entering wedge for the prohibition might well be
the need to restrict the political activities of enemy aliens in time of
war, and the usual deferential review of federal alien policy for "for-
with aliens and free blacks, who in some states were entitled to vote without being (in his view)
members of the sovereign political community.
382. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
562 (1964).
383. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. VII, § 1; MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. VII, § 1;
N.D. CONST. of 1889, art. 5, § 121(3); WIS. CONST. of 1848, art. III, § 1.
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eign relations" reasons would accomplish the rest. 384
An examination of declarant alien suffrage illustrates the absence
of an inherent barrier to an alien's participation in the political com-
munity. Regardless of whether the state adopted declarant aliens as
local state citizens, full enfranchisement of declarant aliens repre-
sented an admission to the active political community of the state on
the basis of mutual consent and residence. Declarant aliens had not
yet been admitted to the overarching national political community,
and therefore lacked rights of interstate mobility as well as rights of
constitutional protection against deportation by the federal govern-
ment.385 But declarant aliens were "on a citizenship track"; 38 6 they
had expressed their desire for national citizenship, and, given the
broad eligibility for naturalization as of right, it was largely a matter of
time before they attained it.387 As between the state and the voter,
both a subjective and an objective political bond existed. It was not an
"inescapable" political bond, but neither was the bond between a state
and its other citizens.
In this regard, even some communitarians could consider unen-
franchised declarant aliens (and their contemporary equivalents 38 ) as
passive members of the political community, like adolescents, rather
than as outsiders. U.S. immigration policy has imposed the residence
period preceding naturalization for educational as well as probation-
ary purposes.389 Thus, unenfranchised declarant aliens residing in the
community already looked more like prospectively active members
384. See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 1984 Sup. Cr. REV. 255. David Martin has suggested to me a different
route; if the naturalization clause supports some implied Congressional power to regulate the
consequences of naturalization, regulation of voting by unnaturalized aliens could be within Con-
gress's authority.
385. The republican-style objection, which claims that aliens' reliance on the federal govern-
ment for continuation of their status demonstrates that they lack independence and therefore
cannot be trusted with the franchise, seems perverse by modern American standards.
386. Cf Rosberg, supra note 214, at 1110 (referring to all resident aliens).
387. I do not mean to ignore the racial qualifications imposed for most of United States
history. The point is that naturalization generally followed as a matter of course for those who
were not openly disqualified from the outset, then as it does now.
388. As previously mentioned, the declaration of intent was eliminated as an element of natu-
ralization procedure in 1952. The 1952 Act retained a procedure for filing declarations of intent,
apparently because some states extended favorable treatment to declarant aliens. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1445(f) (1988). The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 gave new federal relevance
to the declaration in connection with protection against employment discrimination on grounds
of alienage, which was extended only to "intending citizens" who had completed a declaration of
intent. See Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 102(a), 100 Stat. 3374 (1986) (provision formerly codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3)). The documentation requirement was repealed in 1990. See Immigration
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 533, 104 Stat. 4978.
389. Immigrants were thought by the national majority to lack exposure not only to the local
language and customs, but to the local political institutions, whether the American style of de-
mocracy or democracy itself. See, e.g., KETrNER, supra note 215, at 237-42.
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than like prospective members. Unlike citizen-members, 390 they could
be expelled from membership and territory, 391 but revocable member-
ship is not a contradiction in terms.
Looking beyond declarant aliens, some resident aliens are ineligible
or unwilling to naturalize. The moral status of naturalization criteria
- whether a country should regard itself as free to adopt whatever
naturalization policy it pleases, or whether a country that invites long-
term settlement of resident aliens may be morally obliged to offer them
citizenship 392 - could be debated, but for present purposes it may be
better to assume arguendo that the U.S. criteria, including the demand
for renunciation of prior nationality, 393 are morally defensible. While
other categories could be considered, the most significant question
would seem to be whether a state may extend voting rights to an alien
who has freely rejected an opportunity to exchange a prior allegiance
for exclusive allegiance to the United States.3 94 (I will call such an
person a "nondeclarant alien," although it is not simply the opposite
of being a declarant alien.)
The political bond between a nondeclarant alien and the state is
less strong than in the case of the declarant alien. The alien has volun-
tarily chosen to reside in the state, and (under current law) 395 has been
390. This is an overconcession, since it is modern constitutional law that places severe limits
on the government's ability to denationalize its citizens. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253
(1967), overruling Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958). But see Fedorenko v. United States,
449 U.S. 490 (1981) (withdrawal of defectively acquired naturalization); Rogers v. Bellei, 401
U.S. 815 (1971) (permitting "condition subsequent" on citizenship of child born to citizen par-
ents abroad). See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 MICH. L.
REV. 1471 (1986). The German Basic Law expressly forbids involuntary denationalization, GG
art. 16(1), but denationalization resulting from naturalization in another country is regarded as
voluntary. See Judgment of June 22, 1990, Bundersverfassungsgericht (Kammer), 43 NJW 2193
(1990).
391. Under U.S. law, resident aliens are statutorily subject to deportation for a variety of
forms of misconduct, see 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(l)(E), (2), (3), (4) (1988), or even misfortune, see 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(D), (5) (1988).
392. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 60-61 (1983); Herman R. van Gun-
steren, Admission to Citizenship, 98 ETHICS 731, 737-38 (1988).
393. Some critics of German naturalization policy, however, have maintained that its de-
mand that aliens divest themselves of their former nationality as a precondition to naturalization
is unduly harsh. See, e.g., Groth, Doppelstaatsangeh"rigkeit mit aktivem und ruhendem Tel -
eine Perspektive?, in AUFENTHALT - NIEDERLASSUNG - EINBORGERUNG: HOHENHEIMER TAGE
ZUM AUSLANDERRECHT 1986, at 245 (1986); Hailbronner, supra note 11, at 78-79 (rejecting this
criticism). Germany even extends this requirement to children born within its territory to alien
parents, unlike the United States, where such children are usually dual nationals at birth.
394. It should be recognized, however, that some immigrants who would otherwise natural-
ize may be deterred by the process itself or by the institutions that administer it. See, e.g., David
S. North, The Long Gray Welcome: A Study of the American Naturalization Program, 21 INT'L
MIGRATION REV. 311 (1985).
395. A crucial turning point in United States immigration policy was reached with the impo-
sition of numerical limits on permanent immigration in the 1920s. I do not want to place too
much argumentative weight on the selectivity of the government's process for admitting immi-
grants, especially because it varies with the category of immigration and over time. Compare T.
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admitted for the express purpose of living in the country indefinitely,
after going through a complex administrative process. Opinions may
differ as to whether the alien has "disappointed" the country by decid-
ing not to naturalize; certainly nothing in the immigration laws makes
desire for naturalization a criterion of admission or failure to natural-
ize a ground of deportation. 396 The alien has voluntarily submitted to
the state's governance for the duration of her residence in most re-
spects as if she were a citizen. 397 Under U.S. law, all aliens owe alle-
giance to the United States during their residence here. 398 U.S. law
has always recognized resident aliens as at least passive members of
the community to the extent of including them - in contrast to "Indi-
ans not taxed" - in the basis of apportionment. 399
Both declarant and nondeclarant aliens are normally also members
of a foreign political community - and not merely another political
community, like a sister state. But even national political communi-
ties need not have mutually exclusive memberships. A state could
confer its local citizenship on a declarant alien without demanding the
immediate renunciation of her prior citizenship. U.S. nationality law
itself is much more tolerant of multiple nationality than the German
legal system, which displays an obsessive concern with the "evils" of
dual nationality.4m U.S. naturalization practice developed at a period
when most of the relevant countries of emigration did not recognize a
right of expatriation, 4° 1 and the constitutional principle ofjus soli citi-
Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMEN-
TARY 9, 15 n. 31 (1990) with Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §§ 131, 132, 162(a),
104 Stat. 4978 (nonselective lottery systems for "diversity immigrants").
396. See Aleinikoff, supra note 395, at 16 (citing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
585 (1952)).
397. These are among the standard arguments for considering resident aliens members of the
national community. See Aleinikoff, supra note 395, at 23; David A. Martin, Due Process and
Membership in the National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 165,
201-03 (1983). Rosberg, supra note 214, at 1129-36, uses similar arguments to support the
stronger conclusion that aliens are constitutionally entitled to vote.
398. See, e.g., Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. 147 (1873).
399. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. XIV, § 2; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 395, at
21; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Census and Undocumented Aliens: A Constitutional Account, 33
LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES 26 (Winter 1989). In the debates leading up to the Fourteenth
Amendment, Roscoe Conkling opposed a proposal to change the basis of apportionment to vot-
ers, on the grounds that it would give states an undue incentive to enfranchise aliens. CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 356-57 (1866).
400. See, e.g., Hailbronner, supra note 11, at 77-78; Helmut Rittstieg, Doppelte Staats-
angehdrigkeit im VOlkerrecht, 43 NJW 1401 (1990) (critical of this concern). A valuable window
into German conceptions of nationality is provided by the Federal Constitutional Court's opin-
ion invalidating on sex discrimination grounds the statute denying German nationality to chil-
dren born to German mothers and their alien husbands. See Judgment of May 21, 1974,
Bundersverfassungsgericht, 37 BVerfGE 217.
401. After the Civil War, the United States was able to negotiate a series of treaties to assure
recognition of the changed nationality of naturalized citizens. See BORCHARD, supra note 221, at
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zenship provides further opportunity for overlap. Today, constitu-
tional principles can even require the government to permit a U.S.
citizen to acquire a foreign nationality by naturalization without relin-
quishing her U.S. citizenship.4°2
Nonetheless, a nondeclarant alien has decided not to undertake the
full commitment entailed in a change of citizenship. Unwillingness to
renounce a prior citizenship may reflect a wide variety of factors ° 3
Sometimes unfavorable economic consequences under the former
country's law, such as forfeiture of accrued pension rights or ineligibil-
ity to inherit from relatives, may be dominant. Political exiles may
wish to preserve the option of return in case of an unlikely change in
the character of the regime. Some business immigrants use the United
States as a base for international activities, while maintaining close ties
with their homelands. Some immigrants expect ultimately to retire to
the land of their childhood. Others may have no intention to make
practical use of their prior citizenship, but view it as a part of their
psychological identity that they are reluctant to renounce. Still others
may find a U.S. identity repugnant, and perhaps would not take it on
even if they could maintain both nationalities.
Various communitarian theories may treat some or all of these rea-
sons for failing to naturalize as fatal barriers to political participation.
Communitarians may, however, be reluctant to require lifelong com-
mitment to a community as a minimum condition for political partici-
pation. An immigrant's decision to maintain Italian nationality in
order to preserve the right to live in Tuscany if she survives to retire-
ment age may be no more disqualifying than a New Yorker's intention
to retire someday to Arizona, or to emigrate. U.S. constitutional law
does not treat the latter types of mobility as valid reasons for disen-
franchising citizens. In the liberal tradition, participation and emigra-
tion are continuing choices.
From an individualist perspective, the nondeclarant alien's desire
to maintain exclusive permanent allegiance to another nation is not
inherently disqualifying, but rather creates instrumental reasons for
withholding the franchise.404 It may be more or less probable that the
548-49. Even today, United States naturalization law requires only renunciation of other alle-
giances, see 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a)(2) (1988), unlike German naturalization law, which demands
legally effective abandonment of a former nationality absent exceptional circumstances. See
HAILBRONNER, supra note 53, at 1055-57.
402. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980) (elaborating standard of voluntary relin-
quishment of citizenship); Parness v. Shultz, 669 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1987) (applying standard in
naturalization context); 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1988) (codifying standard).
403. See, e.g., William S. Bernard, Cultural Determinants of Naturalization, 1 AM. Soc.
REV. 943 (1936); DeSipio, supra note 323.
404. One instrumental reason sometimes mentioned is the creation of incentives for naturali-
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alien's political participation would be guided by an identification with
the other nation's interests, rather than concern for the welfare of the
community in which she resides. Undoubtedly this perception has
formed an important part of the reason why states have chosen to
deny aliens voting rights.4° 5 This choice may.reflect an understanda-
ble reliance on objective rather than subjective indicia.406 But as an
empirical matter, it must be admitted that using nondeclarant alien
status as a proxy for insufficient concern is extremely overinclusive
and underinclusive. American tradition does not demand of citizens a
chauvinistic identification with the national interest to the exclusion of
all other considerations, nor does the Constitution permit disen-
franchisement of dual nationals, citizens with strong ethnic identifica-
tions, or former Peace Corps workers. 4°7
A state may nonetheless conclude that under currently prevailing
conditions, 4°' enfranchising both declarant and nondeclarant aliens
would not create a risk of harm that outweighs the benefits to be
achieved by including them in the state or local electorate. The state
might base this judgment on a variety of factors, including what it
knows regarding the commitment of its alien residents, their relative
number, the disparateness of their national allegiances, and the rela-
tive absence of opportunities for a conflict of national interests. 4° 9 Be-
zation. But cf Peter H. Schuck, Membership in the Liberal Polity: The Devaluation of American
Citizenship, 3 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 6 (1989) (criticizing this argument). It could hardly be
argued, however, that the Constitution compels this or any other strategy for inducing otherwise
reluctant individuals to naturalize.
405. I owe thanks to Louis Henkin for driving home the point that this argument would not
justify withholding the vote from stateless alien residents who declined on grounds of conscience
to take on United States citizenship. Conceivably the government would assert its inability to
distinguish such residents from stateless aliens who identified with their former country, though
not its current regime.
406. There are serious dangers in delegating to election officials the power to hold periodic
individualized hearings on a voter's commitment to the welfare of the local community. Even if
officials could be trusted not to make partisan or other invidious use of their authority, it would
be difficult to specify what evidence of concern for another nation's interests could rebut a voter's
profession of local commitment. Thus, broad classifications turning on status or oaths, which
would be impermissible as applied to members of the core electorate, may be the state's only
option.
407. Cf Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-56 (1972) ("'[D]ifferences of opinion' may
not be the basis for excluding any group or person from the franchise.")
408. If the circumstances change, the decision can be reconsidered. Of course, any political
issue is subject to reconsideration at some level. Calling aliens an optional electorate means that
the federal Constitution in its current form neither compels nor prohibits their enfranchisement.
State constitutions, as we have seen, often specify voter qualifications, so that extension or with-
drawal of alien suffrage could require a constitutional amendment at the state level. Alterna-
tively, a state constitution might leave the issue to be decided by ordinary legislation.
409. Such opportunities may arise particularly rarely in local elections. Once a state has
made resident aliens eligible to vote in state legislative elections, the Constitution entitles them to
vote for Senators and Representatives, but it also bars them from running for Congress or the
Presidency themselves.
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cause the withholding of the franchise is instrumentally rather than
intrinsically justified, nothing in the Constitution prevents the citi-
zenry from deciding that its goals would be better met by inclusion
rather than exclusion of alien voters, just as nothing in the Constitu-
tion prevents them from deciding to accept the "risks" involved in
enfranchising persons convicted of crime, nonresident property own-
ers, and citizens not literate in English.
Thus a state's power to include declarant aliens within its political
community is not simply an archaic survival. It is consistent with
broad themes of U.S. constitutional law, particularly the inclusive and
rights-oriented themes of constitutional modernism. I have addressed
this question primarily as it relates to full enfranchisement in the state
electorate, which carries with it federal voting rights. A more re-
stricted grant of voting rights at the municipal level or in special-pur-
pose elections (where even corporations sometimes vote410) should be
permissible afortiori. Unlike the German Basic Law, the U.S. Consti-
tution does not expressly address the structure of local government,
and local units are not considered "sovereign" in the same sense as the
states.411
B. Alienage as a Legal Status
With its thorough ventilation of reasons why exclusion of aliens
from voting could be regarded as essential, the juristic debate on alien
suffrage also affords a rich collection of data for examining the legal
image of the alien. Before concluding this article, I will discuss two
examples of the ways that the legal discourse of alienage can conceal
realities. The first example concerns alienage as a base for erecting
legal fictions. The second concerns the ability of status discourse to
serve as a screen for more narrowly directed prejudice.
The argument about "inescapability" made against alien suffrage
in the FRG is a good starting point. 41 2 To recapitulate, aliens were
widely considered disqualified from political participation because
their international mobility took away their incentive to vote respon-
sibly and prevented them from feeling implicated in the fate of the
polity. Aliens could flee the consequences of improvident political de-
cisions by returning to their homelands, but Germans had no such
410. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 730 (1973)
(observing, but not adjudicating, this circumstance).
411. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I - The Structure of Local Government Law,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 85-99 (1990); Gerald L. Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Pro-
tection, and Self-Determination, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 303-05 (1987).
412. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
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guaranteed refuge.41 3 Therefore, it was argued, no alien may vote.
As the proponents of alien suffrage were quick to point out, the
description of reality on which this argument rests is a gross simplifi-
cation. Germans have a constitutional right to leave the country.414
Many Germans have more than one nationality, and the number of
dual nationals was increased in 1974 by the Federal Constitutional
Court's holding that German mothers with alien husbands must have
the same capacity to confer German nationality on their children as
German fathers with alien wives.4 5 Status-Germans may have only a
foreign nationality. The argument of mobility rings particularly
hollow in the context of the European Community, since Germans
have broad rights to settle within the territory of any Member State.
Additionally, unlike non-Community nationals, they can reside
outside Germany without abandoning the right to return.
Conversely, alien residents may have no option of returning to
their homeland, in theory or in practice. Some resident aliens are
stateless. Others are recognized refugees. Civil disorders and eco-
nomic collapse may make the country of nationality inhospitable to
the alien resident. Aliens who were born and educated in Germany
may have no acquaintance with the language, culture and customs of
their country of nationality.
Confronted with these counterarguments, opponents of alien suf-
frage responded implicitly or explicitly that these factual complexities
were irrelevant. One expert stated with exemplary clarity the method-
ological reason why exceptions could not undermine the rule:
A discussion of status cannot be contested with atypical instances. A
status is a typifying regulatory complex, which is focused on the concep-
tual form of the normal case. If the assignment of status does not corre-
spond to this conceptual form in concreto (as in the case of an alien who
was born in Germany and is professionally and familially integrated ex-
clusively into German society), then this gives no grounds for calling
into question the legal position of aliens, but rather only grounds for the
assumption that in the particular case the status of alien does not do
justice to the facts and naturalization is called for.41 6
In other words, alienage is a legal status category, for which stereo-
413. One author, without apparent irony, invoked "the difficulties that Germans had in find-
ing a refuge in the years 1933-1945" as evidence of the inescapability factor that contributes to
making constitutionally unalterable the principle that only Germans can vote in state and federal
elections. Ruland, supra note 58, at 11 (author's translation).
414. This is not explicitly stated in the Basic Law, but is included in the general liberty
protected by Article 2. Judgment of Jan. 16, 1957, Bundesverfassungsgericht, 6 BVerfGE 32.
415. Judgment of May 21, 1974, Bundersverfassungsgericht, 37 BVerfGE 217.
416. Die staatsrechtliche Stellung der Auslnder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Aus-
sprache und Schlussworte), 32 VERbFFENTLICHUNGEN DER VEREINIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN
STAATSRECHTSLEHRER 113-14 (1974) (remarks of Prof. Isensee) (author's translation); see also
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typed analysis is appropriate. How else could one account for the ar-
gument that young women, born to Turkish parents in Germany, who
have grown up and assimiliated in German society, cannot be permit-
ted to vote because (1) these young women are still Turks; (2) as
Turks, they have the right to return to their ancestral villages, and
therefore lack the incentive to vote responsibly in German elections;417
and (3) Turks do not have the same compensating civic duties as
Germans, because Germany does not draft Turkish men?418
Some generalizations about differences between citizens and resi-
dent aliens may have a moderate degree of statistical validity. A coun-
try's immigration system may, for example, operate in a manner that
produces a resident alien population less fluent on average in the domi-
nant local language than the citizen population, or less committed to
certain dominant local values. If a court were doing nothing more
than seeking a rational basis to support a legislature's reservation of
preferential access to positions of public authority to citizens, such
generalizations might suffice.
As arguments for constitutionally prohibiting the legislature from
ever permitting an alien to exercise public authority, however, these
generalizations take on the character of disabling legal fictions. Legal
fictions are no novelty to U.S. immigration law, where they have tradi-
tionally been employed to enhance the flexibility of national sover-
eignty.419 The particular usage made of legal fictions in the German
alien suffrage debate nonetheless seems distinctive. Some opponents
sought to elevate legal fictions to unalterable higher truths that would
deprive both the legislature and the process of constitutional amend-
ment of the power to improve the situation of immigrants. This de-
gree of attachment to a concededly inaccurate mental picture, to the
extent that it resulted solely from legal habits of mind, is a phenome-
non to wonder over.
A similarly powerful legal fiction, though less of an object for won-
Ruland, supra note 58, at 11 ("It is in the nature of a typification to be refutable in individual
cases.") (author's translation).
417. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
418. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
419. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 24-27 (1984) (discussing fiction that deportation is not punishment); Ibrahim J. Wani,
Truth, Strangers, and Fiction: The Illegitimate Uses of Legal Fiction in Immigration Law, 11
CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 89-92, 104-06 (1989) (discussing entry fiction and fiction that deportation
is not punishment). In Anglo-American law, naturalization, as its name implies, was originally a
fiction. See, e.g., KETrNER, supra note 215, at 32-33 (naturalized aliens deemed to have been
born as subjects); State v. Commissioners of Roads, 3 S.C.L. (2 Brev.) 667 (Const. Ct. 1809)
(even if only citizens could hold office, officer naturalized during term of office would be eligible
because naturalization operates retrospectively to time of birth).
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der, arose in the argument that aliens could not vote because they owe
an all-purpose "duty of loyalty" to their countries of nationality.
Although this duty went beyond concrete legal commands and carried
no concrete legal sanction, it facilitated the argument that aliens dif-
fered decisively from Germans because their status entailed an inabil-
ity to place the German national interest foremost. The authors could
even phrase this argument in a wording that connoted sympathy for
the conflicted position in which aliens would inevitably be placed by
the conferral of suffrage. The institutionalized assumption of disloy-
alty to Germany could also be distinguished from the empirically ob-
servable concern for the interests of another country that frequently
influences the voting choices of naturalized immigrants (and other
citizens).
Ascribing inherent disloyalty to aliens may be more than just poor
legal reasoning. The divided loyalty of foreigners is a standard figure
of xenophobic rhetoric, and it naturally raises the concern whether the
.dividing line between realism about the Nation-State and a generalized
antiforeign animus has been crossed. That some arguments against
immigrants' rights, in Germany as well as in the United States, reflect
overactive national feeling is, however, too obvious to require much
discussion. It is perhaps more useful to recall a different parallel, the
accusations of divided loyalty specifically directed at Catholic immi-
grants (naturalized as well as unnaturalized) in nineteenth century
America.420 When a German author asserts that admitting unin-
tended immigrants to participation in government would amount to a
"conquest," 421 one may suspect that it is not the Danes he has in
mind; when the same author expressly doubts that Islamic voters can
be persuaded that a party identified as Christian would represent their
interests, 422 one may suspect that more than just excessive party zeal
has affected his analysis.
As the U.S. experience confirms, the discourse of legal status per-
mits coded discussions whose true referents may be not only the native
and the foreign, but, worse, the particular foreign group that is the
principal focus of current hostility. Earlier in this century, U.S. law
refined this technique with the legal category of "alien ineligible to
citizenship," interpreted as alien racially ineligible to citizenship, and
420. See, e.g., BENNETr, supra note 237, at 39-41.
421. See Quaritsch, supra note 58, at 15 (Landnahme).
422. Id. at 13. The reference is to one or both of the conservative parties, Chancellor Kohl's
Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian partner, the Christian Social Union.
Michigan Journal of International Law
meaning Japanese. 423
Theorizing about the characteristics of noncitizens is more accept-
able in polite society today than disparaging particular nationalities.
Indeed, we are all aliens when we travel outside our own country. As
a result, it is easier to say that aliens cannot vote responsibly on mu-
nicipal housing policies because they can "escape" the financial bur-
den resulting from improvident expenditures than to say that one does
not place much value on making decent housing available to Turks,
who should really go home anyway. It is easier to attribute to Euro-
pean intellectual history the notion that children born to alien parents
in the FRG are nonetheless by definition outside the "community of
fate" than to claim that Turks are unassimilable due to their un-Ger-
man religion, diet, and customs. If the result of phrasing the argument
in this euphemistic manner is that Swiss technicians in Bavaria are
barred from voting while children of mixed German and Turkish par-
entage are not, the approximation may be an acceptable substitute.
I do not want to claim that the juristic analyses cited in this article
usually, or even frequently, can be translated in this manner. But
some of them do illustrate the fact that, under the right social circum-
stances, the technical distinction between citizen and alien lends itself
to roughly targeted discussion, and can facilitate the implementation
of roughly targeted policies. Discrimination against aliens as a class
occurs not only because upswellings of nationalist sentiment can pro-
duce hostility to noncitizens per se, but also because, lacking the right
to vote, they may be more easily sacrificed to confer a kind of respecta-
bility on measures aimed at a particular foreign group.
CONCLUSION
The debates on alien suffrage within the United States and Ger-
many illustrate the contrast between a liberal interpretation of popular
sovereignty as reconciling individual self-determination with the need
for collective action and a nationalist-communitarian interpretation of
popular sovereignty as a form of collective self-determination.
Although some dicta of the U.S. Supreme Court may suggest accept-
ance of the nationalist-communitarian perspective, in practice the fed-
eral Constitution has permitted Congress and the states to act in
accordance with the liberal aspect of their political heritage. The right
to have the right to vote is reserved to citizens, but the right to vote
can be shared with others.
423. Compare Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923) with Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
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The Federal Constitutional Court, in contrast, has recently con-
firmed the prevailing opinion that the FRG's Basic Law impliedly
adopted a nationalist-communitarian version reflecting the historical
development of German Statehood. Alien suffrage is not compatible
with democracy within the meaning of the Basic Law. The German
People have forbidden themselves to share their political power,
although the Court has fortunately rejected the claim that the People
lack the power to repeal this prohibition. Given the population struc-
ture of the FRG, and especially the inheritability of alien status, this
resolution of the debate is regrettable. In the short run, the disloca-
tions of German unification will only increase resident aliens' need for
protection, and it remains to be seen what alternative steps will be
taken to provide it.
